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ABSTRACT 
RESOURCEFUL FINANCING BY NEW FIRMS: 
THE USE OF MULTIPLE CREDIT SOURCES 
John M. Mueller 
November 15,2012 
New firms face financial constraints that could hinder firm performance. Yet founders 
exhibit persistence and resourcefulness in building their new ventures and finding solutions 
to their financial constraints. The use of financial theories that focus on financing costs, profit 
maximization, and valuation of firms draws attention to the question of whether 
entrepreneurs increase survival and growth prospects for their firms through resourcefulness 
in financing (e.g. using multiple credit sources) or instead make suboptimal financing 
decisions (i.e. when being resourceful in their financing) that actually decrease the 
probability of new venture survival and high growth rates. 
My dissertation examines if being resourceful in financing in the form of multiple 
credit source usage is beneficial to the performance (survival and growth) of new firms. A 
theory of resourceful financing by new firms using multiple credit sources is developed 
based upon financial constraints, credit rationing, and capital structure theories (pecking 
order theory and financial growth cycle theory). The study incorporates a six year 
longitudinal design and mixed statistical methods to test hypotheses and perform sensitivity 
analyses to better understand this specific form of resourceful financing activities of new 
firms. 
vi 
The results suggest that the use of multiple credit sources is positively related to 
growth rates for firms that are growing above average, thus supporting the theoretical 
framework proposed in the study with boundary conditions. However, for firms that are 
growing below average, multiple credit source usage is found to be negatively associated 
with the survival rates. This suggests that founders should be resourceful in their financing 
options only when they are growing quickly and they should not use multiple credit sources 
when they are not growing or as a means to get out of a dire financial situation. The use of 
multiple credit sources cannot be used by creditors as a signal to determine the survival and 
growth of firms during their early years of operations. It is only after the third or fourth year 
that the use of multiple credit sources provides a positive or negative signal to external 
entities such as creditors. Limitations to the study apply. 
vii 
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Financial capital is one of the fundamental resources needed to start and operate a 
firm (A. C. Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994), and is a main factor in the performance 
of new firms 1 (e.g. Cressy, 2006a, 2006b; Musso & Schiavo, 2008; Oliveira & Fortunato, 
2006; Parker & Van Praag, 2006). Many founders are personally constrained financially 
when trying to start and operate their firms as they lack personal wealth (e.g. Evans & 
Jovanovic, 1989; Evans & Leighton, 1989; Holtz-Eakin, Jou1faian, & Rosen, I 994a; Lindh & 
Ohlsson, 1996). As a result they look for external funds to survive and grow their venture 
during their early years (Cressy, 2006a, 2006b). Retained earnings (i.e. internally generated 
equity), debt, and external equity are all forms of financing that a firm could use to finance 
operations. New firms have access to only a limited number of external funding options, be 
it debt or equity, early in their lives. It is only as they age that new firms gain access to more 
external funding options, giving the firms options to choose from to fund their operations 
(Berger & Udell, 1998). 
It has been suggested that firms use a pecking order to finance their operations, 
choosing to first use retained earnings, then debt, and lastly external equity (Myers & Majluf, 
I New firms are defined as firms that have recently been started by an individual (i.e. a founder) or group of 
individuals (i.e. founding team). The new firm can either be unincorporated or incorporated (i.e. sole-
proprietorship, LLC, partnership, S-corporation, or C-corporation). In this study, new firms are not nascent 
ventures, in which the business is only an idea and no activities have been embarked upon to call it a 
"business". 
1984; Myers, 1984). New firms do not generate much, if any, internal equity as retained 
earnings are generated over time by a firm and by default a new firm has not existed long 
enough to have generated any retained earnings. Also, founders find it more difficult to 
quickly convince investors of the value from investing equity in their new firms than 
convincing lenders to provide debt because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems2 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). This is supported empirically, as only 0.03% to 3% 
of new firms receive venture capital funding in any given year (Parker, 2009; Shane, 2008), 
and 3% to 8% of firms receive angel funding in a given year (Mason & Harrison, 2000; Sohl, 
2003). Finally, founders prefer to not share the upside with equity investors if possible 
(Landier & Thesmar, 2009). Thus, debt often becomes the first sizeable financing option 
available to new firms (e.g. T. Bates, 1997; Berger & Udell, 1998; Cosh & Hughes, 1994; 
Cressy, 1996a; M. A. Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
While banks can provide debt to assist new firms to overcome the financial 
constraints they face, they may ration credit to new firms due to information asymmetry 
prevalent in the relationship between borrowers and banks (e.g. Jaffee & Russell, 1976; 
Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Banks, which are financial intermediaries, are used by many firms. 
For credit, new firms tend to approach banks first since founders often have a prior personal 
relationship with a bank and banks (namely, commercial banks) have a strong market 
presence with many outlets (Berger & Udell, 1998). Research suggests that banks have a 
strong ability to gather information and monitor borrowers through relationships and contract 
covenants (e.g. Berger & Udell, 1998; Diamond, 1984, 1991a; Fama, 1985; Ramakrishnan & 
2 Adverse selection is defined as the situation where the "poorer" options (e.g. products, services, etc.) are 
selected due to a lack of information between two parties (i .e. information asymmetry), such that the selecting 
party cannot distinguish between good and bad options. Moral hazard is defined as the situation where a party, 
in maximizing hislher own utility, behaves differently when insulated from risks they would be otherwise not be 
exposed to if they were fully exposed to the risk. 
2 
Thakor, 1984). Even so, infonnation asymmetry could still exist between the banks and new 
finns. This infonnation asymmetry is more prevalent when the finn is small and/or new. 
The infonnation asymmetry prevalent in the relationship between a new finn and its bank is 
magnified because new finns do not have a track record and possess limited collateral, unlike 
small established finns (Cressy, 1996b). This lack of a track record creates an obstacle for 
banks when they attempt to evaluate new finns' ability to service the debt. Even though 
banks have evolved to work successfully with small, established finns, they may have greater 
difficulty accurately detennining which new finns will be able to repay their debt due to high 
infonnation asymmetry prevalent in their relationships with new finns. This is the case even 
when founders share accurate infonnation about the quality of their finns and their abilities, 
commitment, and drive to execute their plans. In addition, founders might not be truthful in 
releasing this infonnation as: a) they have the incentive to overstate their abilities, and/or b) 
they might not be willing to reveal specific infonnation about their innovation since that 
infonnation can be expropriated by outsiders. Thus, banks may ration credit to finns due to 
infonnation asymmetry (Jaffee & Russell, 1976; Jaffee & Stiglitz, 1990; Keeton, 1979; 
Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), and the rationing problem is more prevalent for new finns than older 
finns. 
Credit rationing could inhibit a new finn's growth and survival, since this means that 
banks will not lend money, or will lend less than the optimal amount, to positive net present 
value projects (Becchetti, Garcia, & Trovato, 2011; Jaffee & Russell, 1976; Jaffee & Stiglitz, 
1990; Keeton, 1979; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). With the possibility that creditors ration credit 
and turn down requests for all or part of the requested funds by viable new finns that 
objectively should be able to service the debt, new finns will be less able to successfully 
3 
operate and grow. This suggests that new firms require additional sources of external 
financing when their initial creditor imposes credit limits on them. The inability to obtain 
additional external sources of financing could result in the firm shutting down entirely or 
having its growth hindered. 
However, entrepreneurship research suggests that new firms may continue to survive 
even when rationed credit, since the founders who start new firms tend to be persistent (e.g. 
Astebro, Jeffrey, & Adomdza, 2007; Cardon, Zietsma, Saparito, Matherne, & Davis, 2005; 
Gimeno, Folta, A. C. Cooper, & Woo, 1997; P. Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 
2010; Hamilton, 2000; Sexton & Bowman-Upton, 1991), persevere longer than rational 
decision making models would predict (M. W. Meyer & Zucker, 1989; D. A. Shepherd, 
Wiklund, & Haynie, 2009; Van Witteloostuijn, 1998), and are resourceful3 (Baker & R. E. 
Nelson, 2005; Bhide, 1992; Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008). These character traits suggest that 
founders will look for other funding options to help their firms survive when their firms are 
rationed credit rather than close their firms, or they will settle for their firms being smaller 
than desired. If they look for other funding options, these funding options include 
bootstrapping (Van Auken & Neeley, 1996; Bhide, 1992; Winborg & Landstrom, 2001), 
accessing external equity, or accessing alternative credit sources. 
Research suggests that, before trying to tap into external equity options, new firms 
will exhaust their debt options (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984), with more options 
becoming available as they age (Berger & Udell, 1998). This suggests that new firms will 
examine all of their credit (debt) sources of which they are aware and possibly use more debt 
3 "Resourceful" has several meanings. Resourceful could mean someone who is capable of dealing with 
difficult situations. However, in this study, resourceful refers to wisely using, or using ingeniously, a 
combination of materials that are at hand or are accessible in the environment. Specific to this study, resources 
at hand are credit sources that are available to new firms. A new firm is considered to be more resourceful if it 
takes advantage of a combination of credit sources (i .e. resources) available in their environment. 
4 
options. Different credit instruments include loans, letters of credit, credit cards, and trade 
credit. These credit instruments are provided by different sources, including banks, non-bank 
financial institutions, credit card institutions, the government, other businesses, family and 
friends, and other individuals (e.g. Astebro & I. Bernhardt, 2003; Berger & Udell, 1995, 
1998; Danielson & Scott, 2004; Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht, 2007; M. A. Petersen & 
Rajan, 1997; Robb & D. T. Robinson, 2010). These various sources offer credit to firms in 
different ways, each of which tends to have different market power, offers different interest 
rates, provides different schedules of payment, provides different levels of funding, has 
different application procedures, has different collateral requirements, applies different 
lending covenants, differs in their risk attitudes and ability to diversify, gathers information 
differently, monitors differently, and reacts differently to financial distress. These 
differences could possibly affect firm performance, with prior studies finding mixed results 
when testing the relationship between different credit sources and firm performance (e.g. 
Astebro & I. Bernhardt, 2003; Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2010; T. Bates, 
1990; Cressy, 1996b; Scott III, 2009). 
Using one credit source might not fulfill the financing needs of the firm due to credit 
rationing (Type I credit rationing4). Rather, in order to survive and grow, new firms might 
need to use several credit sources to obtain the additional funds required. Small firms, both 
new and old, have been found to use multiple credit sources. In the 1993 and 1998 Surveys 
of Small Business Finances (SSBF), around 50% of the firms borrowed from multiple 
creditors. Using multiple credit sources could provide access to additional debt capital 
4 Type I credit rationing is defined as credit rationing that occurs when a partial amount of credit that is desired 
is provided by the creditor. In other words, the amount of credit that is extended by a creditor is positive but 
below the level that maximizes the firm's profit (Gale & Hellwig, 1985; Keeton, 1979). This is as opposed to 
Type II credit rationing which is the case where only a fraction ofthe applicants are able to obtain credit 
(Keeton, 1979; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
5 
(capital constraint argument). Obtaining more funds could increase the survival probability 
and growth rate of new firms. By using multiple credit sources, entrepreneurs are being 
resourceful in the means to finance their firms. Thus, being resourceful in financing by using 
multiple credit sources could benefit new firms. 
This leads to the following research question: 
Does resourceful financing, in the form of multiple credit 
source usage, affect the performance (survival and growth) of 
new firms?5 
The theory developed results in two hypotheses that posit a positive relationship 
between multiple credit sources and survival and multiple credit sources and growth. A 
longitudinal study is performed to test the two hypotheses and to answer the research 
question. Data from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) are used to examine the use of credit 
sources over a six year period starting from the first year of a firm's existence while 
controlling for various factors that could affect its financing decisions, including the 
characteristics of the founders. The KFS data set is a panel study consisting of firms that 
were started in 2004 in the USA. Multiple statistical analysis tools are used, including OLS 
regression, Pro bit regression, survival analysis using cox proportional hazard regression 
(Cox, 1972), growth curve analysis using hierarchical linear modeling (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002), and panel data regression. The use of multiple statistical analyses results in a robust 
set of findings. 
The results suggest that the use of multiple credit sources is negatively associated 
with the survival for new firms that are growing below average and possibly already failing. 
5 A related question that is asked in the finance literature, but only for banks, is, what is the optimal number of 
banks for a firm to borrow from (Bonfim, Dai, & Franco, 2008)? 
6 
Thus, being resourceful in financing by using multiple credit sources doesn't stop these firms 
from failing and possibly makes them fail quicker. However, the use of multiple credit 
sources for new firms growing above average is positively associated with an increased 
growth rate. This suggests that founders should be resourceful in their financing options only 
when they are growing quickly and to not use multiple credit sources as a means to get out of 
a dire financial situation. The use of multiple credit sources cannot be used by creditors as a 
signal to determine the survival and growth of firms during the early years of operations. It 
is only after the third or fourth year that the use of multiple credit sources provides a positive 
or negative signal to external entities such as creditors. There are several limitations of the 
study that need to be considered when understanding the results of the study. One of the 
limitations pertains to endogeneity due to causal direction. With the decision to use multiple 
credit sources being a choice for founders, and the founders have a goal for their firms to 
survive and possibly grow, the possibility of endogeneity exists in the statistical analysis that 
might bias the results because a viable instrumental variable was not found. 
Understanding financing decisions and whether they have an impact on survival and 
growth of new firms has important economic implications for a variety of stakeholders, 
including researchers, entrepreneurs, and policy makers. The decisions affecting debt-related 
financing are important for economic development. The reliance on debt by new and small 
firms has come to light through research related to the United States "credit crunch" in the 
early I 990s, which saw available credit diminish for small firms because of the consolidation 
in the banking industry (Berger & Udell, 1998). Similarly, almost 15 years later, the 
concerns of the effects of credit availability rose again after the "credit crisis" in 2007-2008. 
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The survival and growth of new firms are important to study. From 1998 to 2007 in 
the United States, the average number of firms started each year was 612,257 while the 
average annual number of firm closures was 560,729 (SBA, 2010). The closure rate of new 
firms is up to 60% within the first six years (Cressy, 2006a, 2006b; Phillips & Kirchhoff, 
1989), with the majority of closures happening within the first 2-3 years (Bruderl, 
Preisendorfer, & Ziegler, 1992; Cressy, 1999, 2006b; Oimeno et aI., 1997). Some suggest 
that the importance of capital as it relates to survival is at its highest during the first 2-3 years 
of a firm's life (Cressy, 2006b)6. In the years 4+, the capital structure of a firm becomes less 
of a factor of survival (Cressy, 2006b). During this stage, the firm determines if it wants to 
or can grow. If a new firm is able to overcome the financial constraints during its early years 
and grow, it is able to contribute positively to a country's economic welfare by adding to its 
gross domestic product (ODP) and creating jobs (Davidsson & Delmar, 2006; Kirchhoff & 
Phillips, 1988). In the Phillips & Kirchhoff (1989) data set, which used data from United 
States firms, if a firm survived six years it also demonstrated growth. New firms that grow 
have been found to be the real drivers of new job growth in an economy (Haltiwanger, 
Jarmin, & Miranda, 2009). Survival and growth for new firms thus are important to 
understand. 
Specifically for researchers, this study contributes to the body of literature pertaining 
to new firm financing by developing a theoretical framework to explain resourceful financing 
by new firms and the relationship between resourceful financing and new firm performance. 
The theoretical framework builds upon the theories of credit rationing, pecking order, and 
financial growth cycle, which all use information asymmetry arguments. In addition, the 
longitudinal nature of the study offers a dynamic view of the financing process that new 
6 (Cressy, 2006a: 34) refers to the first 2-3 years of a firm's existence as the "valley of death". 
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firms go through to possibly diversify their debt structures to affect firm performance. This 
is important to finance research, which has shown that large firms have similar opportunities 
to diversify their debt sources, albeit in different ways than new firms, including using capital 
markets, both domestic and international. The dynamic aspect of the study is also important 
in entrepreneurship research since new firms change rapidly (Davidsson, Low, & Wright, 
2001; Low & MacMillan, 1988). New firms have dynamic capital structures (Berger & 
Udell, 1998; J. Lee & Zhang, 2010; Vos, Yeh, S. Carter, & Tagg, 2007), and are by nature 
evolving organisms; they are in a learning experiment (Jovanovic, 1982a). When researching 
such a dynamic and evolving environment, it is best to use longitudinal methods. From a 
researcher's perspective, it is novel to model the use of multiple credit sources over time for 
new firms. Doing so helps us better understand the financing decisions of new firms over 
time. Finally, this study examines the decision to employ multiple credit sources, consistent 
with the call by Berger & Udell (1998: 627) to examine multiple financing sources together 
rather than individually. 
This study is beneficial from a pedagogy perspective when educating potential 
entrepreneurs. It is helpful for entrepreneurs to understand if they should be resourceful in 
their means of financing, just as they are resourceful in their other activities involving their 
firms. The results suggest that entrepreneurs should seek and use multiple credit sources to 
improve their firms' chance of survival and growth rates depending on the reason to use 
multiple credit sources. The use of multiple credit sources as the last resort by a new firm 
that is struggling accelerates the closure of the firm; whereas, the use of multiple credit 
sources for new firms that are already growing above average increases the growth rate of the 
firm. This is important from a pedagogy perspective as teachers can better educate inspiring 
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entrepreneurs by explaining to them that being resourceful in their financing can be helpful 
depending on the situation their firm is in. 
Policy makers will be interested in the findings as they suggest that it is beneficial to 
allow and support multiple types of credit sources in the market rather than just commercial 
banks if they care about increasing the growth of potential high growth firms. The argument 
used in this study for why new firms use multiple credit sources is based upon the firm being 
able to obtain additional funds. This implies there is a market failure since one credit source 
(e.g. banks) did not provide the necessary funds to some firms and thus is detrimental to 
them. This market failure possibly indicates credit rationing exists and that new firms are 
financially constrained. Credit rationing has received considerable attention in policy circles 
(e.g. J. E. Bolton, 1971; Brierley, 2001; MacMillan Committee, 1931; Parker, 2002; 
Stanworth & Gray, 1991; Wilson, 1979), with several solutions derived to try and alleviate 
such financial constraints on new firms. One means to alleviate credit rationing is by 
combining multiple credit sources that new firms use. Doing so would suggest that new 
firms that are operating positive net present value projects are possibly alleviating the 
information asymmetry issues and thus making credit rationing less prevalent. Therefore, it 
might be in the best interest for the policy makers to ensure that legislation does not hinder 
the resourcefulness of new firms when regulating the various credit sources that are available 
in the market place. However, even though such a financing strategy promotes the growth for 
new firms that are already growing quickly, implementing such a financing strategy can also 
accelerate the closure of firms that are not growing. Thus, any policies implemented which 
affect multiple credit source usage need to be well thought out. 
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My dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature 
on new firm financing, financing and new firm performance, and explains in depth the 
various credit instruments and sources that can be used by new firms. Upon providing an 
examination of the relevant literature on new firm financing, testable hypotheses are 
developed in Chapter 2 using the financial constraints, credit rationing, pecking order, and 
financial growth cycle theories. In chapter 3, I explain the methods and data used to test the 
hypotheses. I present the results of the analysis in chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes the study 
by discussing the results, summarizing the findings, examining the limitations of the data and 




How firms finance their operations has been a question that researchers have been 
interested in for a number of years. Past studies in corporate finance have suggested that 
firms make logical financing decisions that lead to predictable capital structures and that 
capital structure affects firm performance. A firm's capital structure refers to the mix of 
financing sources used to finance real investment (Myers, 2001). In its simplest essence, a 
firm's capital structure is made up of a mix of debt and equity. Various theories have been 
developed regarding how an established firm's capital structure evolves (e.g. Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Mac an Bhaird, 2010; Modigliani & M. H. Miller, 1958, 1963; Myers & 
Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). Only a few of these theories have many advocates to support 
their continued existence and popularity in the academic community. These notable capital 
structure theories that are derived from corporate finance include static trade-off theory (Mac 
an Bhaird, 2010; Modigliani & M. H. Miller, 1958, 1963), agency theory (free cash flow 
theory) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984; 
Myers, 1984). 
The results for testing capital structure theories have been mixed, and as such, after 
more than 40 years of studying capital structure our understanding of firms' financing 
decisions is limited (Myers, 2001), especially for new firms. The corporate finance capital 
structure theories have shown mixed results when testing these theories with large, 
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established finns. And when bringing these theories into the entrepreneurship context by 
examining small and new firms, the results are also mixed. While these theories are derived 
for established and usually large firms and thus assume a firm has a track record and existing 
assets that can be used for collateral, new firms are different than established firms and 
possibly require new capital structure theories that do not assume a firm is established. As a 
result, capital structure theories have evolved from entrepreneurship research, including the 
financial growth cycle theory (Berger & Udell, 1998) and the financial theory of 
entrepreneurial types (Cressy, 1995). These two theories have not been tested extensively, 
and the little empirical work that has been performed has produced mixed results. Thus, 
even though firms' capital structure decisions are not completely understood, it is not due to 
a lack of trying. 
Capital structure is important to understand as it has been found to affect the value 
and perfonnance of established firms (Modigliani & M. H. Miller, 1963). The earliest 
rigorous capital structure theory concluded that the capital structure of a firm did not affect 
its total value (Modigliani & M. H. Miller, 1958). This would suggest that capital structure is 
not important to examine. However, their assumptions of perfect capital markets are not 
representative of the real world, as they assumed competitive, frictionless, and complete 
markets. Since Modigliani and Miller (1958), further research has found that capital 
structure may matter to firms, including their own study in 1963. In 1963, by changing just 
one assumption, they demonstrated the existence of tax subsidies on interest payments meant 
the debt-equity choice could affect the value of the firm (Modigliani & M. H. Miller, 1963). 
Different capital structures provide different levels of discipline for the firm and different 
levels of incentives to the finn's external equity investors (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994), 
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which in tum affects performance of established firms. Performance has thus also been 
associated with capital structure decisions. By affecting valuation and performance of 
established firms, capital structure becomes important to understand for both academics and 
practitioners. 
This line of research supports the reason why understanding capital structure is 
important for established firms. However, capital structure has also been found to be 
important for new firms. A large percentage of firms close within the first six years (e.g. 
Bruderl et aI., 1992; Cressy, 2006a; Gimeno et aI., 1997; Phillips & Kirchhoff, 1989). 
Although multiple factors have been found to be associated with closure of new firms 
(including selling to another firm, poor management, poor business idea, pursuing other 
opportunities), capital structure has been found to be one of the main factors affecting the 
survival rate of new firms (Cressy, 2006a). The effect of capital structure has been found to 
be greater on the survival of firms during the first 2-3 years of a firm's life than in subsequent 
years (Cressy, 2006a). This first 2-3 year period of a firm's life is considered the "valley of 
death", as the rate of closure is highest during the early years. By understanding capital 
structure of new firms we will better understand the failure rates of new firms and how they 
can overcome the "valley of death" issue. 
My research question for this study revolves around answering part of the capital 
structure issue by focusing on the debt of new firms. To answer the research question and 
ultimately shine more light on capital structure decisions of new firms, I posit herein an 
argument based upon new firms being resourceful with their credit options which leads to 
being able to obtain additional funds. By obtaining additional funds, new firms are able to 
improve their performance (surv.ival and growth). In this chapter, I first explain the general 
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research on financing of new firms and why new firms would use debt. Then I explain the 
different credit instruments and credit sources that are available to new firms. This leads to 
the development of a theory explaining how and why new firms can be resourceful in their 
financing activities when they use mUltiple credit sources, and how such resourcefulness 
affects the rate of survival and growth of new firms. Thus, I am able to address the research 
question that is posed in this study, does being resourceful in financing by using multiple 
credit sources affect the performance of new firms. 
Financing of New Firms 
Researchers have found that new firms face financial constraints (e.g. Astebro & I. 
Bernhardt, 2003; Blanchflower & Oswald, 1998; Evans & Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et 
aI., 1994a; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, & Rosen, 1994b; Lindh & Ohlsson, 1996). Securing 
external funds from any source could possibly relax financial constraints on investment for a 
new firm. By securing funding, conventional logic dictates that new firms should have a 
higher probability of survival and growth. 
These financial constraints push new firms to use external funds. External funds can 
be offered in the form of either debt or equity. A debt claim entitIes the creditor to a 
contracted set of cash flows in the form of interest and principal payments (Damodaran, 
2010). An equity claim entitIes the investor to residual cash flow left over after a firm has 
met all other promised claims. Debt is a claim to a set amount of a firm's future cash flow 
via a contract, and has a priority over equity in that debt is not a residual item that is payable 
after all other claims have been paid. 
Sources of equity for new firms include venture capital funds, angel investors, 
corporate investors, and family and friends. Venture capital funds are private equity funds 
focused on investing in high risk capital, including investing in new and young firms. Dollar 
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commitments to venture capital funds increased from $3.1 billion in 1992 in the United 
States to $87.3 billion in 2000 at the height of the Internet boom (Denis, 2004). In 2011, the 
new commitments to venture capital funds amounted to $18.7 billion (NVCA, 2012). At the 
peak of the capital commitments in 2000, venture capital funds in the United States invested 
$105 billion in firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012). In comparison, in 2011, venture 
capital funds in the United States invested $29.1 billion in firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2012). As the supply of funds in venture capital funds decrease, so does the amount of 
money that firms receive in investment from venture capital funds. 
Venture capital funds provide benefits to new firms that are not normally provided by 
other investors and creditors (e.g. Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996). The involvement 
by venture capitalists results in a reduction in the founder's decision and control rights. 
Angel investors tend to invest at earlier stages than venture capital funds and are not as 
involved as partners involved in venture capital funds (Mason & Harrison, 2000; Van 
Osnabrugge & R. J. Robinson, 2000; Wong, Bhatia, & Freeman, 2009; Wong, 2002). 
Partners in venture capital funds tend to try to manage the market risk, while angel investors 
tend to manage the agency risk that exists with the founders (Fiet, 1996). 
Typically academic scholars have treated entrepreneurial finance separate from 
corporate finance since issues faced by new, young, and small firms are different than the 
issues faced by publicly traded and large firms. New, young, and small firms face agency 
problems and information asymmetries like publicly traded and large firms, but in a much 
more pronounced fashion - the magnitude of these two issues is larger for new, young, and 
small firms (Denis, 2004). This has resulted in different contractual solutions and alternative 
sources of capital being used by new, young, and small firms. 
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In addition, due to the differences in equity and debt instruments, equity investors 
have different incentives than creditors that result in different financing strategies. Equity 
investors can afford to lose on a majority of their investments in new firms because of the 
oversized returns on the few successful investments. Lenders have a limited upside and 
cannot afford to have a many of their borrowers fail. For example, a couple of million dollars 
in equity investment might tum into a billion dollar return (e.g. Google, Facebook, Zynga). 
While the same amount made in the form of debt will yield a return of only the interest 
payments. This results in creditors using relatively risk adverse strategies when choosing 
their borrowers. 
New firms are often associated with venture capital financing (i.e. equity finance). 
However, debt is a more common source of funding for new ventures in general (Berger & 
Udell, 1998), especially when excluding personal equity provided by the founders (Parker, 
2009). And when project returns are not known ex-ante, debt becomes the financing 
instrument used by external financiers (Parker, 2009). Both debt and external equity 
financing use covenants to restrict the borrower's behavior, use capital rationing through 
stage financing, and financing limits to provide additional control in the event the borrowing 
firm performs poorly. There are differences between debt and external equity in that external 
equity finance tends to have very skewed return distributions and is used by firms in specific 
industries; whereas debt financing tends to have normally distributed returns and is used by 
firms in a wide variety of industries7 (Fenn, Liang, & Prowse, 1995; Sahlman, 1990). In 
addition, equity investors play an active role in the firm's major decisions (Steven N. Kaplan 
& Stromberg, 2001; Sahlman, 1990), whereas creditors do not. Berger & Udell (1998) find 
7 To clarifY this point, this is not saying that a single loan to a single borrower produces nonnally distributed 
returns. Rather, I am trying to make the point that banks that make many loans to many borrowers end up 
realizing normally distributed returns. 
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that small and young firms (firms 2 years and younger) in the United States use roughly the 
same amount of debt as they do equity even at a young age. This is also supported by the 
study performed by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008) in which they use the 
World Business Environment Survey (WBES) to analyze the capital structure of2,754 firms 
in 48 countries. 
In the United States, in 1988 (& 1989) one-third of small firms (firms with less than 
$15,000 in assets) borrowed from at least one credit source (M. A. Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
This figure increases with size to 90% for firms with more than $1.3 million assets, 
indicating that a greater percentage of large firms use debt than do small firms. Overall 
borrowing by small firms decreases with age as they pay back the creditors; 79% of firms 
less than 2 years old use credit, whereas 59% of firms greater than 30 years old use credit. 
There is a similar trend in the United Kingdom. In 1988 in the United Kingdom, one-third of 
new firms borrow on lines of credit, with half of them doing so by their 3rd year of 
operations, and 10% of new firms use bank loans (Cressy, 2007). During the early years, 
bank borrowing increases with age (Cressy, 1993). Even though these are cross-sectional 
studies, the results suggest that as firms grow in size and age they use more credit sources. 
Hughes (1997) performs a study in the United Kingdom to examine the financing 
habits of small firms since entrepreneurs had complained that problems in financing of their 
firms significantly hindered their ability to operate successfully. His study compares large 
and small firms to determine if there is a difference in their financing habits. He finds there 
is little evidence of gaps in equity and debt financing. However, what is more important in 
his study as it relates to my study is that he examines additional financing sources by small 
and medium-sized firms. He finds that banks accounted for 60.6% of the additional 
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financing used, followed by hire purchase8 (16%), partners I shareholders (7.6%), factoring 
(3.5%), venture capital (2.9%), other private investors (1.7%), and other miscellaneous 
sources (7.6%). This indicates that small firms have access to a variety of financing sources, 
including various credit sources. 
The next logical line of thought is to understand why these firms use debt. Various 
arguments have been suggested, including the static trade off theory, agency cost theory, 
pecking order theory, and financial growth cycle theory. The static trade-off theory suggests 
that firms try to balance interest tax shields against the cost of bankruptcy and agency costs 
to determine their use of debt (e.g. DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973). 
The theory has evolved, starting with Modigliani & Miller's (1958) seminal paper. At first, 
they proposed a firm's capital structure does not affect its value. They assumed a world of 
no income taxes and agency costs. They later added corporate income taxes (Modigliani & 
M. H. Miller, 1963), proposing that a firm would use its debt financing options to decrease its 
tax burden. The tax deductibility of interest lowers the cost of debt financing making debt 
the cheapest type of outside financing. This would suggest that a firm should borrow as 
much as possible, with 100% debt financing maximizing firm value. However, with the 
increase of debt, there is an increase in the risk that lenders will push the firm into 
bankruptcy if the firm is not able to service the debt. So the firm tries to balance its tax 
shield against the cost of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy costs are the costs associated with the 
perceived probability that the firm will default on financing and become insolvent. 
Bankruptcy costs can be direct or indirect. Direct bankruptcy costs affect liquidation returns 
(Harris & Raviv, 1991); whereas, indirect bankruptcy costs relate to stakeholders losing 
8 "Hire purchase" is a term mainly used in the United Kingdom and refers to a contract where the borrower 
agrees to pay for a good or service in separate payments. In the United States, this is referred to as an 
installment plan, rent-to-own, or closed-end leasing. 
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confidence in the firm's ability to survive (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Tax law is written to 
provide an incentive for debt use as interest is deductible. With more debt increasing the 
after-tax proceeds to the suppliers of capital, this would suggest that firms will balance the 
tax benefits with bankruptcy and agency costs (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). DeAngelo & 
Masulis (1980) articulate this theory as the debt/equity mix being such that the firm's 
weighted average cost of capital is minimized and the firm's value maximized. 
Agency theory explains the capital structure of firms through the importance of 
agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Agency costs arise when firms 
utilize external financers. According to agency theory, a firm tries to manage multiple 
relationships between different stakeholders through contracts resulting in the firm being a 
"nexus of contracts". The stakeholders mainly are the firm's owners and creditors 
(principals) and the firm's managers (agents). The relationship between the principals and 
agents is considered the agency relationship, with the relationship involving a contract under 
which one or more persons (principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf. If both parties are utility maximizers, there is good reason that the 
agent will not always act in the best interest of the principals, as these two parties have 
different incentives. This creates agency costs that involve the monitoring expenditures by 
the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent, and the residual loss as the agent cannot 
fully bond his/her expenditures (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The introduction of agency 
costs creates the need to balance the use of debt and equity. 
The pecking order theory is based upon information asymmetry between firms and 
external financiers. Information asymmetry arises from insiders being more informed than 
outsiders of firms since the insiders have access to information about the activities and 
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situation of the finn (Williamson, 1975). This theory takes into account that managers favor 
internal funds as a source of funding future growth even to the exclusion of external funds 
Donaldson (1961). The pecking order theory suggests there is an orderly priority that finns 
will follow to detennine what type of financing to use (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984), 
as opposed to targeting an optimal debt-to-equity ratio or mitigating the agency costs. Rather, 
the financing preferences are more about balancing the ability to obtain financing to 
implement the desired project while minimizing the intrusion of external financing in their 
operations. The pecking order theory says that internal funding is used first (i.e. retained 
earnings), followed by debt, and then by equity. The logic behind this order of funding 
sources is based upon infonnation asymmetry issues arising from the principal-agent 
relationship between the suppliers of capital and the finn. 
Another theory concerning capital structure is the financial growth cycle theory. The 
financial growth cycle theory is derived from the perspective of new finns. Posited by 
Berger & Udell (1998), the theory suggests that different capital structures are optimal at 
different points in the development of a finn. This is a dynamic perspective of capital 
structure for new finns as it is based upon time. Newness and scale of a finn make some 
financing options unavailable to new finns. New finns rely on internal sources of funds in 
their early years of operation (Berger & Udell, 1998; Huyghebaert, 2001). As new finns 
grow in size and age, they should have better access to external funding sources. This is 
because larger and older finns (finns with a track record) have more assets which to use as 
collateral for credit and have less infonnational opacity and thus less infonnation asymmetry. 
This uses logic similar to the pecking order theory - as it includes the concept of infonnation 
asymmetry. Berger & Udell (1998) support their theory inductively as they construct the 
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theory by examining their data. They find initially that new firms use insider finance, trade 
credit, and/or angel finance. As new firms age and grow, they tap into venture capital and 
mid-term loans as sources of intermediate equity and debt. In the final stage of their theory, 
the focal firm is now older and larger, and thus possesses more experience and appears 
informationally transparent. This allows the firm to gain access to public equity and/or long-
term debt financing. The Berger and Udell theory is a supply-side theory of capital structure 
as firms are not able to use certain financing options until they reach a certain stage. It is 
based upon the external financiers deciding when to provide funding as opposed to when the 
firms need the financing. For example, even if a firm wants to go public the first day of their 
operations, financiers (through the market - aggregate of financiers) do not allow them to do 
so. These circumstances create a greater role for debt financing for new firms (Berger & 
Udell, 1998; Scholtens, 1999). 
In addition, entrepreneurs do not want to share any upside with external funders 
(Landier & Thesmar, 2009). Entrepreneurs started the firm to succeed, not fail, with many of 
them being overly optimistic (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; A. C. Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 
1988; Hayward, D. A. Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006; Koellinger, Minniti, & Schade, 2007). 
Along with being constrained financially (e.g. Evans & Jovanovic, 1989; Evans & Leighton, 
1989; Holtz-Eakin et aI., 1994b; Lindh & Ohlsson, 1996), this would lead many 
entrepreneurs to use debt over equity when possible. 
Credit Rationing 
Even though banks tend to be the largest provider of credit to new firms (T. Bates, 
1997; Berger & Udell, 1995, 1998), new firms still feel constrained financially (e.g. Astebro 
& I. Bernhardt, 2003; Blanchflower & Oswald, 1998; Evans & Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin 
et aI., 1994a, 1994b). In a perfect capital market, all firms should be able to find the funds to 
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invest in positive net present value projects (Fazzari, Hubbard, & B. C. Petersen, 1988). 
Such a capital market assumes that information is symmetrical; meaning that the financier 
and borrower have the same information about the potential of the firm. However, 
information is not symmetric in the relationship between the banker and a new firm. Thus, 
banks cannot easily identify a good entrepreneur from a bad entrepreneur, nor a good project 
from a bad project. This suggests that good entrepreneurs may not be able to easily access 
external funds even when the new firm is a positive net present value project. Basically, 
lenders either do not lend enough to a viable borrower or do not lend at all to them (Jaffee & 
Stiglitz, 1990; Keeton, 1979). This is a market failure, as lenders, if their goal is to maximize 
profit, should lend to viable borrowers if they represent a positive net present value project; 
the loan will be repaid. Positive new present value projects are expected to provide a 
positive return for lenders, and thus lenders should want to lend to them. However, if there is 
credit rationing, then some viable borrowers are not able to obtain credit to finance their 
ventures. This is considered the financing gap (Storey, 1994; Deakin, 1996; Berger and 
Udell, 1998). 
Credit rationing occurs when firms needing external financing for positive net present 
value projects either do not obtain all the money they need (Type I) or do not obtain any of 
the money they need (Type II) to implement the project (Jaffee & Stiglitz, 1990; Keeton, 
1979). Credit rationing was posited by Jaffee & Russell (1976) and expanded on by Stiglitz 
& Weiss (1981). The existence of crediting rationing has been supported by various 
researchers (J. Black, Meza, & Jeffreys, 1996; Blanchflower & Oswald, 1998; Evans & 
Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et aI., 1994a, 1994b; Lindh & Ohlsson, 1996). Pure credit 
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rationing involves competition between banks which keep interest rates low and then 
randomly select which applicants get loans (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
Gersbach and Uhlig (2007) also find support that credit rationing exists when there is 
competition between different type of banks. They postulate a market with a standard 
commercial bank and an investment bank. The commercial bank is good at monitoring after 
loaning the money and the investment bank is good at screening which firms are good to 
provide loans to. The result is that investment banks obtain the better borrowers and the 
commercial banks provide credit to the weaker borrowers. The result is that competition 
from different types of creditors causes market inefficiencies. Such market inefficiencies 
could result in credit rationing by commercial banks and thus be detrimental to new firms. 
A theoretical model of credit rationing involving entrepreneurs is posited by 
Bernhardt (2000). He builds a single period model where an entrepreneur has the ability to 
move a project forward but lacks the capital to do so, which leads him to borrow from a 
bank. The entrepreneur is a price taker, and the lender dictates the interest rate. The result of 
the model is an equilibrium interest rate at which entrepreneurs desire to still obtain 
additional capital but cannot. This goes against the intuition that interest rates alone can 
solve credit rationing (i.e. raise interest rates as high as the risk warrants) or that competition 
among creditors will induce an interest rate that will result in efficient investment. Rather, 
Type I could be caused by limitation of funds based on the size of collateral from the 
borrower. Collateral mitigates credit rationing (e.g. Besanko & Thakor, 1987; Bester, 1985; 
Chan & Kanatas, 1985). However, new firms and founders of new firms have limited 
collateral. Collateral ends up being less than what is needed to be borrowed. Therefore, 
collateral doesn't completely solve the credit rationing problem faced by new firms. This 
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leaves the need for new firms to try to obtain the remaining funds from other sources. In 
addition, even if a firm does have enough collateral, and thus there is less possibility of being 
credit rationed, the necessary collateral still provides access to additional credit options that 
would not otherwise be available (Chittenden, G. Hall, & Hutchinson, 1996). 
Relationships can possibly help mitigate costs and credit rationing. Creditors can 
utilize either transaction-based or relationship-based lending. Transaction-based lending is 
based on hard information like financial statements. Transaction-based lending is primarily 
focused on informationally transparent borrowers (i.e. large, established firms). However, 
creditors tend to use relationship-based lending with small and new firms (e.g. Berger & 
Udell, 1995). Relationship-based lending is based on soft information generated via 
interactions between the lender and the borrower. This includes communications like 
meetings, emails, etc. Relationship-based lending is primarily focused on informationally 
opaque borrowers. Large financial institutions have a comparative advantage in transaction 
lending to small firms; whereas, small financial institutions have an advantage in 
relationship-lending to small firms (Berger & Udell, 2006). Closer relationships between 
creditors and borrowers can help reduce interest rate costs and monitoring by banks (D. W. 
Blackwell & Winters, 1997), and mitigate credit rationing. 
Credit rationing should not be evident in efficient financial markets, even when a 
project is a high risk. Some suggest that a banker should raise interest rates to cover for 
higher risk, and thus allow a borrower to obtain as large a loan as they wish (M. H. Miller, 
1962). Assuming it can raise interest rates without losing business (i.e. can offer higher 
interest rates than other banks and not lose business), a bank could cover its risk by 
increasing the interest rate and allowing the risky borrower to take out as large a loan as the 
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borrower desires. However, this strategy does not work for profit-maximizing bankers since 
the borrower can default on their loan and lose only their collateral. Collateral is used by 
banks to mitigate the risk they face due to information asymmetry in the relationship between 
them and the borrowers to whom they lend. Therefore, if the loan is higher than the value of 
collateral the bank loses the difference between the loan amount and the value of the 
collateral. Thus, the bank does not lend more than the value of the collateral even when the 
project is a positive net present value project. Therefore the banker who maximizes the 
expected profit on a loan will ration credit when the borrower needs more money than the 
borrower has in collateral (Freimer & Gordon, 1965). The collateral requirement is also 
confirmed by studies that find riskier borrowers can borrow more on a secured basis than on 
an unsecured basis (Klapper, 2001). In addition, a higher interest rate can distort 
entrepreneurs' incentives and persuade them to choose the riskier projects. This means that 
adverse selection can lead to moral hazard that in turn can lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981). 
Assuming that credit rationing exists, it leads to a debt gap. In other words, firms are 
not able to obtain all the necessary funds from one credit source. This possibly leads to other 
credit sources that firms might use to obtain the necessary funds to survive and possibly 
grow. 
Resourcefulness and New Firms 
New firms are resourceful in their activities (Baker, Miner, & D. T. Eesley, 2003; 
Baker & R. E. Nelson, 2005). "Resourceful" can have several meanings. Resourceful could 
mean someone who is capable of dealing with difficult situations. However, there is a 
dynamic that is missing from this definition which relates to what studies have found which 
entails a combination of resources rather than a single resource. Thus, in this study, 
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resourceful refers to wisely using, or using ingeniously, a combination of materials that are at 
hand or are accessible in the environment. 
Various terms have been used to explain resourcefulness in the organizational setting, 
including bricolage, improvisation, and bootstrapping9• One of the most cited papers along 
the lines of resourcefulness of new and young firms is Baker and Nelson (2005). Using a 
concept from biology, bricolage, they explain how resource-constrained firms differ in their 
responses to operating in a resource-poor environment. Bricolage is defined as "always to 
make do with 'whatever is at hand'" (Levi-Strauss, 1966: 17). From their field study of 29 
service firms, Baker and Nelson observe the new firms rendering unique services by 
recombining resources at hand for new purposes. The resulting services challenged the limits 
of the existing institutions. The notion ofbricolage is based upon the evolution framework 
(variation, selection, and retention) which means there is no agency involved. Thus, 
entrepreneurs can combine various resources, but don't know which ones will be successful 
or not; rather the environment is what determines which combinations are selected. 
However, entrepreneurs tend to believe their own abilities mitigate the risk their business 
faces, with these abilities including leadership, hard work, and resourcefulness (Isenberg, 
2010). 
An example ofbricolage is found in the study by Garud & Kamoe (2003) who 
compare bricolage activity in Denmark to breakthrough activity in the USA in the wind-
turbine industry. The firms in Denmark used bricolage in which the designers and producers 
9 Additional terms that are similar to resourcefulness and are used in the literature are adaptation and 
effectuation. Adaptation is an adjustment of a system from its current state (Campbell, 1969; Stein, 1989). 
Unlike the other terms similar to resourcefulness, adaptation can occur without convergence of design and 
execution and may involve planning and/or using routines (Baker, Miner, & D. T. Eesley, 2003). Effectuation 
is the process where a set of means is given and the individual selects between possible outcomes that can be 
created with such means (Sarasvathy, 200 I). Effectuation differs from bricolage in that bricoleurs can possibly 
use resources at hand both to see what can be accomplished (effectuation) and find out how they can meet pre-
existing goals from resources at hand (causation) (Baker et aI., 2003). 
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improved their designs while incorporating the inputs of the actors involved, which included 
the designers, producers, users, evaluators, and regulators. The actors took a low-tech 
design, took small steps to improve the design, and engaged in product development in 
between various stages of the development process. It is this combination of available 
resources that provides the example of being resourceful; in this example, the resources are 
individuals that possessed various levels of knowledge. With limited financial resources, 
they spent hours in the scrap yards to obtain materials for their design. In contrast, U.S. 
companies started with a high-tech design and took large steps to improve on the technology. 
They purchased or built new components from scratch designed specifically for their wind 
turbines. The U.S. counter parts felt the Danish design features were too easy or not 
challenging enough, and thus didn't pursue the Danish technology even though it was already 
successful. 
Improvisation is another term used in the literature that has a similar meaning to 
resourcefulness. Like bricolage, improvisation has been adapted from other fields (theater, 
musical performances, therapy, and education) to explain and better understand creativity 
and innovation in organizations. Improvisation theory is couched in organization theory 
where order and control is prevalent (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Weber, 1947), 
however, the main theories don't explain that creativity and innovation come from 
spontaneous and not planned activities within an organization. Improvisation is defined as 
"the negation of foresight, of planned-for, of doing provided for by knowing, and of the 
control of the past over the present and future" (S. A. Tyler & M. G. Tyler, 1990: x). Thus, 
spontaneity is an important dimension of improvisation, and with it comes intuition (Weick, 
1998). 
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In organizational theory, improvisation has been studied with firefighters (Weick, 
1993), new product development (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Miner, Bassoff, & Moorman, 
2001; Moorman & Miner, 1998, 2002), in schools (March & Olsen, 1976), during a strike 
(Preston, 1991), and after a failure in a navigational system (Hutchins, 1991). In addition, 
Baker et al. (2003) studied the firm founding process, where design and execution of novel 
activities converge. 
Thus, multiple activities and resources are combined in an unplanned order and done 
so in varying degrees. This implies there are varying degrees and forms of improvisation in 
the organizational context, and thus it lies on a continuum (Weick, 1998). Finally, 
improvisation does not start from a blank slate where there are no resources. "You can't 
improvise on nothing; you've gotta improvise on something" (Kernfeld, 1995: 119). As with 
bricolage, there is an element which implies there is no agency involved as no planning can 
be done by an agent. 
Entrepreneurial finance literature is biased towards studying the process of acquiring 
a large amount of financial resources from external financiers. However, new firms often 
experience limited access to external finance due to market imperfections. With the financial 
constraints faced by new firms due to market imperfections, and with entrepreneurs being 
resourceful, firms are taxed with the decision to try to find external funds and manage cash 
flow in non-traditional ways. One of those ways is via bootstrapping. Faced with financial 
constraints, entrepreneurs resort to trying to reduce as much as possible the need for external 
finance (Bhide, 1992) and bootstrapping ends up being a way of life for new firms 
(Timmons, 1999). The logic behind firms using bootstrapping techniques is that it is often 
impossible for new firms to acquire all the resources needed to fully develop over time 
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(Baker & R. E. Nelson, 2005), but entrepreneurs continue to pursue new opportunities 
despite their inability to acquire the traditional resources (Starr & MacMillan, 1990). 
Bootstrapping is defined as "highly creative ways of acquiring the use of resources 
without borrowing money or raising equity financing from traditional sources" (Freear, Sohl, 
& Wetzel, 1995: 394), and could be considered improvisational activities that involve 
financial resources. Traditional sources of start-up capital include using funds from personal 
savings, borrowing from financial institutions, or obtaining funds from venture capital and 
angel investors in return for a percentage of ownership in the new firm. Bootstrapping 
techniques range from hiring personnel on a contract basis (instead of as an employee) to 
bartering for goods and services (instead of buying goods and services), from sharing 
premises with others to running the business from home. Bootstrapping also entails funding 
techniques such as using funds from a second mortgage, sale of personal assets, inheritance, 
credit cards, leases, and more lO• 
There are different categorizations of bootstrapping (e.g. Van Auken & Neeley, 1996; 
Freear et aI., 1995; Harrison, Mason, & Girling, 2004; Winborg & Landstrom, 2001). One 
categorization method is based upon product development and business development (e.g. 
Freear et aI., 1995; Harrison et aI., 2004). The second categorization method is based upon 
1) delaying bootstrappers, 2) relationship-oriented bootstrappers, 3) subsidy-oriented 
bootstrappers, 4) minimizing bootstrappers, 5) private owner-financed bootstrappers 
(Winborg & Landstrom, 2001). The second categorization method is based upon external 
finance reliance and cost minimization (e.g. Vanacker, Manigart, Meuleman, & Sels, 2011). 
For this latter categorization method, the "external finance reliance" includes strategies to 
acquire resources without using bank finance and external equity financing, while "cost 
10 Winborg & Landstrom (2001) list 32 different bootstrapping techniques in their paper. 
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minimization" includes strategies that minimize the need for cash by securing resources at 
little or no cost. Thus, bootstrapping may allow new firms to pursue new opportunities 
without the need to own a large amount of resources, and thus do not have to look for a large 
amount of external financing. 
Prior studies show that new firms rely heavily on bootstrapping methods and these 
techniques change over time as firms age and grow. Freear et al. (1995) survey 77 computer 
software firms about their financial activities, which include a list of 20 different 
bootstrapping techniques. They find that 56% of the software entrepreneurs in their survey 
utilize bootstrapping techniques within the first four years of their firms' existence. A study 
by Van Auken & Neeley (1996) examine 78 United States firms and find that on average 
35% of the firms' start-up capital is obtained by bootstrapping techniques. Winborg & 
Landstrom (2001) survey Swedish firms and ask them about their usage of 32 bootstrapping 
techniques. The result is a clustering of the 32 bootstrapping techniques into five ll different 
bootstrapping techniques that the firms indicate they use. R. B. Carter & Van Auken (2005) 
find that owners who perceive themselves as being less capable rely more heavily on owner-
related bootstrapping techniques. N. M. Carter, Brush, et al. (2003) perform a study with 235 
women entrepreneurs and find that for women, social capital increases the odds of using 
bootstrapping techniques. Brush, N. M. Carter, E. J. Gatewood, Greene, & Hart (2006) 
interview 88 women entrepreneurs who were seeking an equity investment to grow their 
firms. Their results show differences in the use of bootstrapping techniques which women 
entrepreneurs use depending on the development stage of their firms. Firms that had not 
II There were six different clusters of bootstrapping techniques. However, one of the six techniques was "non-
boostrappers". This indicates that those techniques are not bootstrapping techniques, even though they were 
included in the initial 32 techniques in Winborg & Landstrom's (200 I) survey. Thus, there are only five 
bootstrapping categories that the authors found to be unique from one another. . 
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achieved their first sale yet are more likely to emphasize bootstrapping to reduce labor; 
whereas, firms that have greater sales are more likely to focus on bootstrapping techniques 
that minimize operation costs. Ebben & A. Johnson (2006) survey 183 retail and service 
firms in the Midwestern United States that are between 2 and 40 years old. The results of 
their study indicate that firms change their reliance on bootstrapping techniques over time. 
The amount of owner-related, joint-utilization, and delaying-payments techniques decreases 
over time, with the customer-related techniques increasing over time. The increase in 
customer-related techniques might suggest a resource dependence and organizational 
learning trend. Firms might be able to possibly gain leverage with customers or learn ways 
to obtain payments earlier. Harrison et al. (2004) find that 95% of software firms in Northern 
Ireland / South East England and the United States use at least some form of bootstrapping. 
They also find that larger firms tend to make use of bootstrapping for product development 
and smaller firms tend to make use of bootstrapping for value cost-reduction. Overall, 
research shows that bootstrapping techniques depend on the characteristics of the firm and 
the owner, and the techniques change over time as the firm ages and grows. 
As the first studies focus on determining if firms used bootstrapping techniques, a 
more recent study on bootstrapping focuses on how bootstrapping techniques affect the 
performance of firms. Ebben (2009) examines the income statements and balance sheets of 
901 manufacturing firms over a two year period, with 186 of them indicating they use 
bootstrapping techniques. His results indicate that firms that use bootstrapping techniques 
are more highly levered, illiquid, and are underperforming based upon financial measures. 
Vanacker, Manigart, Meuleman, & Sels (2011) perform a longitudinal study in Belgium that 
include 214 new firms and find that bootstrapping techniques are either positive or have no 
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effect on performance. Specifically they find that new firms that use more internal funds, 
employ more temporary workers, encourage customers to pay quicker, and obtain funds from 
subsidies exhibit higher growth over time. 
In a constrained environment, the ability to be resourceful can be the difference 
between surviving and not surviving. Kodithuwakku and Rosa (2002) find that when 
investigating the economic and business success of Sri Lanka villagers via case studies, it is 
not the ability to find or create innovative business opportunities that increase the survival 
and starting rates of new firms. Rather, it was founders being more creative and persistent in 
finding solutions to better mobilize scarce resources that increased the survival and starting 
rates of new firms. This indicates in particular the ability of founders to tap into their social 
network to overcome their struggle of accumulating additional funds. Thus, being 
resourceful can provide a means to obtain additional financial capital. 
The use of bootstrapping techniques show that new firms are financially constrained 
and that they use multiple techniques and sources to manage their cash flow and fund their 
operations. In addition, new firms call upon various techniques to obtain additional funds, 
especially in a constrained environment. The use of multiple and a combination of 
techniques indicate these firms are resourceful in their means to operate and finance their 
operations. In addition, using multiple traditional funding sources has been found to be 
positively related to growth of owner-managed firms (Westhead & Cowling, 1995). 
Going back to the definition of resourcefulness and relating the definition to this 
study, resources at hand are credit sources that are available to new firms. A new firm is 
considered to be more resourceful if it takes advantage of the various credit sources (i.e. 
resources) available to them in their environment. With firms found to be resourceful and 
using multiple funding sources, the next step is to examine the most used type of funding, 
debt, as explained next. 
Most corporate finance literature on capital structure theories tends to treat all types 
of debt the same (as one source). Actually, there are multiple sources of credit available to 
firms. The literature that does distinguish different credit sources categorizes the debt in 
ways such as outside and inside debt, and formal and informal debt. And recent studies on 
new firms have examined financing from suppliers via trade financing separate from other 
types of financing (Huyghebaert, Van de Gucht, & Van Hulle, 2007; Huyghebaert & Van de 
Gucht, 2007; Huyghebaert, 2006). However, credit can be provided in different ways and 
from different sources. The different credit instruments and sources are different in nature, 
as are equity sources (e.g. venture capital firms, angel investors, family and friends). 
Different sources of credit use different contracting mechanisms and possibly have different 
motives for financing a new firm (Cassar, 2004). These different contracting mechanisms 
and motives could be important for a new firm in determining which credit sources to use in 
order to survive and grow. The different credit sources include credit provided by banks, 
non-bank financial institutions, credit card institutions, other businesses (i.e. strategic 
partner), government, owners, employees, family members, friends, and other individuals. 
Each one of these sources offers credit to firms in different ways, each of which tends to have 
different market power, offer different interest rates, provide different schedules of payment, 
provide different levels of funding, have different application procedures, have different 
collateral requirements, apply different lending covenants, differ in their risk attitudes and 
ability to diversify, gather information differently, monitor differently, and react differently 
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to financial distress. These differences are summarized in Table 1 and are further explained 
in the next section. 
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Profit support finn 
Credit can be provided in multiple forms as there are multiple types of credit 
instruments available to new firms. Credit instruments are distinguished from each other by 
the means that the credit instrument is provided; whereas credit sources are distinguished by 
the entity that provides the credit. A credit source can provide multiple types of credit 
instruments. With equity, the two financing forms are common and preferred stock. With 
credit, there are more forms, which include loans, lines of credit, credit cards, corporate 
bonds, and trade credit. Corporate bonds are usually not available to new firm (e.g. Berger & 
Udell, 1998). Trade credit is operational funding and represents spontaneous funding which 
might or might not be costly. This leaves loans, lines of credit, and credit cards which are 
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available to new firms, have a measureable cost associated with them, and would not be 
considered spontaneous financing. 
Loans 
Term loans are loans for a specific amount that have a specific repayment schedule 
and an interest rate that can be fixed or floating. Bullet loans are loans that do not have any 
amortization but require a balloon payment at the end of the term. Bullet loans are usually 
used for interim financing (e.g. bridge financing), with the hope of obtaining refinancing 
before the balloon payment is due. Both term and bullet loans usually are extended as 
secured credit instruments which entail the creditor requesting a form of collateral from the 
borrower (e.g. Berger & Udell, 1990). Most of the credit in terms of dollar value is extended 
to new and small firms in the form ofloans (e.g. T. Bates, 1991, 1997; Beck et aI., 2008; 
Berger & Udell, 1998; Cressy, 1993,2007; Hughes, 1997; M. A. Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
Term and bullet loans are provided by various sources, including commercial banks, non-
bank financial institutions, government, owners, family, friends, and other businesses (i.e. 
strategic partners). 
Lines of Credit 
Another credit option is a line of credit, which is similar to a term loan and is usually 
provided by commercial banks (Berger & Udell, 1995). Lines of credit represent a forward 
commitment to provide working capital financing under predetermined terms. The borrower 
can draw down on the loan up to the maximum loan balance at any time, and can repay the 
outstanding balance at any time. The borrower only pays interest on the amount which they 
have drawn down (i.e. the outstanding balance). The payment schedule is flexible with a 
minimal amount to be paid monthly. The borrower does not have to apply for the funds each 
time they are needed, and the amount of funds used is not a set amount as the borrower can 
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pay it off early and still have access to the unused balance. As opposed to bank loans, these 
predetermined terms are easier to adjust, and in many cases are adjusted on a scheduled basis 
by the financial institution that is providing the line of credit. Lines of credit usually are 
smaller in size than bank loans (Duca, 1986). 
Lines of credit may be extended as either secured or unsecured. When extending an 
unsecured line of credit, the creditor cares about the borrower's ability to pay back the 
outstanding balance of the line of credit. Lines of credit are often secured by accounts 
receivables as a form of inside collateral. Account receivables are balances that the borrower 
"loaned" customers to purchase their products or services. Lenders that use accounts 
receivable as a means to secure the amount lent to borrowers care more about the ability of 
the borrower's customer to pay than the borrower's ability to continue to generate new sales 
(Klapper, 200 I). It has been suggested that lines of credit are the first financing instrument 
used by small firms rather than term loans (Cressy, 2007). The line of credit is used by the 
small firms to finance working capital as opposed to purchasing fixed assets. Cosh & 
Hughes (1994) find that in the United Kingdom, lines of credit finance 11% ofa small firm's 
assets. This is compared to 6% for large manufacturing firms and 4.4% for large service 
firms. Berger & Udell (1998) find that 52% of the debt is drawn under lines of credit by the 
firms in their sample. Most lines of credit are provided by banks, and are used by the 
borrowers to reduce transaction costs and provide insurance against credit rationing and 
credit crunches which are based upon general market conditions rather than specific 
characteristics of the borrower (Berger & Udell, 1998). 
Credit Cards 
Another credit facility available to new firms are credit cards, which are issued and 
maintained by credit card institutions. Credit cards are complex financial instruments that 
37 
have different characteristics and motivations (transactions, line of credit, etc.), involve a 
large number of prices (interest rates, teaser rates, grace periods, penalty fees, annual fees, 
etc.), and quantity constraints (credit limits and minimum payments). Credit card debt is 
unsecured debt resulting when a borrower purchases a product or service through the card 
system, and tends to be provided by credit card institutions where the credit card is the 
primary financing instrument they offer. 
Use of credit cards by businesses has increased over the last twenty years, especially 
after the market for consumer credit cards became saturated (Small Business and Micro 
Business Lending in the United States,jor Data Years 2007-2008,2009; Sullivan, Warren, & 
Westbrook, 2001). Credit cards were initially a finance tool for consumers. However, within 
the past 20 years, credit cards have become more prevalent in the world of business. 
Businesses now have business-related credit cards which allow their employees to make 
purchases for the businesses. It has been found recently that founders use either their 
personal or business credit cards to finance their businesses (Robb & D. T. Robinson, 2010). 
Credit cards could possibly be used during times of credit market contraction when new 
firms have greater difficulty borrowing through the traditional markets, such as during the 
2008 credit crisis (NSBA, 2009). Thus, it has been suggested that credit cards are an option 
to increase access to funds when banks limit credit to firms (Danielson & Scott, 2004). In 
addition, it is easy to open up multiple credit cards, as their applications are simple and now 
can be done online without talking with a human being. Having multiple credit cards 
available, firms can possibly use them to obtain more funds than can be obtained with only 
one credit card. However, the amount of credit available via credit cards, either one or more 
credit cards, is usually much smaller than the amount provided by other credit sources. 
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Credit cards, since they are the easiest form of credit to get and don't require 
collateral, are one of the most popular forms of borrowing among new small firms (J. D. 
Cole, Lahm Jr, Little Jr, & Seipel, 2005; NSBA, 2009), especially unsecured debt (Sullivan 
et aI., 200 1). Small and medium-sized firms use credit cards to pay for day-to-day expenses 
and fixed capital (Fraser, 2005). In 2008, 59% of small businesses in the United States 
(firms with 500 employees or less) used credit cards to finance their firms, with only 40% of 
the small firms able to pay off their outstanding credit debt every month (Small Business and 
Micro Business Lending in the United States, for Data Years 2007-2008, 2009). This is a 
rising trend as only 16% of small firms used credit cards in 1993 (NSBA, 2009). Several 
studies have acknowledged the emergence of credit cards as a new means to finance small 
firms. 
Credit cards offer several benefits to businesses. Credit cards are easier to obtain 
compared to traditional bank loans or government grants as they do not require a business 
plan or months of waiting for loan processing and approval (G. Kim, 2007; Manning, 2001). 
As well, credit cards help small firms manage their finances and streamline payments, 
smooth revenue streams, and improve the ability to accept payment and pay for business 
expenses virtually anywhere. Finally, credit card applications are arm's length borrowing, 
and thus can be considered an anonymous funding source (as compared to family and 
friends). 
Even though credit cards are widely used by small and medium-sized firms, but do 
not represent a large dollar amount of the overall debt for the firms. Berger & Udell (1998) 
find credit card financing to be small (0.14%), although much press has been given to 
financing of new firms with credit cards (e.g. Dale, 2007; R. Johnson, 2010; Silver-
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Greenberg, 20 I 0). Fraser (2005) finds this to be the case with small and medium-sized firms 
in the U.K. as well. This differs for nascent ventures, where Gartner et al. (20 10) find that 
14% of their sample, which was the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), use 
credit cards to start their firms. 
Loans are provided according to a fixed, predetermined amount that will not increase 
during the life of the loan. By contrast, credit card repayment schedules for credit card loans 
are more unpredictable than loans due to the open-ended nature of revolving credit contracts 
and the minimum monthly payment requirements. Lines of credit are the only facility similar 
to credit cards in that regards. 
Each of these financing credit instruments provides different revenue streams for the 
creditors, along with different profit margins for them. In addition, each of these credit 
instruments has different application procedures. The process of obtaining a term loan, 
especially one that is long-term, can be laborious; whereas with credit cards, the application 
can be completed and approved online in minutes. This is because the credit card 
applications require less information from the borrower and don't require collateral. As 
such, borrowers can setup multiple credit cards in many cases, and might have to because 
one credit card can't provide all the needed funds for the firm's operations. 
Credit Sources that Provide Credit Instruments to New Firms 
Different entities provide loans, lines of credits, and credit cards. The main provider 
of these credit instruments are banks, which are highly regulated due to being depository 
institutions. This has led many of the past studies that focus on debt to only examine banks. 
Even though a large portion of debt studies use banks as the only provider of debt, there are 
other credit sources available to firms. These other credit sources are non-depository 
institutions, and it has been suggested that non-depository institutions have become more 
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, 
important to small finns. Mach & J. D. Wolken (2006) compare earlier Surveys of Business 
Finances (SSBF) with the latest SSBF (2003) and find that non-depository sources increased 
in monetary value from 25% in 1987 to 54% in 2003. Non-depository sources include non-
bank financial institutions, credit card institutions, government, owners, family, friends, and 
other individuals and businesses. 
Banks 
Banks are the most used credit source by new finns (e.g. Astebro & I. Bernhardt, 
2003; T. Bates, 1990; Berger & Udell, 1998; Fraser, 2005). Banks tend to be unique from 
other credit sources (Diamond, 1984, 1991 a; F ama, 1985; Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984), 
and the bank loan market tends to differ from other debt markets (Carey, Prowse, Rea, & 
Udell, 1993). Banks are financial institutions that accept deposits and pool those deposits to 
provide credit to borrowers. They are highly regulated. As financial intennediaries, banks 
exist because they enjoy economies of scale and comparative advantages in the production of 
infonnation about borrowers, namely for borrowers with high infonnation asymmetries 
(Diamond, 1984, 1991a; Fama, 1985; Leland & Pyle, 1977; Myers & Majluf, 1984; 
Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984). When costly infonnation asymmetries exist between 
external financiers and finn insiders, a bank becomes the optimal financial institution for 
channeling funds from savers to borrowers (Diamond, 1984). Receiving a bank loan not only 
is beneficial because of the funds received from the loan, it is also a positive signal to 
investors. Large, publicly traded borrowing finns experience abnonnal equity returns after 
they announce a loan agreement. This supports the hypothesis that banks are special types of 
financial intennediaries (James, 1987; Lummer & McConnell, 1989; Mikkelson & Partch, 
1986). Banks tend to know more about a finn's future cash flow potential than other external 
financiers (James, 1987). 
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As mentioned in the previous section, banks generally provide credit to borrowers 
through loans and/or lines of credit. Banks usually rely on collateral, interest rates, loan sizes, 
ratio analyses, and forecasts of specific industries to gather information on a firm. Banks are 
reluctant to extend loans to firms that offer little evidence of cash flows, raising doubt about 
their ability to repay the loan. In return, banks require collateral against the risk of default. 
Berger & Udell (1990) find that 70% of the firms in their sample that have bank loans are 
collateralized. Banks use collateral to mitigate their risk in the event of default. In addition, 
collateral provides a signal to the bank that the founder believes the project will succeed 
(Storey, 1994a). Thus, collateral mitigates information asymmetries and can possibly reduce 
credit rationing (Besanko & Thakor, 1987). Many new firms do not have a positive cash 
flow or sufficient collateral for the debt needed to finance the firm's operations. Since new 
firms cannot use the full value of their future returns as backing for their financial claims (i.e. 
for collateral) (Diamond, 1990, 1991 a, 1991 b), new firms require outside collateral. One 
means of obtaining outside collateral is from the equity in the founder's house. Using one's 
house as collateral for a bank loan for the business can help get a business started. To 
support this notion, Black et al. (1996) find that a 10% rise in the value of unreleased net 
housing increases the number of businesses registrations in the United Kingdom by 5%. And 
it is not the low quality firms that are started in this 5% as they find that the additional 
businesses started are at least average quality based upon their survival rates. It is difficult 
for banks to shift all default risk onto borrowers in absence of full collateral, which leads to 
new firms in new industries being credit rationed even more so than established firms (Duca, 
1986). 
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There are several variations of banks. Most research assumes that banks are 
commercial banks. Commercial banks are banks that offer services to the general public and 
companies. These services mainly include accepting deposits and making loans. 
Commercial banks provide a variety of deposit accounts, including checking, savings, and 
time deposits. These institutions are operated to generate a profit and are owned by a group 
of individuals or another institution. Two other variations of banks are credit unions and 
savings and loans. Credit unions are member-owned financial cooperatives controlled by its 
members. The difference between credit unions and commercial banks is that the members 
who have accounts are the owners of the credit union and the members elect the board of 
directors. Credit unions sometimes provide support for community development. Thus, 
credit unions feel they are community oriented and serve the people, and are not necessarily 
operated for a profit. Savings and loans specialize in accepting deposits from consumers and 
make mortgage and other loans. Similar to credit unions, depositors are members of the 
savings and loan and have voting rights. Thus, they have the ability to direct the goals and 
future of the organization. However, unlike credit unions, savings and loans provide only 
savings deposits and cannot have more than 20% of their loans in commercial loans (i.e. 
loans to businesses). 
Non-hank Financial Institutions 
Contrary to banks, non-bank financial institutions do not accept deposits from 
individuals and they are not highly regulated like banks. These institutions include venture 
debt companies, finance companies, thrift institutions, leasing companies, brokerage firms, 
mortgage companies, and insurance companies. Non-bank financial institutions do not tend 
to show up in studies on credit that examine new and small firms. Some of the few studies 
that have included non-bank financial institutions are Berger & Udell (1998) and Astebro & 
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I. Bernhardt (2003). In both of these studies, non-bank financial institutions represent a 
small percentage ofthe overall loans provided to the small firms in their data set, both new 
and old. 
However, this is not to say that non-bank financial institutions are not used by new 
firms. Venture debt companies have been very active recently (Hardymon & Leamon, 2001 ; 
Hardymon, Lerner, & Leamon, 2005). Two-thirds to three-quarters of new firms in the 
United States use venture debt (Sormani, 2004). In 2010, the venture debt industry provided 
$3 billion in loans to new firms in the United States (T. Fischer & De Rassenfosse, 2011). 
Well-known companies have used venture debt to finance their operations, including 
Facebook (Musil, 2008), YouTube (Haislip, 2007), and Amazon.com (Haislip, 2007; Musil, 
2008). These are firms that are considered successful, and have grown to be sizeable in the 
market. Venture debt firms tend to finance high growth firms, with most of the firms not 
having revenues initially. They lend to firms even when there is a high level of information 
asymmetry due to rapid growth, new markets, new products, and when the firms have no 
track record, no cash flow, and no tangible collateral. Thus venture debt firms finance risky 
ventures. 
To help mitigate their risk, venture debt firms tend to provide funds alongside equity 
financing that is provided by venture capital firms. Venture debt firms rely on the due 
diligence of venture capital firms to determine if a firm is credit worthy, leaving the venture 
debt firm to focus on the quality of the venture capital firm. The quality of the venture 
capital firm is more important for the venture debt firms, as they assume that higher quality 
venture capital firms will lead to more credit worthy firms which the venture debt firm can 
provide credit to. Thus, since banks that provide venture debt have more regulation 
44 
requirements, non-bank financial institutions can offer larger loans and with fewer covenants 
than banks (Levin, 2008). In some cases, this situation has resulted in banks and non-bank 
financial institutions partnering, with banks initially offering loans at lower interest rates and 
non-bank financial institutions providing larger loans when regulation hinders banks from 
providing further funding (Ibrahim, 2010). Thus, new firms would use multiple credit 
sources by utilizing both banks and non-bank financial institutions. 
As a result of more usage by new firms, venture debt is readily accepted as part of the 
capital structure of new firms in some industries. However, venture debt has a negative 
effect on new firms. Recent research finds that new firms that obtain venture debt are less 
likely to perform an IPO, be acquired, and venture debt has a negative effect on a firm's 
valuation (Chakraborty & Ewens, 2011). 
The motivation of banks to provide debt to new firms with no track record or 
collateral is to possibly secure the firms' deposit accounts. Non-bank financial institutions 
are motivated by repayment of the loan with high interest rates (Ibrahim, 2010). 
Credit Card Institutions 
Another credit source available to new firms is the credit card institution, which 
issues credit cards to borrowers. The credit card market in the United States is one of the 
largest debt markets in the world, with $800 biIlion total bank credit card debt outstanding in 
2004 (Furletti & Ody, 2006a), with new firms using one or more cards regularly (Scott III, 
2009). 
Much has changed since 1980s in the credit card industry. These changes include 
rapid growth in direct mail solicitations, credit scoring technology and data quality and 
warehousing have led to the use of automated systems for prescreening and solicitation of 
applicants. Some claim that these changes improve the issuers' ability to judge the 
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creditworthiness of applicants and lowers the evaluation costs. However, with the changes 
there has been an increase in the delinquency rates on cards. Penalty fees in 2004 amounted 
to $13 billion (Massoud, Saunders, & Scholnick, 2011). The literature on credit cards mainly 
focuses on the interest rate charged by card issuers. Interest rates on credit cards are 
primarily based on the risk of the cardholder (Furletti & Ody, 2006b: 18). However, credit 
card companies tend to charge a hefty penalty for late payments. Credit card penalty fees 
serve a different function than interest rates. Penalty fees are a means by which card issuers 
can extract rents from only those borrowers who break their contractual obligations - by 
being late or over their credit limit. In contrast, interest rates serve the purpose of charging 
all borrowers who use their credit cards and do not repay the full amount. Interest rates are a 
function of the amount not repaid, while penalty fees are imposed independent of the dollar 
value outstanding. Massoud et al. (2011) find that credit card penalty fees are positively 
related to default risk of consumers. This supports the argument that lenders are able to use 
penalties to offset the risk of default rather than only adjusting the interest rate. 
The majority of unsecured business debt is debt provided by credit card institutions 
(Sullivan et aI., 2001). This is important when a firm fails and bankruptcy can erase 
unsecured debt such as credit cards. However, terms are easier to change for card issuers. 
For example, in the five years ending in 2008, 79% of small firms surveyed in the United 
States stated that their credit card terms had become more imposing and burdensome (NSBA, 
2009). Part of this 5-year period includes the beginning of the 2008 credit crisis. So when 
the credit market becomes tighter, credit card issuers can change their terms to benefit them, 
and implement more onerous terms on the borrowers. In addition, the minimum monthly 
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payments amounts have been raised since the implementation of the Credit Card Holders Bill 
of Rights in 2009. 
Governments 
Governments try to spur new firm formation by providing incentives to start firms. 
One means is to provide loans to new firms, while another means is to provide guarantees for 
term loans provided by banks. Government loans represent a small percentage of loans to 
new firms. For example, Berger and Udell (1998) find that only 0.49% of the firms use 
government loans. However, the government does provide financial support to new firms 
through other methods. For example, in the United States since 1953, the Small Business 
Association (SBA) has provided guarantees to banks on loans that banks have provided to 
small firms, and in 1997 the U.S. Congress passed legislation for the SBA to provide over 
$50 billion for the SBA's business loan programs. In 2006, the SBA extended $20 billion in 
new guarantees, and its outstanding guarantees amounted to $67 billion (CBO, 2007). By 
providing guarantees, the government helps banks provide long-term credit to borrowers. 
Without the guarantee the banks would more willing to provide short-term credit or not 
provide term loans. 
Owners, Family, Friends, and Other Individuals 
Another source of credit available to new firms is provided in the form of informal 
entities. Berger and Udell (1998) find that 5.17% of the total funding from debt sources is 
from owners, employees, family, and other individuals. However, most of that amount is by 
owners (4.10%). The owners have both debt and equity interest (this 4.10% is only for the 
debt amount). It could be that these personal loans by the owners are an easy mechanism to 
provide short-term financing to the firm. Or it could be a means to create a tax benefit for the 
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firm (supporting the static trade-off theory). Of the 1.47% provided by other individuals, 
most is likely from family and friends (Berger & Udell, 1998). 
The use of informal creditors is also supported by other studies. Extended family 
networks have been found to be one of the main sources of funds for new firms (Pistrui, 
Huang, Welsch, & Jing, 2006). In his study, Bates (1990) finds that the second most used 
credit source was family and friends. In addition, Fraser (2005) finds support for this with 
new firms in the U.K. And finally the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) study finds 
that four out of five informal investors are either family members or friends of the founders 
(Bygrave & Quill, 2007), while historical World Bank studies find this is also the case in 
developing countries (World Bank Economic Research Group, 1989). 
The funds offered by family and friends could help the performance of new firms by 
providing these additional funds. The motivation of family and friends is different than with 
formal creditors. Family members may lend money at lower interest rates than formal 
creditors (Bygrave & Reynolds, 2005; Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, & Ruthven, 2010), and 
are possibly more lenient with repayment of the funds borrowed (Basu & Parker, 2001), 
since family members will provide funds out of love rather than for a financial return. This is 
especially the case when founders come from ethnic minorities (Basu & Parker, 2001). 
Family members have a built in monitoring mechanism as they are around their 
family members on a regular basis - more so than would be a financial institution. Hence, 
costly monitoring mechanisms can be avoided (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Therefore, the family 
member does not have to account for monitoring expenses that formal financial institutions 
do. In addition, when family members own more of the firm, the firm is able to obtain a 
lower cost of debt from formal financial institutions (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003). 
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Informal creditors also have an advantage over formal creditors as they have superior 
information, cheaper monitoring, and informal enforcement through social mechanisms -
which mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection. However, informal creditors are wealth-
constrained and thus cannot offer large and follow-up rounds of financing. 
Even though family and friends offer access to additional funds, there is also an 
argument that borrowing from family and friends possibly hinders the performance of new 
firms. The reason is that borrowing from family and friends deters risk-taking due to the 
threat of social repercussions in case of default (Besley, Coate, & Loury, 1993; Besley & 
Coate, 1995; S. Lee & Persson, 2012). To continue and survive and possibly grow, new 
firms need to take risks when they are faced with an uncertain environment. If new firms are 
too risk averse, they won't capitalize on the opportunity they have and their chance of 
survival possibly decreases. Over time, new firms use less and less informal financing, and 
replace it with formal (bank) financing (Chavis, Klapper, & Love, 2010, 2011). 
Other Businesses 
Firms have strategic relationships with other business which provide access to 
resources to which they wouldn't otherwise have access (e.g. Ahuja, 2000; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996). These unique partnerships create value, provide competitive 
advantages, and lead to better performance (e.g. Dyer & H. Singh, 1998; K. Singh & 
Mitchell, 2005). These strategic relationships could entail one of the firms providing 
financing to the other firm as part of its responsibilities in the relationship (Deeds & Hill, 
1996; P. A. Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Rind, 1981; Robinso & Stuart, 2007). The purpose of 
the relationship is to be a benefit to the operations of both firms. By benefiting both firms, 
the relationship could entail increasing sales, decreasing costs, or providing access to an 
innovative product or service. Thus, the motivation is to improve the main operations of the 
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firms. However, seldom does one firm provide all the necessity external financing to another 
firm. If a firm did that, then it is usually better for one firm to buy the other firm rather than 
the two firms operating as separating entities. 
In summary, the credit sources differ in that each tends to have different market 
power, have different interest rates, provide different schedules of payment, provide different 
amounts of funding, have different application procedures, have different collateral 
requirements, differ in their risk attitudes and ability to diversify, gather information 
differently, monitor differently, react differently to borrowers in financial distress. With 
these differences, it would suggest that the credit source that is chosen by a new firm could 
affect the firm's performance. 
Credit Sources and Performance of New Firms 
How the use of these credit sources affects performance is the next logical 
examination of multiple credit source usage, as performance is important to the firm's future 
and its stakeholders. Performance of new firms is measured by survival and growth rates as 
these two measurements are priorities for entrepreneurs. In the corporate finance literature, 
capital structure is looked at mainly for the purpose of maximizing the value of a firm. The 
assumption is that the firm exists, and that it is up to managers to decide how to maximize 
firm value and/or profit based upon their financing options. In contrast, the entrepreneurial 
finance literature focuses on external financing of firms and the capital structure of these 
firms is important in terms of getting the firm started, to survive, and to possibly grow. Thus, 
in the performance dependent variables of entrepreneurial finance studies, valuation and 
profit are not variables that are often examined. Rather, it is founding, survival, and growth 
rates that are measured. 
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Survival and growth are interrelated, but are different in nature. Survival is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for growth; if a finn does not exist, it cannot possibly 
grow. In addition, growth in tenns of size and age of the finn is influenced by the survival 
rates offinns (Cressy, 2006a). Jovanovic (1982a) provides a stochastic model of finn 
survival and growth based on individual optimism and market equilibrium. Other models of 
finn behavior as they relate to the growth process include the Lucas (1978) model and 
Khilstrom and Laffont (1979) model. However, these two models are not stochastic like the 
Jovanovic model. The Jovanovic model represents a learning experiment in that an 
entrepreneur finds out how good he/she is at starting and running a finn only after entering 
the market and getting feedback from the market. The process of learning starts with the 
individual's prior belief about entrepreneurial ability and evolves over time either up or 
down. The model predicts 1) smaller finns fail more frequently than larger finns, 2) younger 
finns are more likely to fail than older finns, 3) surviving finns grow more slowly than finns 
that failed, and 4) older finns have a smaller variance of growth rates than younger finns. 
Thus, growth rates are negatively related to size. This is supported by Hall (1987) in her 
study with publicly traded small finns and with manufacturing finns. In contrast, a later 
study (Hopenhayn, 1992) finds support for the variance of growth rates to decline with the 
increase in the size of the finn. To make the results more complex, a study commissioned by 
the SBA and perfonned by Teitelbaum and Axtell (2005) finds that finn growth is a random 
walk and that the probability of a given percentage change in size is the same for all finns in 
a given industry. This supports Gibrat's law which says that percentage change in growth 
rates should not be associated with the size of a finn (Gibrat, 1931). 
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Evans (1987a, I 987b) is the first to use a panel data set with truly small firms, 
consisting of manufacturing firms in the United States covering a 5 year period between 
1976-1980. The data set includes more than 20,000 firms. He includes firms with as few as 
five employees (Evans, I 987a) and as few as one employee (Evans, 1987b). He finds that 
smaller and younger firms grow faster and fail more frequently than large, older firms 
(liability of newness and smallness, Stinchcombe, 1965). As well, he finds that the 
variability of growth decreases as age of the firm increases, thus, supporting Jovanovic 
(I 982b ) and Hopenhayn (1992). Young firms more likely grow faster than older firms (Vos 
et aI., 2007). 
New firms usually start small (Audretsch & Mahmood, 1995; Birley, 1987), with 
only a minority that grow to any substantial size (e.g. Acs, Arenius, Hay, & Minniti, 2005; 
Reynolds, 2007; Vos et aI., 2007). The majority of firms that survive are small, as shown by 
there being many more small firms than large firms in an economy at any given time (Berger 
& Udell, 1998; SBA, 20 10). With past results showing mixed results with growth rates and 
size, but not with age, the pursuit of growth is a choice made by the owners of the firm. For 
example, Vos et al. (2007) find that only 8.36% of the firms in their sample wanted to grow. 
And over a period of several years or more, it is difficult to sustain the growth (Barringer, 
Jones, & Neubaum, 2005; Parker, Storey, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2010; Zook & Allen, 1999). 
Even though few firms grow or want to grow, the growth firms are important to an 
economy as they create a larger number of jobs (Birch & Medoff, 1994; Haltiwanger et aI., 
2009; Henrekson & Johansson, 2010; Storey, 1994b). The growth of the firm will affect its 
funding needs. If the firm is able to generate positive cash flow while growing, then the firm 
can use retained earnings (i.e. internal funds) to fund future operations and thus possibly not 
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need as much or additional external funds. However, if the firm is growing without 
generating a positive net cash flow, or growth is faster than the cash flow growth, then the 
firm will still need to obtain funds externally as it grows. Or by recapitalizing, the firm would 
decide to use external funding to replace other external funding sources (i.e. recapitalize 
itself). In general, growth-oriented firms are more likely to seek external financing and are 
able to secure financing from at least one of the sources available to new firms (Cosh, 
Cumming, & Hughes, 2009). 
Capital structure has been found to be a main factor in determining if a new firm will 
survive during its first 2-3 years of existence. A new firm with a better capital structure will 
be able to survive through the "valley of death". Cressy (1996b) examines the relationship 
between the survival rate of new firms and their use of bank loans. He examines around 
2,000 start-ups in the United Kingdom and finds that owner characteristics have a significant 
impact on the survival rate of new firms, and that firm characteristics have less of an effect 
on obtaining bank loans than originally thought. 
Bates (1990) studies the survival rates of new firms and concludes that the initial 
capital of firms increases their chances of survival. However, the specific reliance on bank 
debt to finance the new firm's operations does not affect the survival rate. Bank loans are the 
most frequent source of credit for the firms in Bates' study. In addition, debt and equity 
capital are found to be complements of one another. Astebro & Bernhardt (2003) use data 
from firms started in 1987 in the United States from the Characteristics of Business Owners 
(CBO) survey that is conducted by the U.S. Census and find an interesting relationship 
between survival and bank loans for new firms. They find a statistically significant negative 
association between having a bank loan and new firm survival, especially if a new firm 
53 
obtains the bank loan in the first yearl2. This is in spite of these firms with bank loans having 
higher average sales than firms that did not have a bank loan. This finding is contrary to 
Bates' (1990) finding that debt does not affect the survival rate. In the Astebro & Bernhardt 
(2003) study, the survival rate increases if the firm has a loan from friends, family, former 
owners, or a house mortgage. The credit sources used in their study are the owner's spouse, 
other family members, friends, personal credit card, refinanced home, former owner, bank 
loan, other type of loan, and federal/state / local government. The highest category as a 
percentage of dollar value of the debt used by a firm is bank loans (up to 22.4%), with other 
family members the next highest (up to 11.5%). This suggests it is not the amount of funds 
that makes the difference in surviving or not surviving, but possibly the use of these 
additional sources. This is consistent with Bates' (1990) statistics. 
Most founders are similar in their intentions to start and operate a firm that survives. 
However, founders differ in their goals for growing their firms. Some founders want to grow 
fast, and some want to grow slow, while others don't want to grow at all after they have 
reached a certain level of sustainability (Cassar, 2004; Vos et aI., 2007). Thus, the motives 
of founders differ based upon their need for growth. In addition, there are cases where 
founders want and try to grow their firms but other factors hinder their growth. One of these 
factors is the capital structure of the firm. 
Capital structure has not conclusively been found to be a main factor in determining if 
a new firm will grow initially. In some studies, debt has helped new firms grow, while debt 
has been found to hinder growth in other studies. Ayyagari, Oemirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic 
(2010) study bank usage amongst growing Chinese firms. Their study is motivated by the 
12 In the Astebro & I. Bernhardt (2003) study, a firm is considered to be a surviving firm if the original owners 
remain owners for four years or if the firm is still operating after four years but under new owners 
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dominant view that informal finance institutions act in a complementary role to formal 
financial systems. Informal financing institutions complement formal financing institutions. 
They do so by servicing the lower end of the market since informal financing normally 
consists of small, unsecured and short term financing facilities provided to small firms. 
Using a database of2,400 Chinese firms, the authors find that firms with bank loans grow 
faster than firms that use informal methods of financing. Their results hold for their entire 
sample as well as with only private sector firms. 
The relationship between credit card usage and firm performance is not heavily 
researched; only recently have studies been conducted to examine this relationship. As it 
relates to survival of new firms and the use of credit cards, Scott III (2009) investigates 
whether the survival rates of new firms depends on revolving credit card debt. Revolving 
credit card debt is debt that is not paid off at the end of the month and therefore is subject to 
interest rate charges. Credit cards are useful for new firms because of the ease of acceptance, 
accessibility and anonymity. However, credit card debt comes with high carrying (interest) 
costs for small firms relative to other types of business loans. This suggests that firms using 
credit cards to finance their activities may have a lower likelihood of survival during their 
early years. In investigating this, Scott III (2009) finds that new firms that have higher 
revolving credit card debt balances have a lower survival probability. He concludes that this 
is the case because credit card debt is expensive relative to other types of credit and 
distressed firms use credit cards to sustain firms that should fail (i.e. that are negative net 
positive projects). 
Fraser (2005) finds no difference between the usage of credit cards based upon 
growth rates. Small and medium-sized firms use credit cards to pay for day-to-day expenses 
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and fixed capital (Fraser, 2005). However, Fraser (2005) saw 79% to 90% of the finns in his 
data set payoff their outstanding credit balance each month. Thus, many finns do not incur 
the high interest rate costs. 
These studies provide mixed results for how individual credit instruments and sources 
affect survival and growth of new finns. Using multiple credit sources is another external 
financing strategy for finns to use to possibly improve their survival and growth rates. 
Multiple Credit Source Usage by New Firms 
Multiple credit source usage is empirically demonstrated in a recent study. Studying 
bank-borrower relationships in the United Kingdom over the past 100 years, Braggion & 
Ongena (2011) find that since 1966, finns began to move to multiple banking relationships. 
This was especially the case for larger, more transparent, and better governed borrowers. 
From 1960 to 1966, 85% of the finns in their sample had a single bank relationship. From 
1966 to 1986 (the last year in their data set), this figure dropped to 60%. The authors posit 
that the reason for this change was due to the deregulation and resulting increase in 
competition in the banking section in the United Kingdom in the 1970s, as was written about 
by Saunders & Ward (1976). 
Finns may use multiple credit sources to fund their operations for various reasons. 
The reasons for using multiple credit sources are based upon the existence of financially 
weak creditors (Detragiache, Garella, & Guiso, 2000), hold-up costs (Farinha & J. A. C. 
Santos, 2002), threat of bankruptcy of the creditors (e.g. Bisin & Rampini, 2006; P. Bolton & 
Scharfstein, 1996; Rajan, 1992), strong negotiation positions for the entrepreneur (Bergman 
& Callen, 1991), and access to additional funds (Hackbarth, Hennessy, & Leland, 2007). 
Detragiache et al (2000) examine multiple banking relationships using private finns 
in Italy to find out why finns, including small finns, need more than one bank. They 
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construct a model that involves firms' multiple banking relationships where firms wish to 
reduce liquidity risk. Their model predicts that firms whose banks are less fragile or whose 
creditors find it more difficult to enforce loan repayment will be more likely to resort to 
multiple banking relationships. The reason is that the number of banks increases when the 
firm goes to refinance and a more fragile bank cannot increase the amount they have lent to 
the firm. So the firm looks for additional banks at that time which leads to multiple banking 
relationships. In their model, they refer to this as the bank having a "liquidity crisis" (a run 
on the bank; lower deposits). So with this in mind, borrowers will actually seek to have 
multiple banking relationships. The analysis of their data supports this logic. 
Farinha & Santos (2002) find that many firms start with borrowing from a single bank 
and then add additional banks over time. Their analysis shows that a firm will substitute a 
single banking relationship with a multiple banking relationship based upon the lengths of 
the relationship with the banks; the longer the duration of the relationship with the banks, the 
higher probability that the firm will use multiple banking relationships. The same is true 
with firms with poor performance and more growth opportunities. This suggests that firms 
will use multiple banking relationships to either try to survive or to grow. The poorly 
performing firms that use multiple banking relationships do not improve their performance 
because ofthe use of multiple banking relationships. Thus the use of multiple banking 
relationships does not help firms perform better if they are already performing poorly. The 
authors feel their results suggest that hold-up costs are the main reason for the firms to 
initiate additional banking relationships early in their life. Hold-up costs comprise the extra 
rent that a financial institution earns by taking advantage of collecting proprietary 
information on a borrower in a long relationship. This is referred to as the "hold-up" 
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problem 13. This is confirmed in a recent study by Howorth & Moro (2012) where they 
investigate small Italian firms. They find that interest rates are higher for firms with longer 
relationships and multiple product relationships - supporting the argument that small firms 
may be locked into the relationship with a single bank. 
Another reason why firms might have multiple banks is because some banks 
specialize in the type of loans they provide. In this case, a firm might work with one bank to 
obtain a loan based upon using account receivables as collateral, and another bank to obtain a 
loan based upon the owner's mortgage as collateral. With founders not having all the 
collateral needed, these differences in collateral requirements could push new firms to use 
mUltiple credit sources so they can obtain additional funds. 
In the research stream focusing on multiple creditors, several papers base their 
reasoning on using multiple credit sources because of the threat of bankruptcy - that 
managers make decisions to use multiple creditors based upon what might happen if the firm 
was to default on the debt from the creditors. The threat of bankruptcy due to not being able 
to service debt from creditors affects managers' decisions to use multiple creditors. The 
bankruptcy models show that there is a benefit to both firms (borrowers) and creditors, 
suggesting that multiple creditors solve the moral hazard problem between creditor and 
borrower. The motive for the borrower to default is overcome since it is harder to 
renegotiate with multiple sources. The papers have modeled multiple creditor problems 
based upon a borrower voluntarily or involuntarily going into default (Bergman & Callen, 
1991; Bisin & Rampini, 2006; P. Bolton & Scharfstein, 1996; Bris & Welch, 2005; 
Hackbarth et aI., 2007; Rajan, 1992; von Thadden, Berglof, & Roland, 2010; Winton, 1995). 
13 See Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990) for more about the "hold-up" problem. 
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Bris & Welch (2005) also examine the coordination problem between multiple 
creditors in ex-post negotiations. They discuss that such negotiations are inefficient, but that 
free-riding due to using multiple creditors reduces the incentives for such wasteful activities. 
Their view is that dispersed creditors are unable to be proactive as a group since they are not 
able to easily and cost effectively coordinate with one another. In their model, an 
entrepreneur who decides to use multiple credit sources assures himself / herself of better 
bargaining ability against the creditors if the firm falls into financial distress. However an 
entrepreneur who selects to use only one credit source is forced to negotiate extensively with 
that one creditor and this one creditor will be relatively more successful in enforcing its 
claim. The resulting model suggests that using fewer creditors ends up being worse for 
entrepreneurs in financial distress, while fewer creditors means more collection efforts, costs, 
and waste for creditors. Thus, there is an incentive for both the entrepreneur and the creditor 
to have multiple creditors involved in funding a business. 
Bisin & Rampini (2006) study the role of bankruptcy when borrowers can enter into 
multiple credit relationships with non-exclusive contracts and when creditors cannot observe 
one another. Bankruptcy laws inhibit entrepreneurs from using multiple creditors since the 
laws enable the enforcement of a primary creditor's claim to any assets that the entrepreneur 
has above the bankruptcy protection level. Therefore, bankruptcy restricts the number of 
creditors available to firms in the secondary market when assuming banks are the only 
creditors. However, bankruptcy laws might not be a perfect substitute for enforceability of 
exclusive contracts. Their model suggests that secondary markets do not have to include 
additional banks, but can include credit cards, loans from friends and family, and other non-
bank financial institutions that do not require collateral and are thus unsecured creditors. 
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Unlike the other papers on bankruptcy, the Bisin & Rampini (2006) model incorporates the 
entrepreneur and thus is not contingent on the firm being large or established. 
Von Thadden et al (2010) use an optimal contracting framework with imperfect 
negotiation to model the use of multiple creditors. They show that having multiple creditors 
will increase a firm's access to debt while also increasing its incentive to default strategically. 
Their findings support having bankruptcy rules that protect creditors, because without the 
bankruptcy rules, firms would use multiple creditors unethically as default would be in their 
best interest. 
Hackbarth et al (2007) examine continuous-time modelsl4 of debt renegotiation due 
to the possibility of bankruptcy. They extend the model of Hege & Mella-Barral (2005) to 
include both market and bank debt. Market debt is made up of bonds that are financial 
facilities that are issued to public - thus, market debt can be considered public debt. Bank 
debt can be costlessly and efficiently renegotiated. Since market debt is offered to numerous 
entities, it is not costlessly and efficiently renegotiated I 5. Therefore, firms would want to 
only contract bank debt. However, the amount of bank debt that a firm can obtain is limited 
to the firm's collateral. In order to increase the debt capacity of the firm, the model shows 
that a firm will have multiple creditors in the form of market and bank debt. Although 
market debt is usually not available to new and small firms, Hackbarth et al (2007) provide 
another example why firms use multiple credit sources. 
Most of the studies mentioned above assume firms are large or are established. Large 
and established firms are different than new firms, in that they latter experience greater 
14 Continuous-time models are models in which the "system" is constantly changing over time. Such models 
are often described by a set of linear differential equations. Continuous-time models have an advantage over 
discrete time models in that they are friendlier to mathematical manipulation. 
15 Bank debt also ends up having a senior priority over market debt (e.g. WeIch, 1997). 
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information asymmetry with external funders due to various reasons (as mentioned earlier). 
Higher information asymmetry possibly leads to credit rationing of new firms. Established 
firms are more readily able to tap into debt markets and thus it is by choice that they do so. 
In contrast, new firms are limited in their access to debt markets, and there are fewer and 
smaller credit sources available. In addition, they need additional funds to get started and to 
initially survive. Established firms do not have this issue. 
Studies also show small and young firms use multiple credit sources, but borrowing 
patterns of small and young firms reveal a complex picture. In the 1993 and 1998 Survey of 
Small Business Finances (SSBF), around 50% of the firms borrowed from multiple creditors, 
and firms borrowed different amounts from different creditors (SSBF). For example, using 
the SSBF, Guiso & Minetti (2010) find that for firms with two credit sources, the largest 
credit source provides 76.5% of the total credit. For firms with three credit sources, the 
largest creditor provides 65.1 % of the total credit. Therefore, even when using multiple 
credit sources, there is one main credit source that provides the majority of the credit in terms 
of dollar amount. The dollar amount is not evenly spread across credit sources used. The 
additional credit sources fill the difference in terms of the total funds needed by the firm. 
When using the entire SSBF data set, the firms are not young firms since the average age of 
the firms is 17.6 years (Ang, R. A. Cole, & Lin, 2000). Guiso & Minetti (2010) use the 
entire data set along with sub-samples of the SSBF, all of which have firms that have an 
average age of approximately 15 years. Thus, these are not new firms, but are small firms of 
all ages in the analysis performed by Guiso & Minetti (2010). 
Berger & Udell (1998) find that one-third of the firms in their sample of small firms 
use more than one financing institution and the firms tend to stay with their current financial 
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institution an average of 6.64 years (supporting relationship-based lending, as opposed to 
transaction-based lending16). However, the authors do not examine the data based upon age, 
i.e. they do not report if older or newer firms use a different number of credit sources or not. 
Although they do break out the sample into other categories based upon age, they combine 
the entire sample into one group when examining the number of financing institutions small 
firms use. It could be that older firms dominate this figure and as the firm ages it tends to 
move to one financing source. 
Petersen & Rajan (1994) were one of the first to examine the benefits of multiple 
lending relationships by small firms. They examine how the relationships between a firm 
and its creditors affect the availability of funds for small firms, as well as the cost of funds 
for small firms. They find that the primary benefit of having multiple banking relationships 
is to increase the availability of financing, and not to decrease the financing costs. If offered 
the choice, firms prefer more credit rather than cheaper credit. They use data from the 
Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF), where small firms are defined as those having 
less than 500 employees. The 3,404 firms in their sample have a median age of 10 years, 
with a median size of book assets of $130,000 and median sales of $300,000. The firms in 
their sample borrow about 50% of their debt from banks, with 26% coming from the firm's 
owners and their families. They suggest there is a "pecking order" of borrowing by new 
firms, with the closest sources being used first (e.g. family) and then moving to lenders that 
are more at arm's length. They do break up their sample by both size (book value of assets) 
and age « 2 years old, 2-5 years old, 5-10 years old, and 3 other categories). They find that 
18% of the firms in their sample borrow from more than one bank. Their results also suggest 
16 Relationship-based banking is when bank managers base their decision to provide credit on their relationship 
with the borrower; whereas, transaction-based banking is when bank managers base their decision to provide 
credit solely on the financial situation (figures) of the borrower. 
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that using more than one bank increases the firm's cost of financing, as the interest rate 
increases by 31 basis points for each additional bank that a firm borrows from. These results 
go against the rationale for the "hold-up" problem related to single banking relationships. It 
could be that the number of banks is a proxy for the firm's quality, i.e. lower quality firms 
are unable to borrow additional money from their first bank, and thus must approach other 
banks for additional capital. Therefore, the unwillingness of the first bank to extend the firm 
additional credit could be a signal of the firm's quality. In contrast, they find that increasing 
the number of non-bank financial institutions that a firm borrows from has no effect on the 
firm's borrowing interest rate with banks 17. 
Cole (20 II) uses multiple instances of the SSBF and finds 60-70% of the firms in the 
SSBF have mUltiple relationships with financial institutions. The average number of 
relationships that firms have with financial institutions is 2.4 in 2003. 25% of the firms have 
multiple bank relationships, with the average being 1.3. In addition, 6-12% of the firms have 
no relationships with banks, and around 50% have no relationships with non-bank financial 
institutions. Credit card usage increases from 54% in 1993 to 78% in 2003. The percentage 
of firms that do not payoff their credit card balance each month increases from 13% in 1993 
to 23% in 2003. In addition, the use of trade credit declines from 83% in 1987 to 61 % in 
2003. 
Vos et al (2007) find that 25% of the firms in their sample use five or more types of 
financing (out of26 options in their survey): 50.8% - line of credit, 30.6% - personal 
savings, 29.5% - bank loans, 28.5% - retained earnings, 25.5% - credit cards - these are the 
17 With non-bank financial institutions having higher average interest rates than banks, it could be the case that 
even after seeing the lowering effect of the interest rates with non-bank financial institutions and an increase in 
the interest rate offered by banks due to multiple relationships, banks still have a lower interest rate than non-
bank financial institutions. 
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main types of financing used. In their study, only a limited number of firms use financing 
from informal sources such as family (8.4%) and friends (3.1 %). The use of venture capital 
(0.8%) and angel (0.7%) funding is used even less. They examine small and medium-sized 
firms in the United Kingdom and the United States (using the 1998 SSBF). The 44% of the 
firms in the United Kingdom sample were 5 years old or less. 
The use of multiple credit cards is an option for new firms to use (Scott III, 2009). 
With new firms often obtaining less funding from formal credit sources because they are 
considered risky by most banks (Berger & Udell, 1998; Colombo & Grilli, 2007), credit 
cards are a popular form of borrowing among new firms (J. D. Cole et aI., 2005). This is 
especially the case during times of tight credit (National Small Business Association, 2009). 
With credit card institutions using simple and automated application processes, credit cards 
are one of the easiest means for firms to obtain credit. However, credit card institutions put 
strict limits on the amount of credit which a firm can borrow, which is a small amount 
relative to the needs· of the firm and what banks loan to firms. Thus, if a firm is going to use 
credit cards, they don't use just one credit card. Rather, they use multiple credit cards to try 
to obtain any sizeable financing from this source. And, if firms don't repay their outstanding 
balance on time, this can be very costly as the interest rates for credit cards can be high 
compared to other sources of credit. In addition, credit card institutions charge much higher 
interest rates for cash advances compared to purchases of products and services. This pushes 
firms to use credit cards mainly for purchasing products and services specific to their 
operations. New firms use other funding sources to pay for expenses that require cash 
payment, such as payroll, since it would be very expensive to use credit cards to fund such 
expenses. 
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Multiple Credit Source Usage and New Firm Performance 
New firms have limited financial capital and tap into external funding sources, 
including creditors. They are limited with their access and are only able to tap into a limited 
number of options initially. However, as their needs start to materialize, they likely require 
additional funds. They tum to banks for these funds initially. But with the possibility of 
credit rationing due to high information asymmetry issues associated with new firms (Stiglitz 
& Weiss, 1981), new firms explore the use of multiple credit sources. Securing credit from 
any source could possibly relax financial constraints on investment for a new firm. By 
securing credit from one source, new firms should have a higher probability of survival and 
growth. However, as shown, there are mixed results in how an individual credit source 
affects survival and growth of new firms. Alternative credit sources tend to be a more 
expensive option of external funding for new firms than bank loans (e.g. Bonfim, Dai, & 
Franco, 2008; Danielson & Scott, 2004; Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht, 2007; Rajan, 1992; 
Sharpe, 1990). In addition, these alternative credit sources tend to provide smaller amounts 
of credit. The small amount of additional credit could satisfy the capital needs of new firms. 
However, the use of multiple credit sources by new firms (as opposed to a single source) 
might be needed for them to survive longer and possibly grow. The past studies imply that 
multiple credit sources can affect performance, but none of them address how the use of 
multiple credit sources affects the performance of new firms. 
Entrepreneurship research suggests that new firms may continue to survive even 
when rationed credit, since the founders who start new firms tend to be persistent (Astebro, 
2003; e.g. Cardon et aI., 2005; Gimeno et aI., 1997; P. Gompers et aI., 2010; Hamilton, 2000; 
Sexton & Bowman-Upton, 1991), persevere longer than rationally thought (M. W. Meyer & 
Zucker, 1989; D. A. Shepherd et aI., 2009; Van Witteloostuijn, 1998), and are resourceful 
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(Baker & R. E. Nelson, 2005). Entrepreneurs typically have most of their personal wealth 
tied up in their firm. This signals they have a high degree of commitment or emotional 
investment in the outcome. Hamilton (2000) shows that even when controlling for many 
characteristics, founders enter and persist in their firms despite having lower initial earnings 
and lower earnings growth than if they were in paid employment. Moskowitz & Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002) find similar results with family firms. They find the return on family firms 
is no better than on public equity, but the risk is far greater. And finally, when examining 
innovative firms, Astebro (2003) finds that independent inventors are often committed to 
unprofitable firms. Many of the inventors persisted in trying to bring their ideas to market 
despite being advised their venture had a low probability of making money. Persistence can 
be beneficial as entrepreneurial returns are only realized after a long delay (Hamilton, 2000). 
Moreover, entrepreneurs need to persist (survive) to be able to capitalize on the financial 
benefits of starting and operating one's own firm. As well, one does not find out if he/she is 
good at running one's own firm until after sometime since entrepreneurship is a "learning 
experiment" (Jovanovic, 1982a). 
As for the effects of multiple credit sources usage on firm performance, the results are 
mixed. Degryse & Ongena (2001) find a negative relationship between the number of 
banking relationships and firm profitability using Norwegian data; whereas, Weinstein & 
Yafeh (1998) find a positive relationship between the same two variables using Japanese 
data. Castelli, Dwyer, & Hasan (2010) further this line of research by studying Italian firms 
in which they find a negative relationship between the number of banking relationships and 
both return on equity and return on assets, with the relationship being stronger for smaller 
firms. 
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It is difficult to predict the survival and growth of new firms when they use non-bank 
credit sources (Astebro & I. Bernhardt, 2003), and even more difficult to predict survival and 
growth rates when examining multiple credit source usage. We cannot say ex-ante ifhaving 
non-bank credit sources will have a greater effect on survival and growth of a firm. A loan 
obtained from family and friends may be a poor signal of business credibility. However, 
family and friends have better knowledge of personal characteristics of the founders than 
other credit sources. 
Debt and use of multiple credit sources can lead to growth of a firm. This is supported 
by the finding in Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht (2004). Their first finding is that firms in 
high growth industries have higher bank debt usage as a percentage of total external 
financing. Using a data set of new firms in Belgium, the proportion of debt as it relates to the 
total amount of funding is significantly larger for firms in industries with higher historical 
growth rates. These industries may be increasing in the number of firms and not necessarily 
increasing in firm size. However, they also find a positive relationship between growth and 
debt (Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht, 2007). Houston & James (1996) also find support for 
this when firms have multiple bank relationships when examining large publicly traded 
firms. This suggests that debt and the use of multiple credit sources can be used to promote 
growth of new firms. 
An obvious benefit to new firms is access to additional funds. For example, Cole 
(2011) finds that leverage increases with number of bank relationships, supporting the idea 
that as more banks provide credit to firms, the more credit firms are able to use in their 
operations. These additional funds could improve the performance of new firms. 
67 
I f new finns use multiple credit sources because of capital constraints, then using 
multiple credit sources could help finns grow. Binks & Ennew (1996) examine the use of 
financing constraints on growing finns. With a survey of over 6,000 finns in the United 
Kingdom, they find that finns that expect to grow in the future have the perception that they 
are under tight credit constraints. If new finns feel they are under tight credit constraints, 
then they are constantly trying to expand their access to additional credit. Trying to expand 
access to additional credit would suggest these finns would try to use additional credit 
sources to expand access to additional credit. 
Relationship banking is a key aspect in banking research, and has mixed results in 
tenns of the relationship between number of banking relationships and finn perfonnance. A 
close relationship between a bank and finn can reduce infonnation asymmetries and thus 
improve the finn's access to credit and save on transaction and negotiation costs. Banks 
acquire infonnation about a finn over the course of the relationship (e.g. Lummer & 
McConnell, 1989; M. A. Petersen & Rajan, 1994). Creditors use this infonnation garnered 
from closer relationships to set contractual tenns (Berger & Udell, 1995). The longer the 
relationship a finn has with a bank tends to lead to more access to credit from the bank at 
lower interest rates (Boot & Thakor, 1994; M. A. Petersen & Rajan, 1994, 1995). A decrease 
in the infonnation asymmetry in the relationship between lender and finn and better access to 
credit due to the closer relationship between the two parties would suggest using one credit 
source because a close relationship with that credit source could reduce the threat of credit 
rationing by that source. In other words, a closer relationship would lead to the finn being 
able to borrow as much as they need from the lender. This is using the reasoning used by 
Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), where infonnation asymmetry is the cause of credit rationing. 
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A counter argument exists that a long-term relationship between a bank and a firm 
allows the bank to exploit the relationship. The bank has the most information about the firm 
and the firm is then unable to convey information about its quality to other banks quickly to 
strike another relationship (Sharpe, 1990). This is referred as the "hold-up problem" in the 
finance literature. Examining 18,000 bank loans to small Belgian firms, Oegryse & Van 
Cayseele (2000) find support that the interest rate increases as the duration of the bank-firm 
relationship increases even when the collateral requirements decrease over the course of the 
relationship. In their study, interest rates only decrease when the borrower purchases more 
than one credit instrument from the bank (e.g. multiple loans, or a loan and a line of credit). 
The hold-up problem is a large issue for growth firms as they are stretched thin financially, 
living from one day to the next in many cases. This is further supported with research that 
indicates that successful firms don't want to be held hostage to the risk of a creditor going 
bankrupt (e.g. Oetragiache et aI., 2000). 
In a study examining the link between internal financing and firm growth, G. W. 
Haynes & J. R. Brown (2009) discover that small growth firms are more likely to have more 
lines of credit, motor vehicle loans, capital leases, equipment loans, and loans from both bank 
and non-bank financial institutions than non-growth firms. 
The financial growth cycle theory says, in summary, that as a firm ages and grows, 
more information is available about the firm which leads to the less information asymmetry 
between external funders and the firm (borrower). Less information asymmetry results in the 
new firm having the ability to obtain funds from multiple credit sources if it chooses to do so. 
This is the scenario that is implicitly depicted in Berger & Udell's (1998) financial growth 
theory. Figure I on page 623 of their article, and which is provided herein as Figure 1, 
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suggests that new firms are able to obtain different types of financing as they age. Through 
the paper, the authors discuss how firms can use different funding sources, but not 
necessarily at the same time. However, when looking at their Figure I, one can see 
overlapping bars that indicate the firms might use multiple types of financing instruments at 
any given time. They however don't breakout the funding based upon the sources of credit. 
They do break out the funding sources based upon equity sources (venture capital, angels, 
and insiders). I have illustrated there are various credit sources that are important to 
understand and understand how they can be used simultaneously, which can be considered an 
extension of the finance growth theory. 
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Figure 1: Berger and Udell's "Firm Continuum and Sources of Finance" 
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Pr!va1e Plocements 1 
Potential lenders are more likely to extend credit to small firms if they have 
performed a transaction with the small firm or founder / owner in the past (R. A. Cole, 1998) 
and borrowers that use debt once tend to use more debt over time (Vanacker & Manigart, 
2006). Using the 1993 SSBF, Cole (1998) examines the pre-existing relationships between a 
firm and its potential lender to determine the effects of that relationship on obtaining further 
credit. He finds that a pre-existing relationship is. helpful in obtaining further credit from that 
same creditor. This follows on the idea that lenders perceive follow-up loans to be less risky 
when past transactions are successful as the business is considered to be viable and 
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trustworthy (Diamond, 1991 b). Thus, as the new firm ages, it is not required to look outside 
of pre-existing credit relationships to obtain additional funds if the borrower growth rate 
doesn't require more funds than can be provided by the existing creditors. In other words, 
more credit options become available as the firm ages; however, if the firm doesn't want to 
grow and rather wants to be stable, the use of multiple credit sources should level off at some 
point in time. 
Vanacker & Manigart (2006) find that firms that previously issued external financing 
are more likely to do so in the future. They also find that firms that issue debt are more 
likely to issue debt in the future. This suggests a learning or information effect. New firms 
that access multiple credit sources get used to doing so or once a new firm is comfortable 
with one type of credit source they use that same credit source multiple times (e.g. multiple 
bank loans or multiple credit cards). 
The theory of debt structure presented by Bolton & Scharfstein (1996), their theory of 
debt structure shows there is an optimal number of credit sources between using one or two 
credit sources. In their model, having two creditors can increase firm value because of 
increased bargaining pressure in strategic default by the borrower. On the other hand, having 
two creditors can decrease firm value because of less efficient continuation choices in 
liquidity default. What emerges is an optimal number of creditors that is based upon the 
trade-off between these two tendencies. In addition, the search cost for finding a new bank 
can stop firms from obtaining multiple banking relationships (N. R. Blackwell & Santomero, 
1982). This results in a hold-up problem that could restrict firms from adding another 
banking relationship. 
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Firms that continue to survive are able to pay off their debt with cash flow and require 
less external funds. For example, Cole (2011) finds that book-value leverage (total loans / 
total assets) is negatively related with age for small, privately-held firms. Thus, as a firm 
ages, the less leverage it uses relative to its total assets. Therefore there may be less of a 
need for using multiple credit sources. 
Credit sources other than banks can be more costly. Loans from non-bank financial 
institutions, credit cards from credit card institutions, and trade finance tend to have higher 
interest rates 18. Hence, if a firm uses these non-bank credit sources, the financing costs could 
actually be higher. Danielson & Scott (2004) and Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht (2007) find 
that non-bank credit sources are more expensive. Danielson & Scott (2004) use the 1995 
Credit, Banks, and Small Business Survey (CBSBS) which focuses on small, privately 
owned firm and is conducted by the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) 
with their 600,000 members at the time the surveys were conducted in 1980, 1982, 1984, 
1987, and 1995. Unlike the SSBF, which is used by Petersen & Rajan (1994, 1997) and uses 
detailed balance sheet and profit/loss information, the CBSBS asks the firms to provide the 
categories that best fit their firm (self-reports and Likert scales). Their study focuses on 
understanding whether the availability of bank loans affects trade credit and credit card 
demand 19. Their main finding is that firms increase their demand for trade credit and credit 
card debt when faced with credit constraints, and they conclude that there is a "pecking 
order" within debt financing where firms increase their demand of potentially expensive 
credit sources when banks will not lend to them. Their study is focused on determining if 
18 Credit cards and trade financing usually have higher interest rates than other types of credit sources. 
However, the cost is only higher to borrowers if they do not pay on time. 
19 The NFIB CBSBS survey asks respondents about possible problems with financial institutions, sources of 
funding, current bank funding, outcome of most recent loan request, and more. See Dunkelberg (1998) for a 
more detailed description of the CBSBS survey. 
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credit limits on small firms by banks increase the reliance on trade credit and credit card 
debt. Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht (2007) find that new firms with high adverse selection 
and risk shifting problems use less bank debt and compensate for this by using other credit 
sources, such as leasing and trade credit. Firms in growth industries are not able to use 
alternative credit sources to fully compensate for the lack of access to bank debt. 
Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht (2007) use a data set of 244 manufacturing firms incorporated 
in Belgium. However, they also find that trade credit and credit card debt are more 
expensive than bank credit. 
Banks may be eager to build a relationship with new firms that have the potential to 
grow. By establishing a relationship with the firm at an early age, they are hoping that the 
long-term relationship will payoff in the future. Throughout the relationship, banks hope to 
obtain private information about the firm to better understand the firm's ability to meet future 
financial obligations. Such information may allow the bank to lock in the firm as a customer 
and extract higher interest rates (Degryse & Ongena, 2002). Hence, the banks help new 
firms get off the ground, but might hinder their growth if the banks try to subsequently 
extract higher interest rates. 
Studies presented herein suggest that the general population of new, young, and small 
firms are credit rationed by banks, but banks are the first to be approached by these firms 
when deciding to borrow. Banks are the most frequently used source of credit by new firms, 
even though entrepreneurs don't trust banks. A firm's propensity to borrow decreases with 
age, and bank borrowing becomes less important as the firm ages. However, if the firm 
grows in size, borrowing may become necessary to finance the acquisition of fixed assets and 
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fund working capital. Access to additional funds could be gained through using alternative 
and multiple credit sources. 
New firms usually require more resources as they grow, emerge, and mature (H. E. 
Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Greiner, 1972). If they are able to access multiple credit sources 
during their early years of existence, it would be logical that new firms continue to utilize 
more credit sources as they come available over time for the purpose of obtaining additional 
funds. Over time, new firms start to mature and accumulate assets on the balance sheet 
against which they can borrow (Berger & Udell, 1998). This may provide new firms access 
to more credit sources. With banks possibly rationing credit (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), new 
firms have to look elsewhere for adequate amounts of funds. Firms will try to exhaust their 
debt options first before tapping into equity options (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). 
New firms can leverage the positive signal of a bank loan to obtain more debt from multiple 
credit sources since banks produce valuable information about new firms (James, 1987; 
Lummer & McConnell, 1989; Shockley & Thakor, 1997). This would possibly suggest that 
as new firms age they start to leverage their bank relationship to obtain additional funds from 
additional sources, possibly other credit sources. 
Theory of Resourceful Financing Using Multiple Credit Sources 
The previous sections in this chapter each provided a building block for the theory of 
resourceful financing by using multiple credit sources, specifically for new firms. A 
summary of the theory, which is based upon the capital constraints argument, is as follows. 
As shown in the chapter, considerable (but not all) research indicates that new firms 
face financial constraints. New firms are thus often required (or need) to obtain funds from 
external sources if they are to survive and possibly grow. The external sources of funding 
include debt and equity. Debt is one of the first sizeable sources of external funding by new 
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firms, in particular debt from banks. However, due to a large amount of information 
asymmetry prevalent in the relationship between banks and new firms, banks may ration 
credit to new firms and thus don't provide any or all of the necessary funds needed to operate 
a positive new present value project (and there are specific sets of assumptions that are 
sufficient to theoretically result in credit rationing, and there are empirical studies that show 
that credit rationing does occur). Type I credit rationing occurs when banks provide only a 
portion of the required funds to the borrower. With Type I credit rationing prevalent with 
new firms, they are not able to obtain all of the necessary funds from one bank. They need 
additional funds to continue to survive and possibly grow. According to the pecking order 
theory (which, along with credit rationing theory, is based upon information asymmetry 
reasoning), new firms will exhaust their other credit options first before looking for funds via 
equity. In addition, entrepreneurs favor debt over equity because they do not want to share 
the upside with equity investors and don't trust banks. Thus, new firms possibly evaluate 
other credit sources. To obtain additional funds they can access non-bank financial 
institutions, government, other businesses, owners, employees, family, friends, and other 
individuals. However, non-bank financial institutions operate in conjunction with banks over 
time. In addition, credit card institutions don't provide a large amount of funds even though 
it is generally quite easy to obtain funds from them. Family and friends offer funds, but may 
be financially constrained themselves and possibly hold back the firm from reaching its 
potential. However, family and friends will generally not push a firm into bankruptcy as 
formal credits would do when the firm faces financial distress. None of these individual 
credit sources provide all the necessary funds needed to survive and possibly grow. 
However, according to the financial growth cycle theory, new firms provide more 
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information to external funding sources as they age and grow and thus are possibly able to 
use multiple credit sources at the same time. This resourceful activity of using multiple 
credit sources would enable the new firm to obtain additional funds. With additional funds 
associated with higher survival and growth rates, being resourceful in financing by using 
multiple credit sources should lead to higher survival and growth rates. 
Thus, 1 hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1: For new firms, being resourceful in financing by 
using multiple credit sources is positively associated with 
survival 
Hypothesis 2: For new firms, being resourceful in financing by 
using multiple credit sources is positively associated with 
growth 
Figure 2 depicts the hypothesized model: 
Figure 2: Hypothesized Model 
Multiple Credit 
Source Usage 





In my theory, I use arguments that refer to financial constraints, credit rationing 
theory, pecking order theory, and financial growth cycle theory. Each of these theories has 
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assumptions upon which the arguments hold true. These assumptions also apply to my theory 
of resourceful financing. For credit rationing to exist, there is a market assumption that says 
that credit rationing in the market place exists due to information asymmetry and it is Type I 
credit rationing (not Type II credit rationing20). Thus, firms are able to obtain partial funding 
from credit sources rather than no funding from credit sources. The financial growth cycle 
theory assumes that the available credit sources are banks, non-bank financial institutions, 
credit card institutions, other businesses, government, owners, employees, family, and other 
individuals (Berger & Udell, 1998). Other types of credit sources, such as corporate bonds, 
are not available to new firms until they become older and larger. Contrary to the financial 
growth cycle theory, I don't include trade financing in the theory as trade financing is 
operational funding and represents spontaneous funding that might or might not be costly. 
Specific to my theory, it is assumed that new firms need external financing and that 
new firms want to survive and grow. This is supported by financial constraints studies, such 
as Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Evans and Leighton (1989), Holtz-Eakin, et al (I 994a), and 
Lindh and Ohlsson (1996). If new firms do not need external financing, then there is not a 
financial constraint on the firms. Thus, the first argument of my theory falls apart. In 
addition, for my theory to hold, new firms need to want to survive and grow. If new firms 
don't want to survive or grow, then the reasoning behind obtaining additional funds through 
multiple credit sources takes on a different meaning. Rather than focusing on using external 
funds to improve performance, the new firms might obtain money for the sake of obtaining 
additional funds with no intention to improve performance. 
20 If Type II credit rationing was assumed to exist only, new firms would not be able to obtain any funds from 
any credit source and thus would never be able to use multiple credit sources. 
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Another assumption specific to my theory is that borrowers self select whom they 
will borrow from but not how much they will borrow from each creditor. From the founder's 
perspective, founders make the decision they want to make. Borrowers self-select their 
financing rather than being selected by the lender (Cressy, J996b). However, borrowers 
don't select how much each credit source will provide them. Borrowers wish to obtain the 
most credit they can get based upon their need and at the lowest cost. Thus, lenders select 
how much is lent to the borrowers, which allows credit rationing to exist. This is unlike 
Cressy's (1996b) argument where borrowers self-selected lenders AND how much they can 
borrow. If this is the case, then credit rationing would not exist. Finally, other market 
variables are assumed to not influence the decision of the founders (e.g. supply of credit, 
legal environment, etc.). 
A boundary constraint for my theory is that it applies to only new firms (and young 
firms as new firms only stay new for a short period of time). Established firms are different 
from new firms in relationship to my theory as established firms exhibit less information 




RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA 
In this study, I examine the resourceful financing decisions of using multiple credit 
sources by new firms and try to determine the effects of such financing decisions on new 
venture survival and growth. In Chapter 2, I built the theory to explain why being 
resourceful by using multiple credit sources possibly leads to additional funds and thus is 
positively associated with survival and growth of new firms. Testable hypotheses were 
developed as a result of the theory development. To test these hypotheses, I perform a 
longitudinal study as new firms change rapidly (Davidsson et aI., 2001; Low & MacMillan, 
1988) and capital structure is dynamic (Berger & Udell, 1998; J. Lee & Zhang, 2010; Vos et 
al.,2007). 
A longitudinal study offers the best means to test the hypotheses and thus answer the 
research questions posed in this study. Past studies have used cross-sectional data to 
examine the financing of new and young firms. Using cross-sectional data would allow me 
to examine multiple credit usage in a given year. However, cross-sectional data alone would 
not provide a full understanding of how new firms change their usage of credit sources over 
time, which could affect their survival and growth. As mentioned earlier, the capital 
structure of firms is evolutionary in nature, especially for new firms where the organization 
can evolve quickly. Entrepreneurship research, the study of the emergence of new ventures 
(Davidsson, 2004), involves a process. A process cannot be examined effectively with a 
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snapshot in time or by static comparisons of a beginning state and an end state. Many things 
can happen in a new venture between the two states. In addition, a cross-sectional study 
would suffer from endogeneity issues due to reverse causality - performance could affect 
multiple credit usage rather than multiple credit usage affecting performance. A longitudinal 
study helps mitigate, not eliminate, this endogeneity effect21 • 
Another benefit of using longitudinal data is to be able to overcome retrospective 
bias, as founders of the firms answer questions shortly after the completion of the year to 
which the questions pertain. In addition, survival bias is overcome as a panel of firms 
started in the same year is tracked from their first year of existence until they close or the 
data collection is stopped, whichever comes first. Only a few relevant studies on new firms 
have been able to overcome survival bias (e.g. Cassar, 2004; Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht, 
2007; S. N. Kaplan, Sensoy, & Stromberg, 2009). Thus, I use longitudinal data consisting of 
six years of data from new firms to answer the research questions posed in this study and test 
the hypotheses. 
Data 
The data set for this study is the private version of the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), 
which is a longitudinal survey conducted by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. 
Access to the data set is via the National Opinion Research Center's (NORC) secure data 
enclave server, where the data is stored and analyses are performed. 
21 I am referring to the endogeneity issue that pertains to reverse causality, which the longitudinal nature of the 
study addresses. Omitted variable bias is another cause of endogeneity, and is not addressed by the longitudinal 
nature of the study. Omitted variable bias occurs when statistical analysis leaves out one or more important 
causal variable. The statistical analysis compensates for the missing variable or variables by over or under 
estimating one of the other variables in the analysis, causing a bias in the results. In regression analysis, this is 
mathematically seen when the error term of the linear regression formula is correlated with one or more of the 
covariates in the formula. I address the endogeneity issue caused by omitted variable bias later in the study. 
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The level of analysis in this study is the firm, which has become more commonly 
used in entrepreneurship research in the last two decades (Davidsson & Wiklund, 2001; 
Ireland, Reutzel, & J. W. Webb, 2005). As such, the data are based upon firm level while the 
actual respondents are the founders of the firms. The founders provide information about the 
firm in their responses. Even though the primary level of analysis is the firm, this is not to be 
confused with the 3-level analysis that is performed in the multi-level statistical method 
(level-l = time, level-2 = firm, level-3 = location; which will be explained later in the study). 
For the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), 32,469 firms were randomly sampled from 
Dun and Bradstreet's database of roughly 250,000 firms that started in 2004 in the United 
States22 • A firm was deemed a firm that started in 2004 ifat least one of the following 
activities had been performed in 2004 and none of the activities performed in a prior year: 
• Payment of state unemployment taxes 
• Payment of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes 
• Presence of a legal status for the business (incorporation) 
• Use of an Employer Identification Number (EIN) 
• Use of Schedule C to report income on a personal tax return 
17,258 firms were screened for eligibility that resulted in the identification of 6,030 eligible 
firms (DesRoches, Mulcahy, Robb, & Shane, 2008). The sample excluded non-profit firms, 
firms owned by existing firms, and firms inherited from another individual, and oversampled 
high technology firms23 . The KFS research team initially interviewed founders of the 4,928 
firms between July 2005 and July 2006, representing a response rate of 43% from the 
22 The United States Small Business Association (SBA) recorded 628,917 firm births in the USA in 2004 (SBA, 
2007: 309). Hence, the Dun and Bradstreet database does not include all ofthe firms that are started in a given 
year. 
23 High technology is based upon the intensity of research and development employment in a firm's primary 
industry( or industries). 
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original sampling frame after the sampling weights were applied (Ballou et aI., 2007). These 
firms were then surveyed on an annual basis thereafter. This study uses data through 2009, 
which is the latest data available at the time this study was initiated24 • The mode of data 
collection consisted of computer assisted telephone interviews (CA TI), Internet, and mail. 
Respondents were paid $50 to complete each instance of the survey. Table 2 indicates the 
timeframe of the data collection for each year. 
Table 2: Data Collection Timeframe 
Fiscal Period of Start of End of 
Survey Year Business Operations Data Collection Data Collection 
Baseline Year 1(2004) Jan-2004 through Dec-2004 Jun-2005 Jul-2006 
First Follow-up Year 2 (2005) Jan-2005 through Dec-2005 Jun-2006 Jan-2007 
Second Follow-up Year 3 (2006) Jan-2006 through Dec-2006 May-2007 Dec-2007 
Third Follow-up Year 4 (2007) Jan-2007 through Dec-2007 May-2008 Dec-2008 
Fourth Follow-up Year 5 (2008) Jan-2008 through Dec-2008 May-2009 Dec-2009 
Fifth Follow-up Year 6 (2009) Jan-2009 through Dec-2009 May-201O Dec-201O 
Six data points are used for each firm, representing six years of data. Six is an 
important number of years to examine as most studies on failure of new firms use six years 
or less (e.g. Bruderl et aI., 1992; Cressy, 2006b; Evans, 1987a, 1987b; Mata & Portugal, 
1994; Phillips & Kirchhoff, 1989), and one of the areas of focus for this study is survival. 
Bruderl et al. (1992) find that 24% of a cohort of new firms in Germany cease operations 
within two years, and 37% cease within five years. Cressy (1996b) finds that a cohort of new 
firms in the U.K. had 45% cease operations within 2.5 years and 80% within six years. And 
Mata & Portugal (1994) see 20% of their sample of new Portuguese firms die in the first year 
and 50% by year four. In the USA, Phillips & Kirchhoff (1989) find 66% of new firms cease 
operations within six years. In addition, researchers find USA technology-based firms have 
24 Data will be collected for 2010 and 20 II to complete eight years of data collection for the Kauffman Firm 
Survey. However, that data is not available at the time this study was started. 
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an even lower survival rate, with 64% of firms established between 1991 and 2000 closing 
within four years and 88% closing within five years (Song, Podoynitsyna, Van Der Bij, & 
Halman, 2008). The longest period of time these studies used is six years. Thus, I use six 
years in my study to define new firms25 • 
In response to the Kauffman Foundation's interest in understanding the dynamics of 
high-technology, medium-technology, and woman-owned businesses, the KFS is a stratified 
sample based on industrial technology level (High-Tech, Medium-Tech, and Non-Tech) and 
gender that oversamples firms in high and medium tech industries (given a higher selection 
probability). Thus, weights in the KFS are used to correct for sample design (over-sampling), 
and for non-response bias. Oversampling a key population subgroup in survey data in 
response to the small size of that subgroup or for a special interest in that subgroup is a 
common practice in policy making surveys. 
Meanwhile, a major drawback of longitudinal data is sample attrition. As a result of 
sample attrition respondents might drop out from the sample prior to the completion of the 
study, thus reducing the sample size in later waves or producing an unbalanced panel. An 
examination of the longitudinal response rates of the KFS indicates that considerable effort 
was made to reduce the impact of sample attrition; the longitudinal response rates across the 
six surveys is 66.9% (out of the 4,928 firms in the baseline, 3,297 are longitudinal 
respondents in fifth Follow-Up Survey - year 2009). 
To create the sample to be used in the analysis, I first construct the longitudinal 
population from the KFS data set. This will ensure I am performing a true longitudinal study 
with panel data. The longitudinal population includes all firms in the baseline survey that: 
25 It could be argued that I am examining new and young firms. However, for simplistic purposes, I label firms 
six years and younger as new firms rather than saying new and young firms throughout the document. 
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1) responded in the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth follow-up surveys, 2) responded in 
every follow-up from the first follow-up up to the follow-up when they permanently stopped 
operations or sold or merged, and 3) responded to every follow-up from the first follow-up 
up to the fifth follow-up and report that they have temporarily stopped operations in the fifth 
follow-up survey. In other words, the longitudinal population includes firms that responded 
to the survey when they are alive. Out of the 4,928 firms in the baseline survey, 3,297 firms 
fit the criteria. Thus, 1,631 firms are removed due to dropping out of the longitudinal 
population. Table 3 shows the number of firms that dropped out of the longitudinal 
population each year. 
Table 3: Longitudinal Population 
# of Firms 
Initial sample in 2004 4,928 
Non-response in 2005 561 11.4% 
Non-response in 2006 389 7.9% 
Non-response in 2007 332 6.7% 
Non-response in 2008 227 4.6% 
Non-response in 2009 122 2.5% 
Longitudinal population 3,297 66.9% 
I then remove the observations of firms that are not started as a new independent 
business, with zero capital in year one, no founding team members, missing data in the credit 
source variables, didn't use credit within six years, sold or merged, and outliers and those 
with obvious incorrect data entry. Firms that are purchased as an existing business, 
purchased as an existing franchise, or are started by means other than from scratch are 
excluded. These firms have an advantage over new independent firms in terms of survival 
and growth. In effect, they have a head-start on new firms by owning assets and generating 
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revenue and profit from the start, and thus should not be considered new firms. This criterion 
entails removing 217 firms. I exclude firms that are not started for business reasons and thus 
companies that would possibly not be reasonable candidates for business-related debt. Some 
firms could be started by individuals who file business tax forms to reduce tax liability rather 
than for business reasons. Thus, in following Astebro & Bernhardt (2003) and Bates (1990), 
I remove firms that have zero capital at start-up, which is measured by the total amount of 
assets in year one26• There are 381 firms with zero capital in year one. For the same 
reasoning, firms that do not have founders are removed from the sample. This results in 
removing an additional 16 firms. In addition, firms that are sold to another firm or merged 
with another firm during the six year period of the data set are removed as this represents a 
positive closure as opposed to a negative closure. When a firm is sold or merged, that firm 
might be a healthy firm, and I want to determine if multiple credit sources negatively affects 
the survival rate. A sold business may offer a premium over the liquidation value of the firm. 
This is the same argument made by Gimeno et al. (1997) when they removed sold companies 
in their analysis of survival of new firms. A negative closure occurs when the firm stops 
operations, which represents a negative outcome and thus a failure. A positive closure of a 
firm is a positive outcome, and thus is not a failed firm. I am interested in equating "non-
surviving" with a negative outcome, not a positive outcome. This results in removing 122 
firms. Missing data is an issue in statistical analysis, thus firms that have any missing data in 
their credit source variables (dependent variables in the analysis) in any year are removed. 
Missing data in a longitudinal study can be due to respondents choosing not to answer a 
specific question in a given year or due to attrition in the respondents over time. This results 
26 Assets include cash, accounts receivables, equipment, land / buildings, vehicles, other owner property, and 
other miscellaneous assets 
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in 139 finns being removed27 • 756 finns that didn't use any credit during the first six years 
are also removed. These finns are removed since I am examining credit sources and use a 
Type I credit rationing argument (Keeton, 1979; Parker, 2009) to partially explain the trend 
of multiple credit source usage and how that trend affects finn perfonnance. A finn that uses 
no credit the first six years of its existence does so either by choice or because it may (or may 
not) be due to Type II credit rationing. Hence, a different explanation is warranted - an 
explanation which I am not theorizing and am not testing in this study. Finally, 32 
observations with incorrect data entry or outliers are removed. Incorrect data entry and 
outliers are removed by using the explorer function in SPSS and through a visual inspection 
of each variable used in the analyses based upon realistic levels (e.g. one finn indicates it 
used 50 credit sources, and another finn indicates it has revenue of $800 million in year three 
when it's previous and following years of revenue are minuscule). A total of 1,663 finns are 
removed from the longitudinal population28, leaving 1,634 finns that provide valid responses 
in the first year (2004) of the survey and these are used in the statistical analysis. Table 4 
shows the data sample selection. 
27 It is possible for hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) growth curve models, the statistical method used in this 
study, to handle situations when a firm provides answers to at least two years of credit source variables. 
However, there are few instances when a surviving firm provided answers to the credit source questions in 
selective years and not other years. Rather, firms that didn't answer the credit source questions in one year 
tended to not answer the credit source questions in any of the years. 
28 t-tests were performed to compare the firms that were removed from the sample to the firms that were kept in 
the sample. The variables that were compared were variables used in the main analysis. Some variables are not 
significantly different, while other variables are. The results of the t-tests are provided in the appendix. 
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Table 4: Sample Selection 
Longitudinal population 
Firms which are not new independent businesses 
Firms with zero capital in 1 year 
Firms with no founding team members 
Firms that are sold or merged within 6 years 
Firms with missing data in credit source variables 
Firms that didn't use any credit within 6 years 
Outliers / incorrect data entry 
Final sample (n) 
Variables, with Descriptive Statistics 











This section describes the variables used in the analyses, including the dependent, 
independent, and control variables. Table 5 is a list of the variables. 
Table 5: List of Variables 
Survival (6 years) 
Growth 
Revenue (6 years) 
Employees (6 years) 
Multiple Credit Sources 
Number of Total Credit Sources (6 years) 
Number of Unique Credit Sources (6 years) 
Diversity Index of Credit Sources (6 years) 
Number of Founders 
Education of Founders 
Type of Education of Main Founder 
Work Experience of Founders (overall) 
Work Experience of Founders (start-up) 
Amount of Outstanding Debt (6 years) 
Amount of New Equity (6 years) 
Dependent Variables 





Product / Service 
Incorporation (in year 1) 
Commitment to Venture 
Number of Hours Worked in Venture (6 years) 
Founder Contributed Equity (in year 1) 
Quality of Business Idea 
Intellectual Property (any year) 
Competitive Advantage over Competitors (any year) 
Credit Crisis (6 years) 
Location 
The dependent variable for the analysis is performance, which is made up of survival 
and growth. In the corporate finance literature, capital structure research primarily assumes 
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that the firm's goal is to maximize value. The assumption is that the firm exists, and that it is 
up to managers to decide how to maximize equity value and/or the risk adjusted present 
value of the firm's profits based upon their financing options. In contrast, the entrepreneurial 
finance literature focuses on the financing of new, young, and small firms and the capital 
structure is important in terms of getting the firm started, surviving; and growing. Thus, the 
performance dependent variables of entrepreneurial finance studies tend to be starting, 
survival, and growth rates that are measured. Although starting rates do not pertain to my 
research question, and thus I do not examine starting rates 29, I do follow along the lines of 
entrepreneurial finance studies and measure performance based upon survival and growth. 
The distribution of the closure (the inverse of survival) of the firms is show in Table 
6, a life table indicating the number of firms that died / survived each of the six years, with 
Figure 3 showing a graphical representation of the hazard (closure) function. There are still 
1,251 firms operating after year six. They are considered "censored" as the data collection 
period stops after year six, and could still possibly die sometime after year six. The 
cumulative closure rate for firms through year six is 23.4%30. 
Table 6: Life Table (Survival) 
Proportion of Firms at Firms Still in 
Beginning of Year who Operations at End of 
Time # of Firms at Firms that Died Censored at Left during Year Year 
Year Year Interval Beginning of Year during Year End of Year (Hazard Function) (Survival Function) 
2004 0 [0,1) 1,634 0 0 0.0% 100.0% 
2005 [1,2) 1,634 47 0 2.9% 97.1% 
2006 2 [2,3) 1,587 80 0 5.0% 95.0% 
2007 3 [3,4) 1,507 96 0 6.4% 93.6% 
2008 4 [4,5) 1,41 I 89 0 6.3% 93.7% 
2009 5 [5,6) 1,322 71 1,251 5.4% 94.6% 
29 "Starting rates" are often called "entrepreneurship rates", especially in literature that is published from the 
discipline of economics. 
30 This closure rate includes only negatively closed firms. When including positively closed firms, this figure 
increases to 31 %, 
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Growth is an important measurement of firm performance (e.g. Brush & Vanderwerf, 
1992; Danson, 1999), but is multi-dimensional (Parker, 2009). Growth can be measured by 
revenue, profit, number of employees, assets, and other variables. However, in this analysis, 
I use only revenue and number of employees to represent growth, which have been regarded 
as very important indicators in past studies (e.g. Hmieleski & Baron, 2009). Sales growth 
tends to be the indication of performance which entrepreneurs use (Barkham, Gudgin, M. 
Hart, & Hanvey, 1996; Robson & Bennett, 2000), whereas policy makers are more interested 
in employment growth (Parker, 2009). New firms do not have a large amount of profit and 
assets during their early years. So their trends might not represent a clean representation of 
growth for a new firm. In addition, these two variables have a large amount of missing data. 
Employment has found to be correlated with profit and assets in past studies (Davidsson, 
Delmar, & Wiklund, 2006). Thus, profit and assets might provide the same results as 
employment and would justify not using these variables. Growth is represented in multiple 
models for each one of these dimensions: revenue and number of employees. 
The distribution of growth for revenue and number of employees is shown in Table 7, 
Figure 4, and Figure 5. Average revenue grows from $0 before 2004 to $692,144 in 2009. 
Revenue grows steadily over the first five years before a decline in the sixth year. The 
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decline in revenue in the sixth year could have been caused by the recession that began in 
December 2007. Standard deviation of revenue has the same trend over time, with the 
largest standard deviation being $2.638 million in 2007. The large standard deviation 
compared to the mean indicates that revenue is skewed. There is a small number of firms 
that experience a larger growth rate than the majority of firms. The average number of 
employees grows from 0 before 2004 to 3.972 in 2009. As with revenue, the number of 
employees increases for the first five years before declining slightly in 2009. However, 
unlike revenue, the rate of growth in employees slows earlier. The standard deviation 
increases over time to 12.816 in 2008. As with revenue, the employee variable shows that a 
few firms grow at a higher rate, but the majority of firms grow at a much lower rate in terms 
of number of employees. 
Table 7: Distribution ofthe Growth Variables 
Year Revenue Employees 
























$600,391 1,634 1.629 4.024 
$1 ,251 ,130 1,587 2.967 6.984 
$2,013,950 1,507 3.510 8.668 
$2,650,270 1,411 3.788 10.669 
$2,638,490 1,322 3.979 11.982 
$2,374,950 1,251 3.972 12.816 
Figure 4: Revenue over Time 
- Revenue 




















Figure 5: Employment over Time 
- Employees 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Different measurements of survival and growth are used depending on .the statistical 
method being used. In OLS regression, which is cross-sectional analysis, survival is 
measured by age at which the firm was when it closes. Growth (revenue and number of 
employees) is measured based upon the last full year of operations. In Probit regression, 
survival is measured as a dichotomous variable, with 0 indicating the firms survive the entire 
data collection (6 years), and 1 indicating the firm closed within the data collection period. 
In Cox proportional hazard modeling, the closure status of the firm is measured each year 
(for 6 years). In HLM and panel data regression, revenue and number of employees is used 
for each year a firm is operating. Revenue and number of employees are transformed using 
the natural log formula since the variables are not normally distributed. 
Independent Variables 
This study examines credit usage by new firms. Table 8 presents a summary of the 
number of firms that use and do not use credit over six years. Credit is used by 50.7% of the 
1,634 firms in 2004, with an increase of credit usage in 2005 to 53.3%. Thereafter, the 
number and percentage of firms using credit drops steadily each year to 44.1 % in 2009. 
Table 8 also shows which firms continuously used credit throughout the six years. The 
percentage of firms that use credit in year two after also using credit in year one drops is 
29.1 %. This is a considerable drop in the number offirms that used credit in year one 
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(50.7%). This figure continues to decline each year indicating that finns which use credit in 
the early years do not necessarily continue to use credit as they age. Only 4% of the finns 
used credit all six years. The average number of years finns use credit is 2.652. The 
descriptive statistics indicate that new finns do use credit during their early years. 
Table 8: General Summary of Credit Usage 
Number of Firms 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Use Credit 828 50.7% 846 533% 785 52.1% 731 51.8% 576 43.6% 552 44.1% 
Don't Use Credit 806 493% 741 46.7% 722 47.9% 680 48.2% 746 56.4% 699 55.9% 
Total 1,634 100.0% 1,587 100.0% 1,507 100.0% 1,411 100.0% 1,322 100.0% 1,251 100.0% 
Number of Firms 
2004 2004-2005 2004-2006 2004-2007 2004-2008 2004-2009 
Use Credit 
Don't Use Credit 
Total 
I Year of Credit Usage Only 
2 Years of Credit Usage Only 
3 Years of Credit Usage Only 
4 Years of Credit Usage Only 
5 Years of Credit Usage Only 






























287 190% 185 13.1% 105 7.9% 72 5.8% 
1,220 81.0% 1,226 86.9% 1,217 92.1% 1,179 94.2% 
1,507 100.0% 1,411 100.0% 1,322 100.0% 1,251 100.0% 
Multiple Credit Sources Used. Three different variables are used to measure the use 
of multiple credit sources by new finns over time: 1) number of total credit sources, 2) 
number of unique credit sources, and 3) diversity index of credit sources. The first variable 
examined in the growth curve model is the number of total credit sources a finn uses during 
each of its first six years. Since all finns in the sample started in 2004, it can be interpreted 
that the credit source usage is from the first year of the finn's existence. There are ten 
different credit sources that are measured: I) banks, 2) non-bank financial institutions, 3) 
credit card institutions, 4) other businesses, 5) government, 6) owners, 7) employees, 8) 
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family, 9) other individuals, and 10) other sources31 • There are questions in the KFS survey 
that the respondents answered about the number of different credit sources their firm used. 
All of the credit source option variables are then added together to calculate the different 
types of debt financing options a firm uses in a given year. The number of total credit 
sources used by each firm is calculated for each of the six years that the survey was 
administered. Table 9, Table 10, Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 show the distribution of 
number of total credit sources used over time, and broken out by the type of credit source 
used over time. Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 show the distribution of this variable in 
graphical format. Figure 8 is included to show the trends of the type ofmuItiple credit 
sources that are not discernible in Figure 7. This is done by removing the bank and credit 
card data from Figure 7 to create Figure 8. 
Table 9: Data for Histogram of Number of Total Credit Sources over Time 
Number of Total Number of Firms 
Credit Sources 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
0 806 49.3% 741 46.7% 722 47.9% 680 48.2% 746 56.4% 699 55.9% 
493 30.2% 429 270% 375 24.9% 336 23.8% 294 22.2% 284 22.7% 
2 182 111% 236 14.9% 227 15.1% 196 13.9% 140 10.6% 151 12.1% 
3 86 5.3% 90 5.7% 87 5.8% 97 6.9% 65 4.9% 61 4.9% 
4 38 2.3% 36 2.3% 36 2.4% 42 3.0% 28 2.1% 20 1.6% 
15 0.9% 22 1.4% 25 1.7% 25 1.8% 17 1.3% 12 1.0% 
6 6 0.4% 9 0.6% 12 0.8% 11 0.8% 9 0.7% 7 0.6% 
0.1% 6 0.4% 5 0.3% 7 0.5% 6 0.5% 8 0.6% 
8 0.1% 4 0.3% 4 0.3% 0.1% 0.4% 0.1% 
9 0.1% 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0 0.0% 
10 0 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 
>10 0.3% 9 0.6% 9 0.6% 9 0.6% 8 0.6% 0.6% 
Total 1,634 100.0% 1,587 100.0% 1,507 100.0% 1,411 100.0% 1,322 100.0% 1,251 100.0% 
31 These credit sources are similar to the categories used by Berger & Udell (1998). 
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2004 2005 2006 
Mean Std Dey % Mean Std Dey % Mean Std Dey 
0.208 0.577 231% 0.27 1 0.846 24.6% 0.289 0.761 
0.041 0.425 4.6% 0023 0209 2.1% 0.023 0.25 1 
0.523 0.853 581% 0.710 0.138 64.4% 0722 1.489 
0006 0085 0.7% 0.005 0070 0.5% 0004 0.063 
0010 0 11 2 11 % 0008 0096 07% 0008 0145 
0.027 0.221 2.9% 0021 0285 1 9% 0024 0.527 
0005 0.085 0.5% 0001 0035 0.1% 0005 0.092 
0068 0468 76% 0055 0437 50% 0045 0.533 
0007 0143 08% 0006 0086 06% 0003 0.063 
0005 0.088 0.6% 0.004 0.070 0.3% 0004 0109 
0.900 1.311 100.0';' 11 04 1829 100 0';' I 125 1.953 
1,634 1,587 1,507 
2007 2008 2009 
Mean Std Dey % Mean Std Dey % Mean Std Dey 
0.385 . 1.223 32.6% 0.32 1 1.1 38 32.4% 0.274 0927 
0.037 0.340 3.1% 0.032 0628 3.2% 0.041 0.707 
0.713 1.465 604% 0.569 1.329 57.4% 0.567 I 112 
0.000 0.000 00'/. 0006 0.102 0.6% 0003 0.056 
0035 0.070 30'/. 0007 0.125 07% 0006 o 174 
0.006 0.095 0.5% 0004 0.06 1 0.4% 0007 0146 
0.001 0027 01% 0.001 0.027 01% 0001 0.028 
0028 0217 24% 0031 0.271 31% 0016 0154 
0003 0053 0.2% 0020 0.531 21% 0004 0.116 
0004 0.092 04% 0001 0.027 0.1% 0003 0069 
I 211 3581 102.7% 0990 4.241 100 0'/. 0922 3489 
1,411 1,322 1,251 
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Figure 8: Number of Total Credit Sources on Average over Time by Source (without 
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The number of total credit sources includes cases where multiple instances of the 
same credit source can be used. For example, five different credit cards can be used, and 
thus count for five in the calculation of total number of credit sources used. It could be the 
case where the number of different types of credit sources used is important. As such, I also 
run analysis using the number of unique type of credit sources to determine if the type of 
credit sources used is important. Table 11 , Table 12, Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11 
show the distribution of number of unique credit sources used broken out by the type of 
credit source used over time, along with the amount of debt by unique type of credit source 
used over time. Figure II is included to show the trends of the type of multiple credit 
sources that are not discernible in Figure 10. This is done by removing the Bank and Credit 
Card data from Figure 10 to create Figure II . 
Table 11: Data for Histogram of Number of Unique Credit Sources over Time 
Number or Unique Number or Firms 
Credil Sources 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
0 806 49.3% 74 1 46.7% 722 47.9% 680 48 .2% 746 56.4% 699 55.9% 
625 38.2% 632 39.8% 564 37.4% 519 36.8% 4 12 31.2% 4 I 7 33 .3% 
2 159 9.7% 163 10.3% 182 12.1% 159 11 .3% 132 10.0% 11 2 9.0% 
3 38 2.3% 46 2.9% 36 2.4% 52 3.7% 28 2.1% 22 1.8% 
4 6 0.4% 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 0 0.0% 4 0.3% 0 0.0% 
0 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0 0.0% 0.1% 
Total 1,634 100.0% 1,587 100.0% 1,507 100.0% 1,4 I I 100 .0% 1,322 100 .0% 1,25 1 100 .0% 
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0.72 1 100.0% 
1.634 
2007 
Mean Sid Dev % 
328 0.233 0.423 34.6% 
28 0.02 1 0.144 3.1% 
543 0.385 0.487 57.2% 
o 0.000 0.000 0.0% 
0.003 0.053 0.4% 
0.005 0.700 07% 
I 0.00 1 0.027 0 1% 
29 0.020 0. 131 30% 
0.003 0.053 0.4% 
0.003 0.530 0.4% 
948 0.673 0.742 1000% 
1.411 
2005 
Mean Sid Dev % 
























0.086 1.1 % 
0.114 19% 
0.035 0.2% 




Mean SId Dev % 
257 0 194 0.395 349% 
16 0.012 0 109 2.2% 
420 03 13 0.464 56.2% 
6 0005 0067 08% 
0005 0.067 0.8% 
0004 0061 07% 
000 1 0027 0 1% 
24 0018 0 133 3.2% 
7 0005 0072 10"10 
0001 0.027 0.1% 
743 0556 0720 1000"10 
1,322 
2006 
Mean SId Dev % 



























073 1 100.0"10 
1,507 
2009 
# Mean Sid Dev % 
222 0.179 0.384 32.6% 
12 0.010 0.097 1.7% 
426 0.336 0.472 60.9% 
4 0003 0056 0.6% 
0024 0049 44% 
0003 0056 06% 
I 0001 0028 0.1% 
16 0013 0 11 2 2.3% 
0002 0.040 ' 0.3% 
0002 0049 04% 
693 0551 0694 1039% 
1,251 










2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
--# of Unique Credit 
Sources 
Figure 10: Number of Unique Credit Sources on Average over Time by Source 
0.450 
0.400 _,~---













- - _ .. Non-Bank 
---- Credit Card 







Figure 11: Number of Unique Credit Sources on Average over Time by Source (without 
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To clarify the distinction between the number of total credit sources and number of 
unique credit sources, I have provided the following example for the usage of credit sources 
by three firms as shown in Table 13. In the example, Firm 1 uses one bank loan and 1 credit 
card. The number of total credit sources for Firm 1 is two, as is the number of unique credit 
sources. Whereas, Firm 2 uses one bank loan, three credit cards, and two loans from family 
members. The number of total credit sources for Firm 2 is six, and the number of unique 
credit sources is three. Firm 3 uses 5 credit cards, and thus the number of total credit sources 
is five , and the number of unique credit sources is one. 
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Table 13: Examples of Number of Total and Unique Credit Sources 
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
Type # # # 
Bank 1 1 0 
Non-Bank 0 0 0 
Credit Card 1 3 5 
Other Businesses 0 0 0 
Government 0 0 0 
Owners 0 0 0 
Employees 0 0 0 
Family 0 2 0 
Other Individuals 0 0 0 
Other Sources 0 0 0 
Number of TOTAL Credit Sources 2 6 5 
Number of UNIQUE Credit Sources 2 3 
In addition to the total number and unique number of credit sources used, I also 
measure the diversity of credit sources used by new firms. The diversity of credit sources 
could be important because having the same number of credit sources does not always mean 
the same thing, as shown in the example above. The number of unique credit sources 
partially captures the diversity of credit source usage. However, it uses a count variable. 
The diversity might be better captured by also incorporating the dollar figures of debt. For 
this I used a variation of the Herfindahl Index to measure diversity based upon the dollar 
amount of debt raised from the various credit sources used by new firms. The Herfindahl 
Index has been used in strategy research and is a measure of diversity in competition among 
firms in an industry (e.g. Berry, 1975; Geringer, Beamish, & Dacosta, 1989; Tallman & Li, 
1996). More specifically, the Herfindahl Index is a measure of the market size of firms in 
relation to the industry, and is an economic measurement applied in competition law, 
antitrust, and technology management. A benefit of the index is that it gives more weight to 
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the larger finns (credit sources in my study). An increase in the Herfindahl Index indicates a 
decrease in competition and an increase in market power (concentration). 
The modified version of the Herfindahl Index (per Berry, 1975; Geringer et ai., 1989; 
Tallman & Li, 1996), which is the complement of the Herfindahl Index32, is: 
c 2 
HICS tf = 1- ~Dnt! [1] 
where, 
HICSt! is the Herfindahl Index of credit source usage at time t for finn! 
D~tf is the square of the ratio of debt ($) for credit source n ~o the total debt ($) at 
time t for finn! 
c is the number of types of credit sources available for the finn to use, which is 10 at 
all time periods and for all finns 
Squaring the proportion of debt gives more weight to the credit source that provides 
the largest amount of debt to the finn. U sing the complement of the Herfindahl Index 
indicates that a higher value from the fonnula means that there is a greater diversity in the 
credit sources used to raise debt by a new finn. The variable varies from 0 to 1 and higher 
values indicate higher diversity of credit source usage. 
Table 14 and Figure 12 show the distribution of the diversity of credit sources based 
upon the Herfindahl Index of credit sources in my sample. The Herfindahl Index of credit 
sources steadily increases over time for the first three years for finns before declining, 
starting at 0.021 in year one and rising to 0.034 in year three. Lower figures indicate there is 
32 The modified Herfindahl Index formula which I present herein is also referred to as Blau's (1977) index of 
heterogeneity. Blau built the index as a measure of inequality for continuous parameters. 
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little diversity in multiple credit source usage. Over time, the standard deviation of the 
Herfindahl Index of credit sources follows the same trend. 
Table 14: Distribution of the Herfindahl Index of Credit Sources 
2004 2005 2006 
Type Mean Sid Dey Mean Sid Dey Mean Sid Dey 
Herfindahl Index 0.02 1 0.092 0.031 0.11 4 0.034 0.11 7 
1,634 1,587 1,507 
2007 2008 2009 
Type Mean SId Dey Mean Sid Dey Mean Sid Dey 
Herfi ndahllndex 0.029 0.107 0.03 1 0.11 3 0.026 0.104 
N 1,4 11 1,322 1,25 1 
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There are several weaknesses in using the Herfindahl Index. Table 15 shows 
examples of the modified Herfindahiindex of credit sources to illustrate how the Herfindhal 
Index measures the diversity in credit source usage. The table highlights four possible 
configurations of debt for a fictional firm. In example 1, the firm only has bank debt. The 
modified Herfindahl Index of credit sources is 0, which indicates there is no diversity in the 
credit sources that are used by the firm. The firm only uses one credit source, but there are 
nine other credit sources available to the firm . In example 2, the firm uses two different 
types of credit sources: $7,500 from banks and $2,500 from non-bank financial institutions. 
The modified Herfindahl Index of credit sources is 0.375, indicating that example 2 is a more 
diverse usage of credit sources by the firm than example 1 when the firm used only banks for 
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credit. In example 3, the firm uses equal amounts of credit from banks and non-bank 
financial institutions and has a modified Herfindahl Index of credit sources of 0.500. Even 
though the total amount borrowed is the same ($10,000), and there are two different credit 
sources used, example 3 is more diverse than example 2. Example 4 represents the highest 
diversity that can be seen in types of credit sources used. In example 4, the firm has 
borrowed the same amount ($1,000) from all ten available types of credit sources. The 
modified Herfindahl Index is 0.900 for example 4. 
Table 15: Examples of the Herfindahl Index of Credit Sources 



























Debt D D' 
$10,000 I 000 1000 
$0 0000 0.000 
$0 (loon (lOOO 
$() 0000 0000 
$0 0000 0000 
$0 () 000 0000 
$0 0 non 0000 
$0 0000 0000 
$0 0000 0000 
$0 O.O(Xl 0000 
$IO,O(KI 101Xl 1000 
() 000 
Example 5 
Debt D D' 
$2,500 0.250 0.063 
$2,5011 0.250 0063 
$2,500 0 250 0 063 
$2,5(Kl 0.250 0 063 
$0 0.000 0000 
$0 0.000 0.000 
$0 0.01Xl 0 (lOO 
$0 0.000 0.000 
$0 0 0011 0 (XIO 
$0 0.0011 O.(lOO 
$IO,O(XI I O(XI 0250 
0750 
Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 
Debt D D' Debt D D' Debt D D' 
$7,500 0750 0.563 $5,000 0.500 0250 $1,000 O.IIXl (UliO 
$2.500 0250 0063 $5,OIlO 0500 0250 $1,000 OlOO 0010 
$0 (lOOO O.tlOO $0 0.000 0.000 $1.000 0100 0010 
$0 0.000 O.(XlO $0 o (XIO 0.000 $1,000 0100 (UlIO 
$0 0.000 0 (X10 $0 o (XIO 0.000 $1.000 OlOO 0010 
$0 0.000 0.000 $0 0.000 0.000 $1.000 o I (Xl 0 (liO 
$0 0.000 0.000 $0 0.000 0000 $1,000 0.100 tUliO 
$0 0000 0.000 $0 OtlOO 0000 $1.000 O.IIXl (UliO 
$0 0.000 0.000 $0 0000 0.000 $1000 (U(lO 0010 
$0 0.000 0 000 $0 OtXlO 0.000 $1.000 O.IIXI 0.010 
$10.000 I (JOO 0 625 $10,000 1000 0.500 $10,000 10(Xl 0.1110 
0375 0500 0900 
Example 6 Example 7 Example 8 
Debt D D' Debt D D' Debt D D' 
$0 0.000 o (KIO $2,S(Xl 0333 0.111 $0 O.O(KI 0 (lOO 
$2.500 0 250 0 On3 $2,S(XI 0 333 0 III $0 0000 0000 
$2,500 0.250 0.063 $2,5(X) 0333 0.111 $0 0000 0000 
$0 0000 0.000 $0 0.000 0.000 $0 0 noo () 000 
$0 0.000 0.000 $0 0000 0000 $0 0.000 0 (lOO 
$2,500 0250 0.063 $0 0000 0.000 $0 0000 0.000 
$0 0000 O.tXlO $0 tl.IXlO 0(100 $0 0 Om) 0 (XIO 
$2,500 0.250 0.063 $0 0000 0.000 $0 O.OtX) 0.tX10 
$0 0000 0000 $0 0.000 0000 $0 0.000 0 oon 
$0 0.000 0.tX10 $0 O.tX10 0000 $0 0.000 O.tXlO 
$IO,(XlO I 000 0.250 $7,5(Kl UXIO 0.333 $0 O.O(XI 0 (X)O 
0750 0.667 UXIO 
Examples 5 and 6 show one of the weaknesses of the modified Herfindahl Index. In 
example 5, the firm borrows the same amount from four different credit sources. The 
modified Herfindahl Index of credit sources is 0.750. In example 6, the firm borrows the 
same amount from four different types of credit sources like in example 5. The modified 
Herfindahl Index of credit sources is the same for both examples (0.750). However, the firm 
borrows from different types of credit sources. While Herfindahl indices are equal, different 
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types of credit sources are tapped (i.e. the Herfindahl Index of credit sources does not 
distinguish between the different types of credit sources). This could be an issue if the types 
of credit sources are of different quality (e.g. borrowing from a bank offers a higher "quality" 
of credit than borrowing from family members because borrowing from a bank signals to the 
market the firm is doing well). 
There is a second weakness with the Herfindahl Index of credit sources as the index 
does not rank the diversity of firms using zero credit sources in a given year. As shown in 
Example 8 in Table 15, firms with zero credit in a given year have an index value of 1. This 
would be the highest level of diversity, which is not a true indication of diversity of credit 
source usage. Using none of the credit sources should not indicate a high level of diversity of 
credit source usage since the firm is not using any credit sources. The Herfindahl Index of 
credit sources interprets a firm using no credit sources as one that is evenly using all credit 
sources. This would not be an issue if a few firms used zero credit sources. The Herfindahl 
Index of credit sources does not take zero into account in past studies since the index is used 
for examining existing industries. Existing industries have at least one firm in the industry -
the industry would not exist if zero firms were in the industry. This, however, is an issue in 
this data set and in this study as there are a large percentage of firms that do not use credit in 
any given year. The sample only includes firms that use credit at least one year in the data 
set, as firms that did not use credit in any of the six years have been removed from the 
sample. These zeros for firms in any given year will change as the firm will have used at 
least one credit source during the six years, and these firms should not be removed as they 
provide value data to analyze. Plus, only 72 firms use credit every year. A solution is an 
avoidance index of credit sources. 
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The avoidance index of credit sources is a measure of a firm's willingness not to use 
the available credit sources in a given period (e.g. a year). A higher avoidance index 
indicates a firm avoids more types of unique credit sources than a firm that has a lower 
avoidance index. 0% represents no avoidance of unique credit sources (i.e. the firm uses 
every credit source available to it evenly), and 100% indicates the firm avoided every credit 
source available to it (i.e. the firm didn't use any credit and thus had $0 of total debt). This 
solves the issue with distinguishing between firms that use one unique credit source from 
firms that use zero credit sources. The avoidance index of credit sources is calculated as 
follows: 
where, 
If TDlf > 0, 
AleSif ~(~((D.f - TDif )/TDif)' -MIN )/(MAX -MIN) 
Or if TDtf = 0, 
AICSrr = (MAX + (MAX -MIN)) I (MAX -MIN) 
AICStf is the avoidance index of credit source usage at time t for firm! 
Dnrr is the debt ($) for credit source n at time t for firm! 
TDtf is the total debt ($)at time t for firm! 
[2] 
[3] 
c is the maximum number of types of credit sources available for the firm to use, 
which is 10 at all time periods and for all firms 
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MIN is the minimum AICS possible for 10 credit sources, which is 0.100; this 
represents no avoidance of the available types of credit sources by a firm as the firm would 
use all 10 types of credit sources evenly 
MAX is the maximum AICS possible; for 10 credit sources, the maximum avoidance 
is 0.111), which is when a firm uses no credit sources ($0 of total debt) 
However, I am interested in diversity of credit source usage, not necessarily 
avoidance of types of credit sources. So I modify the avoidance index to derive the diversity 
of credit sources as follows: 
DlCSI/=I- AlCSI! [3] 
where, 
DlCSI/ is the diversity index of credit source usage at time t for firm! 
Table 16 shows examples of the diversity and avoidance indexes of credit sources. 
The eight examples are the same configurations of debt shown in Table 15. Example 4 
depicts a firm that uses every credit source available to it, and Example 8 uses none of the 
available credit sources available to it. The diversity index of credit sources for Example 4 is 
100%, and is 0% for Example 8. This correctly depicts firms that use no credit sources use 
less types of unique credit sources than firms that use every credit source. In addition, the 
other six examples are ranked properly by diversity. 
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Table 16: Examples of the Diversity and Avoidance Indexes of Credit Sources 













AVOidance [lIde>; ofCredll Source~ ("0) 













A\tl1duncl' lode>; OfCredll Source~ (U o) 
J)1\'er~lh ]nde>;ofCrcdlt Sources (·0) 
Example I 
Debt-
Debt TOlalOebt 0 D) 
$10.000 $0 0000 0000 
$0 -SIO.OOO 0111 0012 
$0 -$10.000 0111 0.012 
$0 -$10.000 0111 (J012 
$0 -$10.000 0111 0012 
$0 -$10.000 0111 0.012 
$0 -$10.000 0 III 0.012 
$0 -$10.000 0 III 0012 
$0 -$10.000 0111 0.012 
$0 -$10.000 0.111 0.012 






Debl T 010.1 Debl 0 Dl 
$2.500 -$7.500 0083 0007 
$25{Xl -$7.500 0083 0007 
$2.500 -$7.500 0083 0007 
$2.500 -$7.S0n OOS.l (J007 
SO -510.000 0111 0012 
SO -SIO.OOO 0 III 0012 
$0 ·$10.000 0 III 0012 
SO -SIO.000 0111 0012 
$0 -SIO.000 0111 0012 
$0 -S]O.OOO 0111 (l012 






Oebl Total Debl D) 
$7500 -$2.500 0028 0001 
$2.500 -$7.500 0083 0.007 
$0 -510.000 011 J 0012 
$0 -SIO.OOO 0 III 0012 
$0 -SIO.OOO 0 III 0.012 
$0 _SIO 000 0 III 0012 
$0 -SIO.OOO 0 III 0012 
$0 -$10.000 0 III 0012 
$0 -$10.000 0 III 0012 
$0 -SIO.OOO 0 III 0012 






Debt IOlal Debt 0 OJ 
SO -$]0.000 0111 0012 
$2500 -S7.500 00S3 0007 
$2500 -S7.500 0 OS.~ 0007 
SO -$ I (l.OOO 0111 0012 
SO -$10.000 0111 0012 
S2.5OO -$7.500 00S3 0007 
SO -SIO.OOO 0 III 0012 
52.500 -S7500 0083 0007 
$0 -SIO.OOO 0111 0012 
$0 -SIO.OOO 0111 0012 






Debt Tota! Oeb\ OJ 
S5.000 -SS.OOO 0056 0003 
$5.000 -$5.000 0056 0003 
$0 -$10.000 0 III 0012 
$0 -$10.000 0 III 0012 
$0 -$10.000 0111 0012 
$0 -$10.000 0 III 0012 
$0 -$10.000 0 III 0012 
SO -$10.000 0 III 0012 
$0 -$10.000 0 III 0012 
$0 -$IOJlOO 0111 0012 






Debl Total Debl 0 OJ 
$2500 -$5.000 0074 0.005 
S2j()() -S5.000 0074 0005 
S2.5OO -S5.000 0074 0005 
SO -$7.500 0 III 0012 
$0 -S7.S00 0 III 0012 
SO -S7,SOO 0 III 0.012 
SO -$7.500 () III 0012 
SO -$7,500 0 III 0012 
SO -$1.500 0 III 0012 
SO -S7.500 Olll 0.()]2 






Debl Total Debl 0 1 
$1.000 -$9.000 0100 0.010 
SI.OOO -$9.000 0100 0010 
S1.000 -$9.000 0.100 0010 
S1.000 -$9.000 0100 0010 
$1.000 -$9.000 0100 0010 
S1.000 -$9.noo 0.100 0010 
$1.000 -$9.000 0.100 0010 
SI.OOO -$9.000 0100 0010 
$1.000 -$9.000 0.100 0010 
SI.OOO -$9.000 0.100 0010 






Debl rotal Debl D D) 
$0 $0 0000 0000 
$0 $0 0.000 0000 
$0 $0 0.000 0000 
SO $0 0000 0000 
$0 $0 0.000 0000 
$0 $(l 0.000 0000 





$0 0.000 0000 
SO 0.000 0000 
SO 0000 0000 




Table 17 and Figure 13 show the distribution of the diversity of credit sources based 
upon the diversity index of credit sources. Higher figures indicate there is more diversity of 
the usage of various types of credit sources. The diversity index of credit sources has a 
minimum of 17% (2004) and a maximum of 19.6% (2006). The range of the figures is small, 
however, a small change in the index represents a material change in the different types of 
credit sources used by finns. An inverted U-shape trend is seen for the index, as shown in 
Figure 13. The index is shown increasing for the first three years, and then decreasing for the 
subsequent three years. Over time, there is little change in the standard deviation of the 






































Mean Std Dev 
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1,251 
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- Diversity Index of 
Cred it Sources 
As discussed below, human capital variables are included as independent variables. 
Entrepreneurship research has suggested that founding teams that have more education and 
more work experience improve the success of new firms. The entrepreneurship research has 
suggested that firms started by founding teams, as opposed to a single entrepreneur, are more 
successful (Cressy, I 996b), because multiple founders can complement each other' s skills. 
As well, when things get rough in the business, each founding team member can pull up 
another founding team member psychologically. In addition, entrepreneurship research has 
suggested that the education level of founders is important in determining if new firms wi II 
be successful. The studies suggest that the more educated a founder or the founders are, the 
better chance of survival for the firm. Findings from entrepreneurship research also suggest 
that prior work experience of the founders is important in determining if new firms will be 
successful, especially work experience in the industry that the new firm will operate in. They 
suggest that the more work experience a founder or the founders has, the better chance of 
survival for the firm. 
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Bates (1990) finds that educational background of founders is a determinant of the 
capital structure of new firms. Human capital is considered an endogenous variable because 
founders accumulate human capital in anticipation of performing better in the future (Cressy, 
1996b; Parker & Van Praag, 2006). Parker & Van Praag (2006) show that human capital 
decreases the capital constraints while increasing performance. Human capital is measured 
as a) the founding team size, b) work experience of the founders, and c) the education of the 
founders. Explanation of these variables can be found in more detail below. 
Number of Founders. The number of founders for each firm is calculated as the 
number of owner-operators in the firm during the first year of its existence (2004) (e.g. 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Using owner-operators as opposed to owners ensures 
that investor-only types are not included in the number of founders. In addition, the number 
of owner-operators is only calculated for the first year of the firm's existence even though the 
number of owner-operators can change from year to year. The average number of founders 
is 1.416 (std dev = 0.698). 68.1% of firms (1,112) have only one founder, 24.5% (401) have 
two founders, and 7.4% (121) have three or more founders. Table 18 shows the distribution 
of the founding team size. 
Table 18: Distribution of Founding Team Size 
# Frequency % 
1,112 68.1% 
2 401 24.5% 
3 88 5.4% 
4 29 1.8% 
5 4 0.2% 
Total 1,634 100.0% 
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Education of Founders. Education was measured on the highest level for each 
founder as of 2004, ranging from 1 (less than 9th grade) to 10 (professional school or 
doctorate). It is important that this variable is not based upon the number of years of 
education, but rather highest degree achieved. The number of years is not a good measure 
for this study since founders that more quickly finish a degree have been found to be more 
successful (Backes-Gellner & Werner, 2007). Table 19 shows the levels (categories) of 
education, and the number of firms with. that average level of education. 
Table 19: Levels (Categories) of Education 
Value Category 
1 Less than 9th grade 
2 Some high school, but no diploma 
3 High school graduate (diploma or equivalent diploma [GEDD 
4 Technical, trade or vocational degree 
5 Some college, but no degree 
6 Associate's degree 
7 Bachelor's degree 
8 Some graduate school but no degree 
9 Master's degree 
10 Professional school or doctorate 
The average level of education of the founders is measured by summing the levels of 
education of each member of the founding team and dividing by the number of members on a 
founding team. This provided a measure of average education ofthe founders that could be 
compared across the firms in the sample. The average level of education for each firm was 
6.416 (std dev = 1.994), which is between an Associate's degree and a Bachelor's degree 
based upon the scale used in the survey. 
Type of Education of Founders. Founders engage in a complex array of financing 
decisions that possibly affect the success of their firms. Founders with a business education 
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might be able to better handle these financing decisions because they would have higher 
financial literacy since business schools expose individuals to finance. Founders with a 
business education have been found to be more knowledgeable in their financing options 
(Drexler, G. Fischer, & Schoar, 2010). And as argued in the theory development section, a 
member of the founding team with a business education might use more credit sources as 
they know more about the various funding sources. Therefore, a dichotomous variable has 
been created, equal to 1 if any of the founding team members has a business college degree 
and 0 ifnone of the members of the founding team has a non-business college degree. The 
average type of education is 0.189 which indicates most founding teams do not have a 
member with a business degree (std dev = 0.92). 
Work Experience of Founders (Overall). Each founder of a firm reported the number 
of years of work experience in the firm's industry. The average work experience of the 
founders is measured by summing the years of work experience of each member of the 
founding team and dividing by the number of members on a founding team. The average 
work experience is 13.116 years (std dev = 10.140). 
Work Experience of Founders (Start-up). Each founder of a firm reported ifhe or she 
had started a previous firm. If at least one founder had started a firm before, this variable is 
1, and otherwise O. Almost half of the firms had at least one founder that had started a firm 
previously (mean = 0.474; std dev = 0.499). 
Amount of Outstanding Debt. The amount of outstanding debt is important as a 
control variable to be able to determine if firms are obtaining additional debt when they 
change credit sources or if they are paying off or consolidating their debt. Table 20, Figure 
14, Figure 15, and Figure 16 show the distribution of the outstanding amount of debt broken 
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out by the type of credit source used per year. Average total outstanding debt increases the 
first four years to $62,906 before falling to $37,788 in year six (2009). The standard 
deviation of total outstanding debt has the same trend, peaking at $595,714 in year four 
(2007). Banks provide the largest portion of credit, ranging from 56.4% of total outstanding 
debt in 2004 to 82.0% in 2008. The next highest provider of credit varies from year to year. 
Non-bank financial institutions and owners provide just over 10% each in the first year. 
Owners stay the second highest provider of credit in year two (9%). The situation changes in 
year three as debt provided by non-bank financial institutions decreases. Debt from credit 
card institutions rises the first three years before falling in 2007 and 2008. In 2009, credit 
card institutions are the third largest providers of debt (10.3%). Government provides little 
debt to firms until the sixth year, when it becomes the second largest provider of debt 
(13.7%). The reason why government was the second largest provider is because the 
government figure is skewed in 2009 as two firms received $5.4m and $1.6m in this year. 
Prior to these two firms obtaining government financing, the highest amount of debt a firm 
received was $Im (in 2004) in any of the previous five years. The highest number of firms 
with government debt in any given year is in 2004 and 2005, when 13 firms used government 
debt. Debt from family members increases for the first three years in dollar amount, but the 
percentage stays stable. However, the standard deviation is large compared to the mean for 
most of the years. Hence, there are a few firms that receive a large amount of debt from 
family members which account for the high standard deviation. Debt from other business, 
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Amount of New Equity Funding. Another variable examined over time in the growth 
curve model is the dollar amount of new funds provided to a firm in the form of equity 
during its first six years. External equity can be provided by multiple sources, including 
venture capital firms, angel investors, owners, family , and friends . However, for this 
analysis, the amount of external equity that is provided to new firms is aggregated over these 
sources each year. Thus, one value for each year measures the total amount of external 
equity the firm has obtained in that year. Including equity as a control variable in the 
analyses relates to the multiple credit source usage by providing a means to determine if 
firms substitute debt funding with equity or use equity to obtain additional funds above and 
beyond what they have obtained in the form of debt. In addition, having the amount of 
equity included in the model handles an endogeneity issue that is in the model. Firm size is 
endogenous to finance conditions at the time a firm is started. This could bias the estimate of 
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the coefficient parameters in the statistical model. The amount of equity is a component of 
firm size. Firms obtained the highest amount of equity in the first ($48,559) and sixth years 
($50,406). After year one, the amount of new equity obtained slowly decreases until 
rebounding in year six. The standard deviation in all six years is much higher than the mean, 
indicating that a few firms obtain large amounts of new equity . Table 21 and Figure 17 show 
the distribution of the dollar amount of external equity funding obtained each year. 
Table 21: Distribution of New Equity Funding each Year 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Type Mean Std Dev Mean Sid Dev Mean Sid Dev Mean Sid Dev Mean Sid Dev Mean SId Dev . 
Amount of ew Equity Funding $48,554 S269.361 $45.974 S377,862 $42,801 $454,509 $41 ,412 $455,271 S33, I66 S331 ,1I0 S50,406 S521 ,648 
N 1,634 1,587 1,507 1,411 1,322 1,251 
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Age of Founders, The age of the founders could influence the usage of credit sources, 
as younger founders might have less of a history with main credit sources such as 
commercial banks. Thus they are required to use alternative credit sources as a necessity to 
keep their firm operating. As well , older founders have had the opportunity to save money to 
invest in their firm, and thus require less external funds. In addition, the age of founders 
could influence the survival and growth of the firm. New firms run by older founders have 
been found to survive longer as older founders can stave off bankruptcy or these older 
founders are more skilled at running a firm (e.g. T. Bates, 1990; Cosh & Hughes, 1994; 
Cressy, 2006b). In addition, young founders are more likely to find more opportunities 
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outside of their firm and voluntarily exit the venture. Finally, Hsu, E. B. Roberts, & Eesley 
(2007) show that founders that graduated from technology-based universities have a 
decreasing median age over time. This implies that founders from tech-based universities 
may now be starting firms at younger ages33• The average age of founders is 44.9 years (std 
dev = 10.813). This is similar to the founding age reported in prior studies, as the average 
age of entrepreneurs when they start their firms has been found to be between 35 and 64 
(Fairlie, 2009; Stangler, 2009), and recent report shows the average age is 40 in some data 
sets (e.g. Wadhwa, Saxenian, Rissing, & Gereffi, 2007). 
Gender. Despite the growing number of female-owned firms in the USA, female-
owned firms tend to be smaller in size and have slower growth rates than male-owned firms 
(e.g. Cliff, 1998; A. C. Cooper et aI., 1994; E. M. Fischer, Reuber, & Dyke, 1993; E. M. 
Fischer, 1992). In addition, firms started by women have a lower survival rate than firms 
started by men (Bosma, Van Praag, Thurik, & De Wit, 2004; Robb, 2002). One reason for 
women possibly not building growth firms and having lower survival rates is their 
differences in access to financial capital. The ability to obtain external financing might be 
affected by the gender of the founder or founders (Brush, N. M. Carter, Greene, M. M. Hart, 
& Gatewood, 2002; Coleman, 2000; Robb & Coleman, 2010). Studies have shown mixed 
results in terms of gender affecting access to external financing. For example, G. W. Haynes 
& D. C. Haynes (1999) and Verheul & Thurik (2001) find that gender does not influence the 
likelihood of getting a loan. In addition, no difference is found due to gender when 
33 Some research has found that a larger number of individuals start firms when they are in their low-20s or 
older than 40 (e.g. Minniti & Levesque, 2008; Parker, 2009). Thus there might not be a positive linear 
relationship between the probability of starting a firm and age; but rather, a convex relationship ("U"-shape). 
This would suggest the age variable should be squared. However, I am not examining the starting rate. I am 
examining credit usage, and older individuals tend to have more money and assets than younger individuals. 
Having additional money and assets can affect credit usage as the individuals can either use the money to fund 
the business (thus, the firm requires less credit) or they could use their assets as collateral to obtain more credit. 
Thus, I do not square the age variable in the analysis. 
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examining the different types of bootstrapping methods used by firms to finance their 
operations (Neeley & Van Auken, 2010). However, S. Carter & Rosa (1998) and Alsos, 
Isaksen, & Ljunggren (2006) find that women tend to use less institutional finance, and less 
financing capital in general. As well, it has been suggested that women ask for external 
financing less often than men. To control for gender, a variable indicating the percentage of 
females on the founding team is computed. On average, the founding team consists of25.9% 
female members (std dev = 0.391). 
Race. Financial institutions have been found to redline certain populations (see 
Parker, 2009, Chapter 7). One of the implications of the Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) model of 
credit rationing is redlining. Redlining occurs when a specific group of borrowers who share 
the same traits as other borrowers cannot obtain a loan even at higher interest rates, but not 
because of a lack of supply of funds. Redlining is often racially determined. For example, 
in the mortgage business, black and Hispanic borrowers were charged a higher interest rate 
than white borrowers with the same credit profiles (Savage, 2011). To control for race, a 
variable indicating the percentage of non-White individuals on the founding team is 
computed. On average, the founding team consists of 13.0% non-white members (std dev = 
0.325). 
Citizenship. Non-American entrepreneurs have a higher rate of starting firms in the 
United States on a percentage basis of their respective population living in the United States, 
than American citizens (D. H. Hsu et aI., 2007). These firms started by non-Americans tend 
to generate more innovation (Saxenian, 2002a, 2002b) and have higher survival rates 
(Coleman, Cotei, & Farhat, 20 11). However, with non-technical entrepreneurship by non-
Americans it has been found that there is a lower survival rate than with American 
116 
entrepreneurs that start non-technical firms (Georgarakos & Tatsiramos, 2009). The reason is 
because non-technical entrepreneurs tend to start firms due to necessity and will thus leave 
the entrepreneurship ranks quickly when a wage opportunity appears. To control for 
citizenship, a variable indicating the percentage of non-American individuals on the founding 
team is computed. On average, the founding team consists of 6.2% non-American members 
(std dev = 0.224). 
Technology Level. The technology level of a firm can possibly affect survival, 
growth, and access to external financing. Founders of high technology firms tend to have 
various reasons for starting their firms, which are not necessarily the same for founders of 
non-high technology firms. Founders in general have been found to sacrifice economic 
rationality for non-financial rewards (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1955), and founders of 
high-technology firms tend to violate economic rationality even more so than founders of 
firms that are not high technology firms. Reasons include independence (Deakins & 
Philpott, 1994; Oakey, 1984, 1995) and location (Greenhut & Colberg, 1962). Thus, 
founders of high technology firms are more willing to substitute profit maximization with 
non-financial objectives as a key goal for their firms as long as the firm does not become 
insolvent (Oakey & S. Y. Cooper, 1989). The high-technology founder may be prepared to 
have his / her firm remain static or grow slowly by avoiding the use of external funds 
(Deakins and Philpott, 1994). This attitude could affect the survival rate of high technology 
firms. 
High technology firms tend to spend a higher percentage of their funds on research 
and development. Research and development expenditures tend to be difficult to finance via 
external means, and for new firms, equity (either internal or external) tends to be the source 
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used (Auerswald & Branscomb, 2002; Brierley, 2001; Carpentier & Suret, 2006; P. A. 
Gompers & Lerner, 2001; B. H. Hall & Lerner, 2009; Lerner, 2010; Lindstrom & Olofsson, 
2001). Thus, high technology firms could have a different usage of credit sources. For these 
reasons, a technology variable is included as a control variable. 
Multiple methods have been used for operationalizing the concept of a technology, 
with most of them pertaining to defining an industry's level of technology (as opposed to 
defining each individual firm's level of technology). The most common indicators of an 
industry's technology level are measured using expenditures on research and development or 
the proportion of the workforce in science and technology occupations (Malecki, 1991). 
Thus, the level of technology is defined by the amount of innovation or human capital in an 
industry. Following Chapple, Markusen, Schrock, Yamamoto, & Yu (2004), the level of 
technology of a firm is defined in two ways: 1) technology employers, and 2) technology 
generators. Technology employers are identified as high technology if they are in an 
industry where the employment of these occupations exceeds three times the national average 
of 3.33%, or 9.98% (Chapple et aI., 2004). Technology generators are identified as firms 
being in industries (as defined by NAICS codes) that exceed the U.S. average for both 
research and development expenditures per employee ($11,297) and for the proportion of 
full-time equivalent research and development scientists and engineers in the industry 
workforce (5.9%). Ifa firm is in an industry that is either a technology employer or 
technology generator, it is considered high technology. Firms in all other industries are 
considered low technology. This is a dichotomous variable, where 1 represents high 
technology and 0 represents low technology. 44.0% of the firms in my sample are 
considered to be high technology firms (std dev = 0.497). 
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Product / Service. Product and service firms have different capital requirements 
which could affect the need for external financing. The service sector has a smaller need for 
fixed assets than the product (manufacturing) sector since investment in plant, property, and 
equipment is relatively low (Cressy & Olofsson, 1997; ENSR, 1996; Hughes, 1997). For 
example, Cressy & Olofsson (1997) find that the median debt/equity ratio for service firms is 
30%, compared to 69% for manufacturing firms. Thus, based upon if the firm is a product or 
service firm, it is important to control for the type of firm. A dichotomous variable has been 
created to determine if the firm provides a service (0) or a product (1 )34. Approximately half 
of the firms offer products or products and services, and half offer a service only (std dev = 
0.500). 
Incorporation. A business is considered to be incorporated if it is a s-corp or a c-
corp. Unincorporated businesses are sole proprietorships, limited liability corporations 
(LLCs), general partnerships, and limited liability partnerships (LLPs). They are different 
than s-corps and c-corps as taxes can be run through the owner's personal tax filing. 
Incorporation could affect the credit a firm is available to obtain. Thus, a dichotomous 
variable is used to indicate if a firm is incorporated (1) or not (0) in the first year of 
operations. Only 31.4% of the firms are incorporated in the first year of their operations (std 
dev = 0.464). 
Commitment to Venture. The level of commitment to the venture by founders can be 
an important factor in determining if a new firm survives and grows (Reynolds & B. Miller, 
1992). For example, Reynolds (2007) says that the intensity of effort is a positive indicator 
for venture success. Level of commitment can be measured by number of hours worked by 
34 If a firm provides both a product and a service, it is considered a product firm. This is done based upon the 
reasoning of capital requirements for product firms. If a firm is a product firm and decides to add a service, the 
capital requirements don't change drastically unlike a service firm that decides to add a product. 
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the founders and the amount of capital initially provided to the venture at startup (Semasinge, 
Davidsson, & Steffens, 2011). The number of hours a founder puts into the venture could 
affect the success of the new firm, with more hours resulting in better performance 
(Gatewood, Shaver, & Gartner, 1995). The reason is because the founder is more committed 
to the positive performance of the firm and isn't distracted by other opportunities. However, 
it has also been found that financial constraints might be less for new firms if the founders 
continue with their day job and work only part-time in the venture (Petrova, 2010). This is 
because the individual is earning money from his or her day job, and is not solely reliant on 
his or her "side" job. These are competing forces as less financial constraints should lead to 
a higher chance of survival and growth for new firms. As such, I include the number of 
hours worked by the founders. The variable is calculated by adding the total number of 
hours worked each week by all the founding team members and dividing by the number of 
founders. For example, ifthere are 3 founders, with founder 1 working 50 hours per week 
on average, founder 2 working 40 hours per week on average, and founder 3 working 20 
hours per week on average, the formula would be: (50 + 40 + 20) / 3 = 36.67%. With the 
standard work week in the United States being 40 hours, any firm with an average of less 
than 40 hours would indicate the founding team on average works less than full time on the 
activities related to the firm. The average hours worked by founders was rather stable, with 
the highest average being 42.5 (in 2005) and the lowest being 39.9 (in 2009). Standard 
deviations are also fairly steady over the six years, with the highest being in the first year (std 
dev = 22.243). Table 22 and Figure 18 show the distribution of the dollar amount of new 
equity each year. 
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Table 22: Distribution of Hours Worked in Venture by Founders on Average 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Type Mean Sid Dev Mean Sid Dev Mean SId Dev Mean Sid Dev Mean Sid Dev Mean Sid Dev 
Number of Hours Worked in Venture 423 22243 42.5 21.697 42.1 21.8 15 42.0 21462 41.0 21621 399 21 127 
N 1,634 1,587 1,507 1,411 1,322 1,251 




2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
~ 
- Number of Hours 
Worked in Venture 
I 
Investment of money by a fo'under can possibly affect the performance of new firms. 
Cooper et al. (1994) find that initial financial capital affects the growth and survival of new 
firms, whereas Cassar (2004) finds that founders with higher household income have higher 
growth intentions for their firms. Along with measuring the commitment of the firm this 
variable controls for startup size. Treating the amount of equity contributed by the owners as 
exogenous can be considered a component of firm size (Astebro & I. Bernhardt, 2003) . 
. Firm size is endogenous to finance conditions at the time a firm is started and thus could bias 
the estimate of the coefficient parameters in the statistical model. Hence, the amount of 
funds provided by the founders in the form of equity in year one is included in the model. 
Founders contributed $27,412 on average at start-up (standard deviation = $66,349). The 
variable is not normally distributed, as there are many firms in the data set where the 
founders did not provide equity in year one and an instance where the founders provided $1 .5 
million. To handle this non-normal distribution, the variable is transformed using the natural 
log function . 
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Quality of Business Idea. The quality of the business idea needs to be controlled for 
as a firm with a better business idea could see higher growth and survive longer than a firm 
with a poorer business idea. Firms with a better business idea have been found to survive 
longer and in many cases have a higher growth rate than firms with lower quality business 
ideas. In addition, a firm with a better business idea could have better access to external 
funds. Or it could be that a firm's multiple relationships with creditors could indicate it is in 
distress. Even though M. A. Petersen & Rajan (1994) do not find using multiple banks 
provides a poor signal to the market, they do discuss how multiple relationships with 
creditors can be a proxy for firms in distress. For example, floundering firms could be cut 
offby financial institutions and be forced to financing options such as trade credit (M. A. 
Petersen & Rajan, 1994: 33). In addition, finance provided by founders later in the life of 
the firm could be a sign oflast resort if the firm is performing poorly (Ou & G. W. Haynes, 
2006). This would indicate that that researchers should control for the quality of the idea 
when examining the effects of multiple credit relationships on survival and growth of the 
firm. 
As a proxy, two binary variables are used to measure the quality of the business idea. 
The first variable measures the existence of intellectual property for a firm. The second 
proxy variable is based upon the competitive advantage of the firm over its competitors. 
Measureable legal intellectual property of the firm consists of patents, trademarks, and 
copyrights. Firms with patents, trademarks, or copyrights tend to be firms with stronger 
business ideas and often higher valuations (e.g. Block, De Vries, & Sandner, 2010; Cao & P.-
H. Hsu, 2010; Eisdorfer & P.-H. Hsu, 2011; Lerner, 1994; Mann & Sager, 2007). A 
dichotomous variable equals 1 for firms that have a patent, trademark, or copyright in any of 
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the years of operations and equals 0 otherwise. 38.4% of the firms had intellectual property 
in the form of a patent(s), trademark(s), and/or copyright(s) within six years of their 
operations (std dev = 0.486). 
To measure competitive advantage over competitors, respondents indicate if they felt 
if their firm has a competitive advantage over competitors when they started the firm. The 
common thought is that all entrepreneurs are going to answer yes to this question, as 
entrepreneurs tend to be overconfident (Busenitz & Barney, 1997), and they would not have 
started the business if they felt otherwise. This is not necessarily seen as 36.5% indicate 
they didn't believe they had a competitive advantage in year one. However, the notion is 
subsequently supported by the percentage of firms indicating they don't have a competitive 
advantage increasing with firm age as 49.0% indicate they don't have a competitive 
advantage by year six. This however doesn't weaken the use of this variable as a proxy for 
business idea quality, as this increase could be that founders are becoming more realistic in 
describing their firm's level of competitive advantage but don't feel they should quit since 
the firm has survived, although not grown (most firms are not growth firms). Thus, a 
dichotomous variable is computed indicating if the founders felt they had a competitive 
advantage over their competitors in any of the six years, with 1 indicating they feel they have 
a competitive advantage and 0 indicating they feel they do not. Of the firms that survive all 
six years, 90.6% indicate they had a competitive advantage in year one. On average, 88.9% 
of the firms indicate they have a competitive advantage in at least one of the years (std dev = 
0.315). 
A summary of the descriptive statistics of the invariant control variables is provided 
in Table 23. In addition, a summary of the descriptive statistics of the multiple credit source 
123 
variables and outstanding debt is provided Table 24 in to better illustrate the distribution of 
the multiple credit sources over time and to compare the amount of debt outstanding each 
year. 
Table 23: Summary of the Descriptive Statistics for the Time Invariant Control 
Variables 
Number of Founders 
Education of Founders 
Variable 
Type of Education of Main Founder 
Work Experience of Founders (overall) 
Work Experience of Founders (start-up) 





Product / Service 
Incorporation (in 1st Year) 
Founder Contributed Equity (in year 1) 
Intellectual Property (any year) 
Competitive Advantage over Competitors (any year) 

































Table 24: Summary of the Descriptive Statistics for the Multiple Credit Source and 
Outstanding Debt Variables 
Number of Total Number of Unique Diversity Index of 
Credit Sources Credit Sources Credit Sources Outstanding Debt ($) 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
2004 0.900 1.311 0.636 0.721 0.170 0.254 $28,142 $189,099 
2005 1.104 1.829 0.681 0.745 0.189 0.265 $34,055 $302,192 
2006 1.125 1.953 0.663 0.731 0.196 0.269 $39,423 $375,948 
2007 1.180 2.036 0.673 0.742 0.186 0.264 $62,906 $595,714 
2008 0.990 2.136 0.556 0.720 0.188 0.266 $42,349 $298,779 
2009 0.921 1.768 0.551 0.694 0.178 0.260 $37,788 $242,607 
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Credit Crisis. During 2007 and 2008, the United States experienced a credit crisis 
that dramatically impacted the economy and the availability of credit which firms were able 
to obtain during the crisis period (e.g. Brunner & Krahnen, 2008; Ivashina & Scharfstein, 
2010). The data set covers this period as the panel of firms is tracked from 2004 through 
2009. The usage of credit by these firms could be impacted by the credit crisis. Thus, a 
dichotomous variable has been set up to indicate if the economy was in the credit crisis or not 
for a given year. For years 2004-2006 and 2009, the ECONOMY variable is set to O. For 
years 2007 and 2008, the years encompassing the credit crisis, the ECONOMY variable is set 
to 1. In addition, there might be an interaction effect between outstanding debt and new 
equity based upon the economic environment. Therefore, two interaction terms are created 
(economy x debt and economy x equity). The variables are mean centered between creating 
the interaction variables so to not have an issue with multicollinearity (DeMaris, 2004). 
Location. Different locations in the United States experience different levels of credit 
availability at different times. For example, local banks in Texas might be more willing to 
lend to oil companies started in Texas when oil prices are high. Or perhaps local banks in 
New York might not have been willing to lend to local Internet firms just after the end of the 
dot-com bubble. In addition, banks might be more or less willing to lend to firms in urban 
areas than firms in rural areas. Thus, a variable which indicates the metropolitan statistical 
area of the firm is included in the analysis and will be controlled for in the 3rd level of the 
HLM model as firms are nested within a metropolitan statistical area. A metropolitan 
statistical area is defined as a geographical region with a high population density of people 
and has close economic ties throughout the area. Metropolitan statistical areas were 
established by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (a division of the U.S. 
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government) for the purpose of a population census and the compilation of related statistical 
data. To be considered a metropolitan statistical area, the area has to have at least one 
urbanized area of 50,000 or more in population. In 2004, when the survey was initiated, 
there were 362 metropolitan statistical areas in the United States (Office of Management and 
Budget, 2003)35. 243 of these metropolitan statistical areas are represented in the sample. 
Not all firms are in a designated metropolitan statistical area as they might be located in rural 
areas or small towns. A firm is given a value of 0 if it is not in a designated metropolitan 
statistical area. There are 282 firms not in a designated metropolitan statistical area. 
Analysis 
Multiple statistical analyses are used in this study to ensure the robustness of the 
findings. It is informative to perform these analyses using the different statistical methods to 
determine if the results are similar or not. Results are more robust when using other 
available statistical methods to further confirm the findings from the main analyses (e.g. 
Creswell & Clark, 2007). Initially, OLS regression is performed using a proxy for survival in 
and difference scores for growth analysis like past studies. Difference scores are used for the 
dependent variables (performance) as OLS regression is a cross section method of analysis. 
For the independent variables, the level of the variables for the last full year of operations are 
used, along with an additional analysis using the first year of operations. OLS and Probit 
regression are used for the initial survival analysis using continuous and dichotomous 
measures for survival. These methods use difference scores to analyze new firms and their 
financing decisions. With difference scores, change is calculated using two end points to 
measure the change (difference scores). Performing analyses with difference scores using 
35 A map of the metropolitan statistical areas can be found online via the following link: 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/maps/msa_maps2004/msa2004_previews_htm/cbsa_us_wall_II04.htm 
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OLS and Probit regression is what most past studies have used and allows me to compare 
these basic results to those from more sophisticated analyses performed in this study, 
including survival analysis, growth curve analysis, and panel data regression. 
The independent variables in the OLS and Probit regression are the three multiple 
credit source variables: number of total credit sources, number of unique credit sources, and 
diversity index of credit sources, each run in separate regression models as they measure 
different faucets of multiple credit source usage. Two measurements of each of these 
multiple credit source variables are used: 1) the level of the multiple credit source variable in 
the last full year of the firm's operation, and 2) the level of the multiple credit source variable 
at the end of the first year of operations (i.e. 2004). This follows the concept from the 
Westhead and Cowling (1995) study when they examined the number of financial sources 
used by a firm at startup and the firm's last financial year (1986). The levels of variables in 
the last full year of operations for a firm is important to examine as the usage of multiple 
credit sources in the last full year of operations is the last full measurement before the firm 
either closes or the data collection is finished - thus, providing a picture of multiple credit 
source usage near the time the dependent variables are being measured. However, with new 
firms, the first year of operations is also considered a crucial time for the firm (e.g. 1. W. 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Stinchcombe, 1965; Wiklund, Baker, & D. Shepherd, 2010). During 
the first year of operations, many activities are set in motion that could affect firms' survival 
and growth rates. Thus OLS and Probit regression is also performed using the end of first 
year levels for multiple credit sources. 
Upon completing the initial analyses of growth and survival using OLS and Probit 
regression, I use several additional statistical methods that effectively incorporate 
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longitudinal data, including survival analysis using Cox proportional hazard modeling, and 
growth curve modeling using hierarchical linear modeling and panel data regression. 
Survival analysis is a statistical method that deals with the death or failure of an organism, 
system, or organization. The analysis technique involves data which estimates the time to a 
certain event such as death, to relapse, an onset of a disease, etc. - as such, it was initially 
used in the medical field (E. T. Lee & Wang, 2003). Over the past 20 years, applications for 
survival analysis have been extended outside the medical field to other fields, including 
criminology, sociology, marketing, and entrepreneurship. The main statistic in survival 
analysis is survival time. Survival time is the time to the occurrence of a given event. In the 
case of my analysis, the given event is the closure of the new firm. 
The survival analysis method I use is Cox proportional hazard modeling (Cox, 1972). 
It is a multiple regression method for examining the relationship between survival time and 
possible predictor variables. The data are censored because some of the firms are still alive 
at year six when the data collection stops (i.e. not all the firms have "died" and thus their 
survival rates are not known; I can't assume 100% of those firms survive indefinitely). In 
addition, the distribution of survival of new firms is not normal as more firms fail earlier than 
later within the first six years. However, when removing the firms that don't close by the 
end of the data collection period, the data does show the failure rate as being normally 
distributed. The normality test was performed using a visual test and examining the P-P plot 
and Q-Q plot results. As mentioned earlier, removing the firms that don't close before the 
end of the data collection period would bias the results. Hence, when examining the entire 
sample, the dependent variable is not normally distributed. Such data lends itself to the Cox 
method as the method is a general nonparametric model which is appropriate for the analysis 
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of data with and without censoring (E. T. Lee & Wang, 2003). The model uses the hazard 
function as the dependent variable. The hazard function is proportional to that of the 
underlying survival distribution. 
Growth curve modeling is the statistical analysis tool that I use to examine the trend 
of multiple credit source usage by new firms over time based upon their performance. 
Growth curve modeling has the benefit of analyzing the change of a repeated measure over 
time rather than just a discrete event (as is the case in survival analysis), including being able 
to estimate flexible curve shapes. Growth curve modeling is a broad term that has been used 
in different contexts for longitudinal analyses (see Bollen & Curran, 2006). The 
contemporary use of the term typically refers to statistical methods that estimate between-
firm difference in within-firm change (e.g. Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Singer & Willett, 
2003). The within-firm patterns of change are referred to as time trends or growth curves. A 
basic growth model is composed of the fixed and random effects. A fixed effect represents a 
value in the population (e.g., the population mean age of the firms). A random effect 
represents the random probability distribution around the fixed effect (e.g. the population 
variance in age of firms). In a growth model the fixed effects represent the mean of the 
"growth" of all the firms within the sample, and the random effects represent the variance of 
the individual growth curves around the group means (Curran, Obeidat, & Losardo, 2010). 
In growth curve modeling, longitudinal data are modeled from variables that describe 
a mean trend for the population while allowing for between firm differences (Duncan, 
Duncan, Strycker, 2006). Growth curve modeling provides several advantages over other 
methods when analyzing trends, including flexibility, practicality, and its robustness to model 
development processes and outcomes of change (Muthen, 1991). Growth curve modeling is 
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able to capture important changes in variables over time that allow the researcher to study the 
development at the aggregate level of young firms, while also capturing individual firm 
differences in levels and trends over time (Muthen & Curran, 1997). Growth curve models 
can be used to model growth as a factor of repeated observations of a single variable, as well 
as with multiple variables. It is possible to use growth curve modeling to determine whether 
development in one variable covaries with the development of another variable - time 
varying covariates (T. E. Duncan, S. C. Duncan, & Strycker, 2006). Such models are 
considered multivariate growth curve models, which depict two trends affecting one another. 
These models provide a more dynamic view of the correlates of change as compared to a 
univariate growth curve model or cross-sectional studies, which offer static views of the data 
(T. E. Duncan et aI., 2006; Muthen & Curran, 1997; Muthen, 1991). I include time varying 
covariates in my models and control variables. Longitudinal studies and dynamic views are 
important in entrepreneurship research since new firms are changing rapidly (Davidsson et 
aI., 2001; Low & MacMillan, 1988). 
Hierarchical linear modeling (HLMi6 is the framework that is used for the growth 
curve analysis (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). There are two general approaches used to fit 
growth curve models to observed data: hierarchical linear modeling (Raudenbush & 8ryk, 
2002) or structural equation modeling (SEM) (T. E. Duncan et aI., 2006). The similarities 
between these methods outnumber the differences (see Curran et aI., 2010). HLM tends to be 
used when there are time varying covariates, multiple levels, and unequal spaced time points 
in the analysis. SEM tends to be used when latent variables are involved in the analysis. 
36 Hierarchical linear modeling is also referred to as multi-level modeling, random coefficient modeling, and 
mixed-effects modeling. 
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Since there are no latent variables involved, I use HLM rather than SEM for the growth curve 
modeling analysis. 
HLM is a statistical technique that is typically used when respondents are nested 
within groups or observations are nested within respondents. Cross-sectional multi-level 
models examine level-l responses (e.g. individuals, firms, etc.) nested within higher level 
entities (e.g. teams, firms, location). The technique takes into account the dependency 
between observations whereas conventional multiple regression analysis does not (J. Cohen, 
P. Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). However, HLM can also be used for longitudinal data 
analysis by treating time as nested within respondents. In longitudinal analyses, the models 
examine patterns of repeated measures nested within individuals, firms, etc. Instead of 
focusing on inter-firm differences, the multi-level framework focuses on modeling intra-firm 
changes over time (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Singer & Willett, 2003). HLM provides a 
method of estimating growth models that result in correct standard errors for parameter 
estimates and thus correct significance tests (MacCallum, C. Kim, Malarkey, & Kiecolt-
Glaser, 1997). 
The basic conceptualization of HLM is a two level model where level-l is within-
firm and level-2 is between-firm. For growth models, the approach in HLM is that time 
points are modeled at level-I, with firms which are being observed modeled at level-2. The 
level-I models represent repeated measures from the same firm but at different points in time. 
The multiple-level aspect ofHLM using panel data with firms allows me to model the usage 
of multiple credit source usage over six years ofa firm's life. 
Panel data regression is another popular form of longitudinal data analysis that is 
increasingly being used by social science researchers, namely economists. As with growth 
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curve modeling, panel data regression is a method of studying a particular subject within 
multiple sites and the subject being observed over a defined time frame. With repeated 
measures, panel analysis data regression permits the analysis on the dynamics of change over 
time. 
HLM and panel data regression are similar, as they both can capture within group and 
between group variance. Panel data regression emphasizes specification procedure and 
misspecification testing. Model specification tends to be simple, with greater attention put 
on issues related to endogeneity of the regression, the structure of the errors, and the 
normality of the estimators. For the method of estimation, panel data models have closed-
form solutions that can be solved via linear algebra 37. The estimation usually generalized 
least squares based on Aitken's Theorem. HLM models do not have closed-form solutions 
and are solved by non-linear numerical optimization, as maximum likelihood is used. Thus, 
HLM models are dependent on approximation and convergence criteria. Even though 
general serial correlation and heteroskedasticity can be controlled in panel data modeling 
(e.g. using generalized least squares (GLS)), the HLM framework allows for a more general 
specification ofheteroskedasticity (e.g. allowing to have non-linear covariates) and within 
group serial correlation (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). HLM also allows covariates to vary by 
group, whereas panel data models do noe8• It is arguable which of these methods is best, so 
both are performed. 
37 A mathematical equation is said to be a closed-form solution if it solves a given problem in terms of a finite 
number of known functions and mathematical operations. The closed-form solution in panel data regression 
uses generalized least squares (GLS) for efficient estimation of unobserved effects models, which means the 
variance components are estimated first (create the covariance matrix of errors) and then the parameters (betas) 
are estimated. More about panel data regression is provided in Chapter 4 - Results. 
38 For a more detailed explanation of the differences between HLM and panel data regression, see Croissant & 
Millo (2008). 
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Survival analysis, growth curve analysis, and panel data regression using longitudinal 
data are more robust than analysis using differencing scores with cross-sectional data, and 
enables analyzing the evolution of a firm ' s change in credit usage over time. In cross-
sectional studies, change is calculated using two end points to measure the change, which 
fails to use important data in between the two points. In contrast to survival analysis, growth 
curve analysis and panel data regression use longitudinal data to examine each point in time 
- in this study, the change for each of the first six years ofa firm ' s life. However, cross-
sectional methods are more regularly used in past studies. Thus, OLS regression, Probit 
regression, Cox proportional hazard modeling (survival analysis), HLM (growth cure 
modeling), and panel data regression are all performed. 
Figure 19 illustrates the statistical methods used in this study as related to the amount 
of usage of the statistical method in past studies and the complexity of the method. 
Figure 19: Statistical Methods Used in the Study 
Simpler I More Readily Used 
• OLS Regression 
• Probit Regression 
• Survival Analysis, also called event history analysis 
- Cox Proportional Hazard Modeling 
• Growth Curve Modeling 
- Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
• Panel Data Regression 
More Complex I Less Readily Used 
With the statistical methods being a mix of cross-sectional and longitudinal methods, 
the measurement of the variables change for some of the variables. Table 25 indicates how 
these variables are measured for each statistical method. 
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Table 25: Summary of Variable Measurement for each Statistical Method Used 
OLS R~n:=:uion Probit R~reuion 
Cos: Proportional PanelOllla 
Varia bit Nllmt 




Year of 01H!rationJ °l)crat ionl Year of O~r"lions °l)crlltionll 
Dependent ~riablcs 
Suryh'ul Age a12009 Age al 2009 O. I • O. I ' Uplo6)ears N/ A N/A 
Gnmlh 
Re\'enue (LN) Last Full Year of Last Full Year of N/A N/A IA Up 10 6 ) cars Up 10 6) cars 
Ope:mllOllS Opcmtions 
Employees (IN) Last Full Year of Last Full Year of N/A N/ A N/A Up 10 6 )CIUS Upto6)cslS 
Opemtlons Opcrotions 
1 ndcpcndenl Variables 
MultIple Crcdu Sources 
Number of Tolal Credit Sources 
l...asI Full Year of First Year of last Full Year or First Yearo( 
NumbcrofUlUquc Credit Sources Opcmlions Operations Operations Operations Up to 6 Years Up 10 6 Years Upto 6 Ye:us 
DI\·crsll~ Index ofCrc(hl Sourccs 
• 0 - survIVed. 1 '" closed 
MeS • multiple credit sourccs. LN - natumllog.. N/A - not applicable 
OLS Re~ra ion Probit R~rallion COl ProllO rtionlll Panel Da' a MCS: Lalit Full MCS: First Yu r of MCS: Last Full MCS: Fi rst Ytar of IILM V. riable Name 
Yellr of 0l~ralions 0l'eraltons Year of O~rations O~netons 
Hll7,a rd Modeling Regm ion 
Control Variables 
Number of Founders 
Education of Foundcrs 
lYpe or Educatkm or Main Founder Tunelm'&l1all 
Work E.xpencnce of Foundcrs (O\'erall) 
Work E.~penence of Founders (stan-up) 
Amoune or Outstanding Debt (LN) l...asI Full Year or First Year of W Full Ycarof Fust Ycarof Up 10 6 ) ears Up to 6 ) ears Up 10 6}ears 
OperattOns Operations Operations Operations 
Amount of Nc,' EqUlt) (LN) Last Full Year or FirstYe.1r Or laS! Full Year or First Year of Up to 6 } COl'S Up to 6 ) ears Up to 6ycars 
Opemtions Opemtions Operations Operations 
Age of Founders 
Gender 
Race 
Cltl7.enslliP Tune Im'Uladl 
Technolo&,! lC\ el 
ProdIlC1 ! Sen'ICC 
IncorpomttOn - In lear I 
Conlnutment to Venture 
Number of Hours Worked in LaS! Full Yenrof First Ycoror Last Full Year or FirstYe.1rOr Up t06~ears Up 10 6 } ears Up 10 6ycars 
Venture Operations Operations OpcratKms Opcraljons 
Founder Contriblilcd Equil}' • in 
year I (LN) 
Quality or Business Idea TIme Im .. ariIII 
Intellectual Propen) - nil) lear 
CompctllJ\'C Ad, anlage over 
Competitors - all} ) ear 
Credit Crisis Not Used Not Used NOI Used Not Used Up t06 )eal'S Upl06)cars Upl06)cars 
LocnIJOIi NOI Used Not Used Not Used Not Used Not Used 3rd Lcvcl Not Used 




In this section, I report the results of the statistical analyses. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, multiple statistical methods are used, spanning from simple statistical 
analyses to more sophisticated statistical analyses. I perform OLS regression, Probit 
regression, survival analysis using Cox proportional hazard modeling, growth curve analysis 
using hierarchal linear modeling, and panel data regression analyses on the entire sample 
using survival and growth variables as the dependent variables. In addition, I perform 
additional analysis using subsets of the data based upon a 2x2 framework39 with the 
dimensions of survival and growth. These additional analyses also include OLS regression, 
Probit regression, survival analysis, growth curve analysis, and panel data regression. 
Finally, robustness checks are performed to confirm the rationale of the hypotheses and to 
better understand which credit sources are driving the results. 
Statistical Software 
The statistical software R 2.15.1 (R Development Core Team, 2012) is used for the 
statistical analysis. R is an integrated suite of software tools that can be used for data 
manipulation, calculation, and graphical display40. There are a number of statistical packages 
that can be installed in R to allow for robust statistical analysis. I use the base statistical 
39 The 2x2 framework is explained in further detail in a later section of this chapter. 
40 Source: http://cran.r-project.org/doc/manuals/R-intro.html 
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package for OLS regression and Probit regression, which includes the 1m and glm functions. 
The other packages I use are survival (Therneau, 2012), nlme (non-linear and mixed-
effects )41 (Pinheiro & D. M. Bates, 2000), and plm (Croissant & Millo, 2008). The survival 
package examines and models the time it takes for events to occur. The package uses the 
coxph function to fit the Cox proportional hazard regression model. The nlme package can 
be used to estimate a variety of hierarchical linear (multi-level) models and provides 
flexibility to easily control the settings of the statistical models, including using the 
maximum-likelihood method for estimation when using the lme function. The plm package 
uses the generalized least squares estimation method to fit an econometrics-based model, 
panel data regression. 
Multicollinearity and Common Method Bias 
Before running the detail analysis, I investigate for multicollinearity and common 
method bias issues. I check for multicollinearity by examining the correlations. 
Multicollinearity occurs when there are two or more variables in the model that are highly 
correlated and provide redundant information. If there is multicollinearity, there could be 
inflation in the variances of regression estimates and inflation in the magnitudes of the 
coefficients (DeMaris, 2004). The average of the absolute correlation values is 0.088, with 
the highest absolute correlate value being 0.953 (between number of employees in 2008 and 
number of employees in 2009). There is a high correlation between repeated measures, 
which include the following variables: revenue, employees, number of total credit sources, 
number of unique credit sources, and diversity index of credit sources. It is normal to have 
high correlation between repeated measures. Longitudinal studies can handle the high 
41 The Ime4 package (D. Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2011) is a newer version of the nlme package. However, it 
doesn't allow for autocorrelation. And since there is an issue with autocorrelation in the growth curve models, 
the nlme package is used instead of the newer Ime4 package. 
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correlation. For example, with HLM, autocorrelation is controlled for (explained further in 
the HLM section). The correlations are much lower when examining only correlations 
between variables that are used in the same equation (e.g. there are them different multiple 
credit source variables, and none of them are used in the same equation; they are tested 
separately). After removing the correlations between repeated measures and correlations 
between variables that are not used in the same equation, the highest correlations are found 
between several of the outstanding debt variables and multiple credit source variables (the 
highest being 0.801, 0.756, 0.735, 0.734, 0.705, 0.701). This is still high. However, these 
five correlations are in the mix of 108 correlations between outstanding debt and the three 
multiple credit source variables, and if those five correlations are removed, the next highest 
correlation in the entire correlation matrix then becomes 0.595. Such levels of correlation 
between the variables are not very high, especially when the average absolute correlation is 
much lower. The overall levels of correlations don't indicate an issue with multicollinearity. 
Common method variance is not an issue in the data set even though the same 
respondent that answered the independent variables also answered the dependent variable in 
the survey. When the same respondent answers the independent variable and dependent 
variable the association of these variables could be stronger than they really are. This could 
possibly bias the coefficient estimates due to common method variance (P. M. Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, J.-Y. Lee, & N. P. Podsakoff, 2003; P. M. Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Hence, I 
test for common method bias by examining the correlations and performing a Harman's 
single-factor test (P. M. Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). As mentioned when examining for the 
possibility of multicollinearity, the absolute values for the correlations between the variables 
are low on average (0.088). In addition, I conduct a Harman's single-factor test to test for 
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common method variance. This is done by performing a factor analysis with principal 
components extraction using all of the independent and dependent variables included in the 
analysis. 15 factors have eigenvalues greater than 1, with the first factor accounting for only 
11.5% of the variance. Since one factor did not explain more than 50% of the variance, this 
suggests that common method variance should not be a critical problem for this study. 
OLS Regression 
The first statistical method I use in this analysis is ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression. I perform OLS regression analysis using three different dependent variables: age 
at 2009 (proxy for survival), revenue (growth), and number of employees (growth), each run 
in separate regression models. The independent variables are the three multiple credit source 
variables: number of total credit sources, number of unique credit sources, and diversity 
index of credit sources, each run in separate regression models as they measure different 
faucets of mUltiple credit source usage. Two measurements of each of these mUltiple credit 
source variables are used: 1) the level of the multiple credit source variable in the last full 
year of the firm's operation, and 2) the level of the multiple credit source variable at the end 
of the first year of operations (i.e. 2004). 
The covariates in the model are: number of founders, education of founders, type of 
education of main founder, work experience of founders (overall), work experience of 
founders (start-up), amount of outstanding debt, amount of new equity, age of founders, 
gender, race, citizenship, technology level, incorporation (in year 1), number of hours 
worked in venture, founder contributed equity (in year 1), intellectual property (any year), 
and competitive advantage over competitors (any year). The credit crisis and location 
variables are not included in this analysis. The credit crisis variable is time varying and the 
same logic of using the last full year level is not appropriate. For the location variable, the 
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variable is essentially a categorical variable with more than 211 categories. It would be 
unreasonable to include more than 211 dummy variables for the location variable. Thus, 
both the credit crisis and location variables are not included in the regression model. 
The dependent variables for this analysis are age at 2009, revenue, and number of 
employees. The proxy for survival in the regression model is age at 2009. This variable 
represents how old the firm is in 2009. If the firm is still living when the data collection 
stops in 2009, the age is 7. If the firm closed in 2009 or before, the age of the firm at which 
it closed is the age of the firm in 2009. The revenue and number of employees are taken at 
the level of the firm's last year of operation. The results are shown in Table 26, Table 27, 
and Table 28. 
Table 26: OLS Regression Results, Dependent Variable: Age at 2009 (MCS - Last Full 
Year) 
Standardin-o Slandardlt;cd Standardized 
Coefficient \+valuc Sig Coefficient t~\aluc Sl£l Codficicnt I-value Sig.. 
'Illmbcr ofTolal Cn.:dll Soun;cs -0.021 -1.030 O.JOJ 
~umbcr ul UnH.JlIC Credil Suurcc~ -02]7 -3.733 ----o.rn)! ... 
DlveNi!), oflndex ofCredl1 Source" -0.200 -OH, 0739 
Number of F()lIndcr~ 0.065 1.333 n.IS3 0.060 1.239 0.216 0.061 1.246 0.213 
education of Foundcls OJ):!5 1.432 0152 U.027 1.525 U.12X UJ):!5 1.419 0.156 
Type of Education ofMam Founder 0.492 5.709 <·0001 ... 0479 5.5R6 ·0.001 . .. 0.491 5.(i90 <..0001 . .. 
Work Expenence ofF(lundcr~ wVCI'nll) 0011 3010 0.001 .. 0012 3291 0001 .. 0.011 2.983 0.003 .. 
\\lork [xpcncncc of Founders (start-up) 0.001 O.Oi3 0990 -0.001 ·D.021 0.983 0.002 0.033 0.974 
Allluunl UrOul~lanJmg D<:bl -0.014 -3533 <0.001 ... -0.0ll6 -1.391' 0.162 -0.010 -0565 U.S?! 
Amount of New Fquity -0.m3 -R.704 '--,0001 ... -0033 -8.796 <,0001 . .. -0_033 -R 706 <0.001 . .. 
Age of Founders -0.005 -1.559 0.119 -0.006 -1.741' 0081 -0.005 -1.555 0.120 
Gender -0.105 -I ::!46 n.::!11 -0107 -1274 o :!O1 -tUm -1207 o 22R 
Racc -0.166 -1.)74 0116 -0177 -1.695 0090 ·0.170 ·1617 0.106 
Citw:n~hlp 0.278 I.H22 0.069 0.274 IR03 0072 o.ns 1.822 0.069 
lechnology LeH:I -il.013 -().190 O,!<4t) -0 ()O4 -V.055 0.957 -0.016 ·0233 o Rlti 
Product Seniee "0.001 ·O.OIR 09&6 0.008 0.120 0.90) -0.002 -0.025 0.980 
Incorporation (m year I) -0'(197 -1.::154 0176 -() 10::! -1.43() 0150 -O.W,N -1186 0.166 
Commitment to \'enture 
l\umber ofHour~ Worked III Venture 0.002 0.975 0.330 {J 002 1000 0318 IUJ02 0.941} 0343 
Founder Cuntnbulcd Equity (Ill year I) 0.001 0333 0739 0001 0.356 0722 lU>01 0.356 0.722 
QU:llity of RlIsme<;s Idea 
Inh:l1edual Property (any year) 0.275 3916 ,() 001 ... o 17K 397"2 <0001 ... 0277 3.942 <0.001 ... 
lompetl11\,e Ad\antage over Competltor~ (any }car) 0.499 4656 <(l.001 ... 0.478 4.469 <0.001 ... 0.500 4.659 <0.001 . .. 
R' () 119 () I~h 0119 
AdJusTed R' O.IOg 0.116 0.1010\ 
Statistical significance: p <, () 10;'" p < (1.05: """ p ---- 0.01: """ ... r '" 0.001 
1\-1.1'14.1 
Dcpcnd.:nl v<lnablc' Age at 2009 
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Table 27: OLS Regression Results, Dependent Variable: Revenue in Last Full Year 
(MCS - Last Full Year) 
Number of Total Credit Sources 
~umber of Un14u~ Cr.:Jlt Source~ 
f)1\"CNfy of Index of Credit Soun:es 
\lumber of Founders 
l:ducatlon of rounders 
Type of Education of Main Founder 
Work Experience of Founders (owrall) 
Wor!.. Experience of Foundcr~ (~tart-up) 
Amoullt uj'Out~tanJmg D ... bt 
Amount of Nc .... Equity 






Ineorporation (in year 1) 
Com!llllm.:nt to \\;ntUie 
~umhcr nfHollr~ Worked in \'~nture 
Founder C ontnbutcd [quit) (in year 1 ) 
Quulity ofBu~Jtlc~s Idea 
lntellcctu~1 Property lany year) 




Coefficient t-valuc Sig 
0.124 4249 <0.001 ... • 
0.6[8 9388 <0.001"" 
O.UH6 .1.507 <() OUI m 
0.171 1482 0.138 
0.016 3227 0001" 
0.253 2.723 0.007 ... 
0.013 2.371 OOIH .. 
-0023 -4 Y;;? <,(l.001·" 
-0.013 -2.684 D.007 .. 
-0425 -1.1127 '--~O.r)Ol·u 
-0.279 -1.880 0.060 
O.42H .2 064 O.UJ9 • 
0,073 O.7RS 0.431 
0.220 2403 0016 • 
0.544 5.598 <0001 uo 
0043 1')410 <11.001'" 
0.007 1.201 0.2'<0 
-00;'i'i -().5X4 055Q 
0.210 1.392 il.164 
0.373 
0.3fo5 
Statistical Significance: p < 0.10:· p " 0.05: .'" p 0.0 I: "'.'" p <. 0.001 
N - I,M":! 
Dqlendent varwble' Revenul' in la~t full year 
StandardIzed 
Coefficient t-value Sig. 
O.2XX 3.670 ...:::0.001 m 
0636 9,f,49 <0.001 wU 
o OK5 3.44~ <O.OUI ~H 
o 190 1.649 0.099 
0.016 30911 (l002 w. 
0.251\ 2.776 0.006 ~. 
0010 1.601 0.110 
-0023 -4.125 <0,001·" 
-0013 -2.S6f/. 0.010 • 
-041(; -3.71.:'i "'_0.001 ••• 
-0.250 -1.684 0.092 
() 455 2.190 0.02',1 ~ 
() 06X 0.736 0.462 
0214 2.334 (l010 • 
0564 5.S03 <0.001 RH 
0.043 19420 <"",0.001 ~ •• 
0.006 1.139 0.255 
-0.On9 -0.724 0469 




Coefficient I-value Sig 
-1.444 -1.992 0.003 .. 
0.616 9.312 <0.001· ... 
O.OX4 3.3H7 <0.001'" 
0.162 U96 0.163 
0.017 3354 <0.001 *u 
0.261 2.806 O.OOS •• 
0.093 3.)0;75 <O.(}()! u. 
-0.023 -4457 <0,001 .... • 
~0.OI3 -2 h2R 0.009 .. 
-0 4.~2 -1 ('77 '-000! ••• 
-0.210 -1.407 0.160 
0.474 2.2711 (l.U:!3 • 
0.08 I 0.871 n.:H~4 
0.221 2.404 0.016 • 
0.553 5.680 <rO.OOI"· 
0.041 1{) 1."7 <0.001 .... 
O.ex)? 1.255 0.2 J 0 
-0.049 -0 519 0.604 
0214 1414 0.158 
0.369 
0360 
Table 28: OLS Regression Results, Dependent Variable: Number of Employees in Last 
Full Year (MCS - Last Full Year) 
Number of Total Credit Source~ 
'Ju!llbcr or Unlt.lue l'r~(ht Suurn~~ 
DiVl..'Nlty of Index ofCredll Sources 
'Jumbcr of Founders 
l:.ducatlOI1 01 Founder~ 
Type of Education of Main Founder 
Work Experience of Founders (overall) 
Work Experience off"ounders (start-up) 
Amount uf OUbtandmg Debt 
Amollnt (lfNe", Fquil} 






Incorporation (IO year I) 
Commitment to Venlure 
~lImhcr of Hour~ Worked in Venture 
founder Contrihuted equity (in year I) 
Quality 01 BU~1JlcSS Idea 
Intelleclual Property (any year) 
Competi1!ve Advantage ovcr C(lmpetitor~ (any ')-ICarJ 
Adius\ed R' 
StandardIZed 
CoeffiCient I-valm' Sig 
0.087 1.149 0.251 
0.688 3.X9H ...:::0.001'" 
0.024 0366 0.714 
0184 0586 0558 
0.1lI7 1286 0.199 
0.412 1 (167 0.096 
0.064 4367 <U.OOI'" 
o.m() 2.142 (l.ln:'. -
-0.036 -2.895 0.004 .. 
-0.019 -2011 0044* 
0.744 1.946 0.051 
O.4HI OX69 03ti5 
-0.1 JO -0.523 0.60 I 
0.467 I 907 0057 
1.508 .:'i 799 <0.001"· 
0.072 121()4 -'_0001 u_ 
0.053 3692 <0.001 u. 
0.470 1 840 0.001l 
0022 0057 0955 
0.214 
0105 
Statistical Significance: p " 0.10;'" r" O.t):'.· .. P -', 0.01: ...... p <"", 0.001 
\J- LM~ 
Dependent \-anabJc: Numb.:'r ot" Cmpl())l'e~ in last full YIC<1T 
Standardized 
Coefficient t-\alue 
0410 1.977 O.04H • 
() 704 3.999 <O.l)() I ••• 
0011 O.J25 U 745 
(J.206 0.659 0510 
0015 I 154 0.249 
0.415 1.6Rl 0,093 
D.053 3.205 0.001·' 
0010 2.179 0030 ~ 
-0035 -2.795 O.OD5 ... 
-0610 -2.014 0044 • 
o 783 2.055 0040 .. 
O.4n O.XXI) () 374 
-0.141 -0.570 0.569 
0450 1.836 OOn7 
1.523 5.865 <0.001·" 
0072 12.414 <DOOI~" 
0.053 3.675 <O.(lOI·" 
0401 I.XI2 0.070 


























-1.(n! 0.042 • 





3.01\2 0.002 .. 
1.141 0.032 • 
-2.8HO 0.004 •• 
-2001 0.046 • 




5.R45 <0.001 ••• 
1243' <0.001 ••• 
3,715 <0.001 .... 
1.911l 0.056 
0052 0.958 
Two of the multiple credit source variables were not statistically significant, with the 
third multiple credit source variable found to be statistically significant but negatively 
associated with age at 2009. The number of total credit sources is not statistically significant 
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with age at 2009 (-0.021, t-value = -1.030, P = 0.303). The number of unique credit sources 
is negative and statistically significant with age at 2009 (-0.217, t-value = -3.733, P < 0.00 I). 
The diversity of credit sources is not statistically significant with age at 2009 (-0.206, t-value 
= -0.333, p = 0.739). These results suggest that hypothesis I, which posited a positive 
relationship between multiple credit sources and survival, is not supported. The results 
indicate that new firms that use fewer unique credit sources experience higher survival rates. 
In other words, new firms that use a higher number of unique credit sources are found to 
have lower survival rates. The negative relationship with survival and the unique credit 
source variables is contrary to the positive relationship found between revenue and the 
multiple credit source variables. This could be because the usage of unique credit sources is 
a last ditch effort for firms that are already failing. The unique credit sources may be 
measuring the efforts of firms that are on the verge of failing as firms have to tap into credit 
sources which they have not previously used. Further analyses will need to be performed on 
surviving and non-surviving firms to further confirm this result, with such analyses reported 
later in this chapter. 
The negative relationship between survival and the number of unique credit sources is 
contrary to the positive relationship found between revenue and the number of total and 
unique credit sources. The number of total credit sources is positive and statistically 
significant with revenue (0.124, t-value = 4.249, P < 0.001). Also, the number of unique 
credit sources is positive and statistically significant with revenue (0.288, t-value = 3.670, p 
< 0.00 I). However, the diversity of credit sources is negative and statistically significant 
with revenue (-2.444, t-value = -2.992, p = 0.003). These results suggest partial support for 
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hypothesis 2, which posited a positive relationship between multiple credit sources and 
growth. 
The relationship between the number of employees and multiple credit sources has a 
similar result. Although the number of total credit sources is not statistically significant 
(0.087, t-value = 1.149, P = 0.251), the number of unique credit sources is positive and 
statistically significant with number of employees (0.420, t-value = 1.977, P = 0.048). The 
diversity of credit sources is negative and statistically significant with number of employees 
(-4.557, t-value = -2.031, P = 0.042). Again, these results indicate partial support for 
hypothesis 2. 
Several of the control variables are statistically significant. Type of education of the 
main founder, work experience of the founders, intellectual property, and competitive 
advantage are positive and statistically significant with age at 2009. A positive relationship 
between type of education of the main founder, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the founder has a business education, indicates that founders with a business education tend 
to start firms that survive longer than firms started by founders without a business education. 
Amount of outstanding debt and amount of new equity are negative and statistically 
significant with age at 2009. Number of founders, education of the founders, work 
experience of the founders, startup work experience of the founders, amount of outstanding 
debt, incorporation, and number of hours worked are positive and statistically significant 
with revenue. Amount of new equity, age of the founders, gender, and race are negative and 
statistically significant with revenue. Number of founders, amount of outstanding debt, 
amount of new equity, incorporation, number of hours worked in the venture, and founder 
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contributed equity are positive and statistically significant with number of employees. Age 
of founders and gender are negative and statistically significant with number of employees. 
The type of education of the main founder is not statistically significant with growth 
(revenue and number of employees). These results, along with the result that the type of 
education of the main founder is statistically significant and positively associated with age at 
2009, suggests business education helps firms survive longer but does not necessarily lead to 
starting a firm that will grow faster. There are several possible explanations for this result. 
One, business educated founders vary in their goals when starting firms that generate a large 
amount of revenue or when hiring a large number of employees as opposed to starting 
lifestyle businesses. Second, business educated founders are contributing to the "walking 
dead" problem, in which they should be closing their firms earlier as the firm is officially and 
legally an organization but is not fully operating (the founders know how to make ends meet 
to not have to close the firm, with the hopes it will revive itself sometime in the future). A 
third possible explanation for the result is that business educated founders know how to use 
losses from a business as a tax write off more so than non-business educated founders. 
Overall work experience is statistically significant and positively associated with the 
age of the firm and revenue. The overall work experience is not statistically significant with 
number of employees. This would suggest that founders with more overall work experience 
start firms that have a higher survival rate or these types of founders are more persistent in 
general. With overall work experience also being positively associated with revenue, the 
reasoning that founders with more overall work experience start firms having a higher 
survival rate (e.g. T. Bates, 1990; Bosma et aI., 2004; A. C. Cooper et aI., 1994; Cressy, 
1996b) makes more sense than the persistence reasoning. The persistence reasoning states 
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that entrepreneurs have a tendency to continue operating their firms even though rational 
individuals would cease their firm's operations (e.g. Gimeno et aI., 1997). For example, 
entrepreneurs continue to operate their firms even though their firms are not growing or are 
losing money. If the persistence reasoning was the case, overall work experience would not 
be positively associated with revenue. With overall work experience not statistically 
significant with the number of employees, but statistically significant with revenue, founders 
with more overall work experience are starting firms that grow financially but don't add jobs 
- they are utilizing resources other than employees to build their revenue. 
The number of founders is not statistically significant with the age of the firm, but is 
statistically significant and positive with growth (both revenue and number of employees). 
The relationship with growth supports past studies which find that firms started with more 
than one individual are more successful (e.g. Cressy, 2006a, 2006b; Forster, 2012). 
The outstanding debt for the last full year is statistically associated with the age of the 
firm and growth. Outstanding debt is negatively associated with age, but is positively 
associated with growth (both revenue and employees). This indicates that more debt is 
associated with both lower survival rates and higher growth. This supports recent work by 
Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht (2007), in which they examine new firms in the Netherlands 
and find that new firms that use debt grow faster. In addition, this indicates that funds gained 
from an increase in revenue are not used to retire debt, but rather to support future growth of 
The amount of new equity in the last full year is negatively associated with age of the 
firm and revenue, but positively associated with employees. This indicates the amount of 
42 Further analysis is needed to confirm this, for example, examine assets and expenses to see where the funds 
are being used specifically. 
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new equity received in the last full year of operations possibly decreases the survival rate and 
revenue growth. However, new equity is associated with firms with more employees, 
suggesting that new equity can spur growth in the form of jobs in new firms. 
The previous OLS regression analysis examined the levels of multiple credit source 
variables in the last full year of operations for firms. The next OLS regression analysis 
examines the multiple credit source variables at the end of the first year of operations. Table 
29, Table 30, and Table 31 present the OLS regression using the end of first year levels for 
the multiple credit source variables, amount of outstanding debt, amount of new equity, and 
number of hours worked in the venture (i.e. the time varying covariates in the main analysis). 
When examining the multiple credit source variables, the results are different than the 
previous OLS regression results presented in Table 26, Table 27, and Table 28 where these 
variables used the level of the variables in the last full year of operations as opposed to the 
level of these variables at the end of the first year of operations. 
Table 29: OLS Regression Results, Dependent Variable: Age at 2009 (MCS - End of 
First Year) 
SlamJardw.-'d Standarducd Standardized 
Cocffkl.:nt I-value Sig Coctlieicnt I-vullle Sl~. Coefficient I-\'alue Sig 
'lumber of Total Credit Source!> -0.211 -3.637 «1.001 .. -
\lumber oj Uniqw: Credit Sourcct> -0 SIX -O.H04 0421 
f),\cr~ity oflndcx of Credit Sourc.:,> 0014 O.2X4 () 776 
\lumber ofFoundcr~ 0.075 1505 0.123 0.071 1.419 () 156 0.727 9.7~9 <0.001 ... 
education of r oUl1dcr~ ().O2~ 1.544 () 123 () on 1.473 {) 141 0.063 2.307 0.021 
Type of Education of Main Founder 0.4S5 5.612 ·0001 ... 0494 5.694 <0001 ... 0.154 1.212 {) 226 
\Vork Experience of Founders \n"cral1) () 011 3062 0002 -. 0.011 2.R9;\ {) 004 0.026 45X3 <0.001 
Work Experience of Founders (start-ur) -0.036 -O.52R () 597 -0030 -0.439 0.66\ 0.309 3.006 0.003 .. 
Amount of Out!-.tandmg Debt -0.003 -0.054 0.513 -0001 ..(1.032 0.974 (I.OlO 1.421 0.155 
Amount of New Equity -OOOS -0.641 0522 -0 n07 -O.59n 0'i51 -0001) -0460 0.646 
Age of Founders -0.006 -1.1\46 0.005 -0006 -1.779 0.075 -0.020 -3.767 <""""0.001 ... 
Gender -0.107 -1.25~ 0.211 -0092 -1.0(,1-: O.2R6 -O.4Rti -3719 <0001 ... 
Race -022(l _~ 077 0038 • -0.207 ~1.937 {) 05~ -0.336 -2057 0.040 • 
CitIzenshIp 0.251 1.633 0.103 0253 1.643 0.101 0.471 2.060 (1.040 • 
li::ehnulugy Levd ~(J.()UI -0.015 O.9HH I) 006 (J.OR6 (j 932 0.105 l.O:W o 30R 
Product I Service -0.025 -0.3 73 0710 -0.021 -0.30(1 () 760 0.11\3 LROI 0.072 
IncorporatIOn (in year 1) -O.OR/'I -I 195 0.2 ~.?: -0096 -1321) o IR4 () h]8 .:5 723 <"0.001 ... 
Commitment to \'~'nturc 
t'-.umbcr of Hour~ Worked 111 Venture 0.001 o H62 o 3K9 0.001 O.H59 0.390 O.O:!7 It 461 <0001 ... 
Founder Cllntnbulcd Equity jm year I) 0.006 0.526 0.599 0.006 0.474 0.636 0010 0.541 0.589 
Quality of Au~mc .... " Idea 
Intellectual Property (any year) 0229 3 244 o OUI .. 0.235 3.313 0001 -. ·OOS6 -0 H14 0410 
C ompctllll ..... Ad\ antage over Compctltor~ (any year) 0.472 4384 <OOO! ... O.4R9 4.S1S <-"U.OOI -.. O.::!45 J.470 0.142 
0077 I) OXO 0.074 
Ad]lI!-.tcd R' O.OM 0.069 0.062 
Statistical signIficance: p ~ 010: ... p < 0.05: ..... p ___ n.ol: ..... '" p c (1.001 
"'.: - 1_64.~ 
Dependent \anahlC" Age lit 2009 
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Table 30: OLS Regression Results, Dependent Variable: Revenue in Last Full Year 
(MCS - End of First Year) 
~umbcr of Total Credit Sources 
'\JulllbcI of UllIque Crcull Sourcc~ 
f)l\'l~rslty of Index of C'rcdn "oure":,, 
:-.lumher of Founders 
I:.ducatlOll of rounders 
Type of Education ofMam Founder 
Work Expericll('C of Founders (oVl'rall) 
Work Experience of F()undcr~ (start-up) 
Amount u! Ouhlanumg Di,:ht 
Amllunl of New Equity 





Product I Service 
Incorporation (in year I) 
CommilmetH 10 Venlure 
l\.\lmhcr of HOIlf~ \VorJ...cd in Vl.!nlUTC 
roundcrContnbutcd rquit) (in year I) 
Quality of BU~lIlc~f, Idea 
Inlcllcctual Pmpl..'rty (Clny year) 




Col'ffielcnt I-value Sig 
-0.063 -0.687 0.492 
0730 9 K50 <0.001'" 
0.063 :2 330 0.020 • 
0.151 I IK9 02)5 
0026 4626 <.0001'" 
0.307 2.9K4 0.003 .. 
0.015 1.919 0 U55 
-0009 -0.475 061,5 
-0.021 -3.7R9 <0.001 ••• 
-0490 _177() -,(UI01·" 
-0.338 -2.068 0039 • 
(J.471 2.051.) 0.04U • 
0.102 09Y3 0321 
o I gO I 775 0070 
0.623 5.787 <0001"· 
0.027 11.472 <0.001'" 
0.010 0.557 0577 
-0.OR9 -0 851 (j 195 
0.241 I 453 0.146 
(j.237 
0.216 
Statistical ~ignlficanee: p < () 10;'" r"" 0.05." P - 0.01. "' .. '" P <, O.!lOl 
-...; - j,64~ 
Dependent \an<1bk· Rcvcnu(' in last full year 
Standanhz:ed 
Coefficient Haluc Slg. 
-4.WY -4.544 <(j.OO I ~ •• 
(l.720 Q.779 <0.001 ••• 
0.059 2.147 O.U2X M 
0.147 1.]72 0.241 
0025 4.561 ,0.001 ••• 
0310 3.035 0002 RO 
0137 4.!NR <0.001 ••• 
-O.OW -05.14 0594 
-0.021 -3.R29 <0.001 7" 
-0453 -3.504 "',0.00 I ••• 
-0.272 -1.667 0.096 
0469 2.065 0.039 • 
0.124 1.209 0227 
(l15K 1.567 0.117 
01">12 5.729 «U)OI·" 
0027 11496 <.0.001 m 
OJ)11 0.601 0.547 
-0.073 -0.707 () 480 











































0.950 () 342 
2.0n 0.038 • 
0.504 0.614 
Table 31: OLS Regression Results, Dependent Variable: Number of Employees in Last 
Full Year (MCS - End of First Year) 
"\lumber of Total Credit Source~ 
Number ul Unltjue <. 'r..:JII Sllurce~ 
DlVl.!Nity nf1ndcx ofCrcda SOLlTce~ 
Number of Founders 
r.ducallO!l of Foundcls 
Type of Education of Main Founder 
Work Exp.:riencc of Founders (overall) 
Work Expcrience of F()undcr~ (start-up) 
Amount 01 OutSlanding Debt 
Amount of New F-quity 





Product . Service 
Incorporation (in year I) 
CUlTlmilllu.:nl to Venture 
!\umner of HOLlT~ Worked in Vcnttlrc 
I·ounder Contnhulcd [quity (in year I) 
Quallty 01 Bll~llh!Si> Idea 
Intdlectual Property lany year) 
Compcl1ll\-e Ad\untagl' over Competitors (an} :-car) 
St_mdardized 
Codficient I-value Slg 
0.064 0.540 O.5k9 
0.833 4.474 <0.001'" 
0.002 00:';4 O.l)SI 
0.219 () 67S 049R 
lHl33 .2 385 0017 • 
0.431 1 6R3 0.093 
0.039 2 263 0.024 • 
0002 OOJX O.97() 
-0.046 ~3.612 <0001 .... 
-0750 -2.:;46 0.019 * 
0.6R2 I 72k a OR4 
0.457 () KOO 0424 
-0.lk4 -0.713 0.470 
OA14 16J5 0.102 
l.b33 6050 <0001 ••• 
0.04(1 79{)9 <.0001'" 









Statistical Significance: p -, () 10;'" P <, 0.0.". *'" p <", 0.01."* P ',0.001 
"1\,;-1.(,41 
[)cpcndcnt \anab!c· Numhcr ofcmploycc!> in Inst full yCllr 
StandarolLco 
Coefficient t-vl)lue 51g 
0.115 0.510 0.610 
OK~R 4.510 <0.001 ••• 
0.002 0.026 09MO 
0.220 0.682 0496 
0033 2.379 n017. 
0432 1.6XR 0092 
U.U3i'j 2.()Z9 0.043 
OO()4 0091 <0001 Mn 
-0.046 -3.545 <0.001·" 
-0749 -2~45 OOIl) ~ 
0.680 1.724 0.OR5 
0.460 O.XU4 0.422 
-O.IX4 -0.714 0.475 
0417 1.646 0100 
1.637 6.073 <0.001 ••• 
0046 R.On <,O.OOI-u 










Coefficient t-\"alue Sig. 
-5.1<85 -2466 0.014 • 
0.046 H.004 <~O.OOI~" 
-0.003 -0.051 0.960 
0.227 0.661 0.509 
0032 2.374 0.018 • 
00430 1.6i'j] 0.092 
(l.lI3 3.053 0.002 ... 
0002 () Ink 0.969 
-0.046 -3620 <'{).OOI ••• 
-().710 -2225 0.026 • 
0.765 1.937 0.053 
0.441 0.772 OA40 
-0. ISO -0.5S3 ().560 
0.37R 1491 0.136 
1.634 (d176 <0.001 ••• 
0.046 R.004 <0.001 ••• 









In the previous OLS analysis, only number of unique credit sources was statistically 
significant with age at 2009. When using the first year levels of multiple credit sources, only 
number of total credit sources is statistically significant with age at 2009. The relationship 
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between number oftotal credit sources and age at 2009 is negative (-0.221, t-value = -3.637, 
p < 0.00 I). The results are consistent in that they are both indicating a negative relationship 
with age at 2009. These results may suggest that obtaining unique credit sources during the 
last full year of operations could be a sign a firm is grasping at straws to survive, while using 
more credit sources in the first year of operations could indicate that firms are struggling to 
obtain the necessary financing from traditional sources (e.g. banks). This could be a sign the 
firm is not a quality business idea or that management is not managing the firm's financing in 
an efficient manner. 
In the previous OLS analysis, all three multiple credit sources were statistically 
significant, with number of total and unique credit sources both positively related to revenue 
and diversity of credit source negatively related to revenue. When examining the first year 
levels of multiple credit sources, only number of unique credit sources is statistically 
significant with revenue. Unlike the previous OLS analysis, number of unique credit sources 
is negatively related with revenue (-4.399, t-value = -4.594, P < 0.001). 
The diversity of credit sources in the first year is negative and statistically significant 
with number of employees (-5.855, t-value = -2.466, P = 0.014). This is consistent with the 
previous OLS analysis that used the last full year levels. 
For the control variables, the relationships with the dependent variables have a 
different sign for startup work experience, amount of outstanding debt, amount of new 
equity, age of founders, and race in several of the models. Amount of outstanding debt is no 
longer statistically significant in the models where the growth is the dependent variable. Age 
of founders is now statistically significant and negative in the model where the number of 
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employees is the dependent variable. Finally, race is now statistically significant and 
negative in the models where age of the firm is the dependent variable. 
Pro bit Regression 
In the previous OLS regression that analyzed survival, the variable used for 
measuring survival was based upon age at which the firm closed (if the firm closed within 6 
years). Another way to measure survival is to use a dichotomous variable for survival rather 
than age at which the firm closed. Therefore, another analysis of survival can specify the 
dependent variable be 0 if the firm survives more than six years, and 1 if the firm closes 
within six years43. A different form of regression should be used as OLS regression should 
not be used when the dependent variable is dichotomous (as opposed to continuous). When 
the dependent variable is dichotomous, OLS regression becomes inefficient at estimating the 
coefficients (e.g. J. H. Aldrich & F. D. Nelson, 1984). A solution to this problem is to use 
Probit regression to estimate the model, which constrains the estimated probability to be 
between 0 and 1. Table 32 presents the results of the Probit analysis using the last full year 
of operation variables. 
43 As mentioned earlier, six years is an important length of time as most studies concerned with new firm 
survival examined firms that were six years or less. 
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Table 32: Probit Regression Results (MCS - Last Full Year) 
St,mu'Huizcu StandardL{~d StandurdiLcd 
C()d'ficl~n' 7-vahlC Slg Cocfficwnt 7-valuc Sig Coctlicient z-valuc Sig. 
~umbcr of Total Crcdil Stlurccs 0.010 0.429 0.668 
'\Julllbcl ot UlllqllC (redl! SOUlCC!'I a.us 2.106 0.035 
01\ cr"ity nflndcx ofCrcdll Sourcc~ 0005 0.007 OQ()4 
"umber of Foundcfs -0 U48 -0872 0383 -0.045 -O.!QS 0408 -0.046 -0847 0.397 
Iducatlon of r ()under~ ·0.052 <.~ 653 () 008 .. -0053 -2.712 0.007 • -0.052 -2.(,53 0.008 •• 
Type of EducatlOn of Mam Founder -0.361 -3479 0.00] .. ·0353 ·).3"7 0.1)0] .. ·0.361 -3.471 0001 .. 
Work ~xrcrjcncc of FnUfl(lcr~ (m"crnl1) -0.015 -~571 <',D.OO1 ... -OOIS -:U2X <,D.OO] ... -() 015 -3559 <0.001 ... 
Work [xpcncncc ofFoundcr~ (!-tart-up) 0.018 0.243 0.888 0.019 O.24f1. 0.804 -0.361 -3.471 0.001 .. 
Amount or Outstanding (kbl 0.008 1.1)06 0.057 0.003 0.601:1 0.543 () 009 0.467 0.040 
Amount (If New Equity (Jon 65Qo <0001 ... aon 6630 <_0001 ... 0027 (15Q4 <0.001 ... 
Age of Foundcr~ 0.006 I.S9g 0.110 0.00(. 1711 O.OfP O.(}()6 1.601 0.109 
Gentler 0.042 O.45U 0.652 0.043 0.461 0.645 0.040 0.437 0062 
Raee 0.139 1.206 0228 0.140 1.267 () 205 0.142 1.234 0.217 
Citr7cn-;hrp -0119 -177'ii. 0075 ·0320 -17X2 0075 -O.1IR ~ I 773 0.076 
Technology Lc\d -0.024 -0.:'17 0.751 ·00)0 ·0399 0690 -0.023 ·0302 0762 
Product Scrncc -O.OMi -0910 0363 -0.074 ·0.995 0320 -O.06R -O.90X 0.364 
im:lIrp,.mllUl1 (ill year I) 0.()R7 1.096 0273 0.OR9 1.120 0.263 O.OXX 1.111 U.2U7 
Commitment to Venture 
l\umbcr of Hour~ \Vorkl'd in Venture -().004 -2.092 0036 • -0004 -~_III 0035 -0004 -207'> 0.03X • 
rounder Contributed [quity (in ycar 1) -0.002 -O.~4J 0658 -0002 ·0.442 0.659 ·0.002 -0453 0.65\ 
Quality OJ HU~ll1cSS Idea 
Inldlccludl PropcIi} (any year) -0.224 -2.~\30 0.005 .. -0226 -2 !.;52 0.004 •• -0.224 -21\30 0.005 .. 
Cornpetitl\ c i\d\·nntagc over Competitor.-. (any year) -0.2X6 -2557 0.011 -0273 -2.4~6 0.015 • -0.2R6 -:2.562 0.010 • 
StatIstical sigmlicance p. 010. * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01: *** p' 0.001 
~ I.M.~ 
f)cpcnd.:nl ,·anahle· Closure 
The number of total credit sources is positive but is not statistically significant with 
closure of the firm (0.010, z-value = -0.429, p-value = 0.668). The number of unique credit 
sources is positive and is statistically significant with closure of the firm (0.135, z-value -
2.106, p-value = 0.035). These results are consistent with the OLS regression that used age 
at 2009 as the dependent variable. These results suggest that an increase in the number of 
unique credit sources is negatively associated with survival rate of new firms. Even though 
these relationships are statistically significant, the direction of the relationship is opposite of 
what was hypothesized in hypothesis I. Unlike the OLS regression results, diversity of credit 
sources is not statistically significant with closure of the firm (0.005, z-value = 0.007, p-
value = 0.994). 
Several control variables in the models are statistically significant across the three 
models. Education of founders, type of education of the main founder, and overall work 
experience of the founders are all negative and statistically significant with closure of the 
firm. Amount of new equity in the last full year of operation is positive and statistically 
significant with closure of the firm in all three models. The proxy variables used for the 
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quality of the business idea, intellectually property and competitive advantage over 
competitors, are negative and statistically significant in all three models. Only one of the two 
proxy variables for commitment to the venture, number of hours worked in venture, is 
statistically significant. 
Table 33: Probit Regression Results (MCS - End of First Year) 
Standardl.lcd Standardi.l.ed Standardized 
Coefficient z-\alue Sig. Coefficient z-yalue S'g Coefficient z·\aiue Sig 
Number of Tolal Credit Sources 0090 2769 0006 •• 
Number of Umque Credit Sources 0.226 1547 O()()]'" 
Di\ersi~ oflndcx of Credit Sources 0%1 )46] Ol4J 
Number of Founders -0060 -1092 0.275 .O()54 -0988 0323 ·()O47 .0854 OJ,)] 
Education of Founders -() 051 -2688 0.007 •• .OOS:! -2694 OOO? .. -()O50 -2.609 000') .. 
Type of Education of Main Founder ·0387 -3772 <0.001 ... -0383 ·)735 uno] .u -0385 -3.770 (lOO] * .. 
Worl Experience of Founders (o\'erall) -0015 -3813 <O.nOI * .. -()OI6 -"1871 0(0) ... -(lOIS -3782 ()(XH*" 
Work Experience of Founders (start-up) o 1143 0581 0561 Il.045 06\0 0542 003S 0.516 0606 
Amount of Outstanding Debt o U02 0.412 0680 -{jo(n -0506 (joB -UOI8 -0929 () .~53 
Amount of Nev. Equit) O.0()8 0.621 0.534 (!.I)B 0.975 0330 0012 0951 0342 
Age of Founders 0.007 1.927 0.054 0008 2m! 0042 • (J007 2.007 0045 
Gender U 060 0655 0.513 0063 0688 0492 0044 0.486 0627 
Race 0.176 1.555 0.120 0174 J530 ()126 0155 1366 (1172 
Citi7.enship -0.263 -1515 0130 -(1258 -! 486 O!37 -0263 -1514 () L~O 
Technolog~ Le' el -0.037 -0.496 0.620 -(1038 -0503 0615 -(J048 -0637 0524 
Product I Sen ice -0048 -0640 0522 -0040 -0545 051!6 -(1041 -0565 0572 
Incorporation (in year 1) () 059 () 755 ()450 O()60 0773 0440 0073 0935 () _~5() 
Commitment to Venture 
Number of Hours Worked in Venture -0.002 -0.943 0.346 -0 (X) I -0796 0426 -(JODI -0815 0415 
Founder Contributed Equl~ (m ~ear I) -0.007 -0.511 0.690 -0.011 -0.866 ()386 -(JOII -0826 0409 
Quahh of Busmess Idea 
Intellectual Propcrt) (an) ~car) -0194 -2500 0012 • -01% -2525 DOl2' -0205 -2649 0008 •• 
CompetlhveAd,antage over Competitors (an~ ~ear) -0296 -271l9 O.l)()7 ,. -0287 -2620 O()()9 •• -0302 -2765 ooot) .. 
Stahshcal sigmficance p< 0.10: '" p < 0 05_ ** p <0.01. *** p < tJ.()() I 
N ~ 1.643 
Dependent \ariable. Closure 
Table 33 presents the results using the first year values for multiple credit sources. 
The number of total credit sources (0.090, z-value = 2.769, p-value = 0.006) and number of 
unique credit sources (0.226, z-value = 3.547, p-value < 0.001) are both positive and 
statistically significant with closure of the firm. The diversity of credit sources is not 
statistically significant with closure of the firm. These results are similar to the Probit 
analysis with multiple credit source variables that used data from the last full year of 
operations. In addition, the number of total credit sources and number of unique credit 
sources results are similar to the OLS regression analysis that used multiple credit source 
usage levels for the end of the first year of operations. 
Education of founders, type of education of the main founder, and work experience of 
founders are all negative and statistically significant with firm closure for all three models. 
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The proxy variables for quality of business idea, intellectual property and competitive 
advantage over competitors, are negative and statistically significant with firm closure. 
These results are similar to the Probit regression results which used the levels of multiple 
credit sources for the last full year of operations. 
Survival Analysis 
In the previous analyses, age of the firm at 2009 was used as a proxy for survival in 
OLS regression and a dichotomous variable was used to represent survival in Probit 
regression. Such means to measuring survival in statistical analyses has its flaws. For 
example, the variable is right censored as firms that are still alive at the end of the data 
collection period (2009) are thought to live forever. This flaw refers to the issue that the 
firms were not observed long enough for all the firms to close. In addition, firms surviving 
through the end of the data collection period (measured as 7) in the OLS regression are 
considered to being just one year greater than firms that closed in 2009 (measured as 6) in the 
OLS regression. Finally, an issue in using OLS and Probit regression to analyze survival 
data is that OLS and Probit regression analyses assume the distribution of the residuals to be 
normalIy distributed. However, time to an event is usually not normally distributed for many 
events. In the case of the proxy used for survival in the OLS regression, the age at 2009 
variable is not normally distributed, nor is the dichotomous variable used in the Pro bit 
regression. 1,251 firms are stilI alive after 2009, and only 383 firms are closed between 2004 
and 2009. A natural log transformation of the variables does not make the variables normally 
distributed. It is only when the 1,251 surviving firms are removed from the data set that the 
survival variable becomes normalIy distributed. Removing 1,251 firms in a data set 
consisting of 1,643 firms would leave only a small percentage of firms (23.3%) to be used in 
the analysis. Thus, in the OLS regression, the variable was used without a transformation. 
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This could lead to a bias in the results of the OLS regression. These weaknesses in the 
analyses warrant using a more robust analysis of survival that can address these issues. 
Therefore, survival analysis is performed using Cox proportional hazard modeling (Cox, 
1972). 
Survival analysis is performed using time invariant and time varying variables. The 
time invariant analysis uses the values of the last year the firm was alive for the mUltiple 
credit source, debt, equity, and number of hours worked variables. The time varying analysis 
allows for the multiple credit source, debt, equity, and number of hours worked variables to 
vary over time. 
The credit crisis and location variables are left out of the model. The credit crisis 
variable didn't allow the model to converge. The location variable is a categorical variable 
with more than 211 categories. This would add 211 dummy variables in the regression, 
which is not feasible for the regression model to converge properly. Thus, these two 
variables are not included in the model. 
In the survival analysis, the event that is being evaluated is closure of the firm. The 
dependent variable is thus coded as 0 if the firm is surviving and 1 if the firm has closed for 
each year. When the coefficient estimate is positive, it indicates a positive relation with 
closure of a firm. 
Cox proportional hazard modeling is similar to multiple regression except the 
dependent variable is the hazard function at a given time. With the explanatory variables, the 
hazard or risk of firm closure at time t can be expressed as: 
h(t) = ho(t) * exp(~1 (MCS) + ... + ~/9 (COMPADV)) 
taking the natural logarithm of both sides, 
152 
In(h(t)) = In(ho(t)) * ~l (MCS) + ... + ~19 (COMPADV) 
where, 
h(t) is the hazard function taking into account the baseline hazard function and the 
explanatory variables 
ho(t) is the baseline hazard function 
MCS is, depending on the model, the number of total credit sources, number of 
unique credit sources, or diversity index of credit sources at a certain point in time for a 
certain firm 
~l ... ~19 are the estimated coefficients in the model 
The baseline hazard function corresponds to the probability of firm closure when all 
the explanatory variables are zero. The baseline hazard function is similar to the intercept in 
multiple regression. The regression coefficients (~s) are proportional changes in the hazard 
and are estimated with the maximum likelihood method. There are 19 independent and 
control variables included in each model. 
The models are run for each of the three multiple credit source variables using time 
varying and time invariant variables, with the results presented in Table 34 and Table 35. 
There are 1,598 observations with 1,150 firms that survive and 378 firm that close during the 
data collection period44 • The Wald test is statistically significant for all the models, which 
indicates the explanatory variables included in the model make a statistical difference in the 
hazard function when comparing the model with the explanatory variables (h(t)) with the 
44 The number of firm closures in the survival analysis is less than the 383 firms that were indicated as being 
closed in the entire sample. The reason is that five,firms that closed had data missing in variables that didn't 
allow the statistical analysis to be performed. In addition, 96 firms that indicated they were still operating were 
removed form the survival analysis due to missing data. The software removed these 101 observations, leaving 
1,598 observations with 3878 firm closures to be examined in the survival analysis using Cox proportional 
hazard modeling. 
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baseline model (ho(t)). The explained variation statistic, R2, ranged from 8.5% to 8.8% in the 
three models. In the first model, the number of total credit sources is not statistically 
significant with closure (0.214, p = 0.487). Education (-0.068, P = 0.016), type of education 
(-0.669, P = 0.001), and overall work experience (-0.020, p = .001) are negatively related to 
closure. This suggests that more overall education, business education, and more overall 
work experience are positively associated with firms that survive longer. Outstanding debt 
(0.016, P = 0.011) and new equity (0.042, p < 0.001) are positively associated with closure. 
Thus, firms with more outstanding debt and that receive more equity in the last full year of 
operations do not survive as long. 
Table 34: Survival Analysis Results, Time Invariant Analysis 
Coefficient Pr(>lz!) CoeffiCIent Pr('lz:J Cocmeicn! Pr(>lzl) 
Numher of Total Credit Sources 0.214 0696 04S7 
Number of Unique Credit Sources 0.213 2.413 0.016 •• 
DiversitY" Index of Credit Sources 0.044 O.04S 0.962 
Numher of Foundcr~ -0082 -1.000 OJI7 -0.077 -0.940 0.347 -0.078 -0.948 0.34] 
Education of Founders -0.068 -2.409 0011> -0.01>9 -2A]0 0.015 .. -0.068 -2399 0.016 •• 
Type of Education of Main Founder -0669 -3.945 <0.001 ... -0.1>55 -3.81>4 <0.001 . .. -0.666 -3.932 <0001 . .. 
Work Experience of Founders (overall) -0010 -3.276 0.001 ... -0.021 -3408 0.001 . .. -0.020 -3.159 0.001 . .. 
Work Experience of Founders (start-up) 0.025 0219 0.819 0.0]0 0.274 0.784 0.024 0.219 O.K27 
Amount of Oubtanding Debt 0.016 2555 0.011 .. o OOS 1.088 0.277 0.017 0.634 0.526 
Amount of Nc\\ Equity (l.(l42 7366 <0.001 ... 0.042 7.431 <0001 . .. 0.042 7.365 <0.001 . .. 
Age of Founders 0.008 J 522 0128 0.009 1.580 0.114 0.008 1.528 0126 
(fend\![ 0.054 0.404 o 6R6 0.056 0.424 0.671 0.052 0.393 0.694 
Race () Zll 1.291 0.197 0.217 1.335 O.IHZ O.ZZO 1.343 0.179 
('ltlZl~nship -0492 -1.782 0075 -OAR7 -1.765 o.on -OAR8 -1.769 0.077 
Tcchnolo£y Lc\d -0.020 -0.177 0860 -0.022 -0.19] 0.847 -0.016 -0.139 0.889 
Product Service -0.069 -0.636 0.525 -0.083 -0.764 OA45 -0.069 -0.64] 0.520 
lm:orporation (in year 1 ) Il.OR9 0.774 0.4]9 0.094 OXW 0.412 0.091 0.793 0.428 
Commitment to Venture 
Number of Hours V,.-'orked in Venture -0.005 -1.999 0.046 • -0.005 -1.970 0.049 • -(l.J)05 -19.813 0.04R • 
Founder Contnbuted Equity (m year I) -0002 -0.246 OR06 -0.002 -0.271 0.786 O.OO:! 0.253 0.800 
Quality of Business Idea 
Intc:lh:t:lual Pmperly (any year) -0.356 -3.015 0.003 .. -0.364 -].085 0.002 .. -0.356 -3.009 0.003 .. 
Competitive Adyantage i..1\er Competitors (any year) -0517 -].511 <-0.001 ... -OA98 -3.380 0.001 '" -0.517 -3.511 <0.001 '" 
R' 0.085 0.088 O.OR:' 
WaldTest 14].6 150A 132.1 
df 19 19 19 
p-value <0.001 <0.001 ~O.OOI 
S(ali~lit:al ~ignilkam:e. P" 0.10, * P < 0.05. ** P -, 0.0 I. *** P ~ 0.001 
N = 1.59H (3fl observalion~ deleted because ofmlssingnc<;s) 
Number of dosurl's: 378 
In the second model, the number of unique credit sources is positively related to 
closure and is statistically significant with closure (0.213, p = 0.016). The positive impact of 
the number of unique credit sources on the closure of firms in the analysis with the time 
invariant variables may indicate the firms are struggling and using whatever external funding 
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they can tap into so they can try to survive longer. This is the case even though they are 
destined to not survive based upon other reasons. For example, poor management and a poor 
business idea could contribute to survival, which has been found to be the case in past studies 
(e.g. Gifford, 1992a, 1992b; Penrose, 1959; Slater, 1980)). This is evident in the results as 
education and the quality of business idea are statistically significant and negatively related 
with closure. This is also what was seen in the OLS regression and Probit regression results. 
As mentioned when reporting the OLS and Probit regression results, the results don't support 
hypothesis 1. Rather, the results suggest that a negative relationship exists between multiple 
credit source usage and survival. 
Figure 20 graphically illustrates how firms that use more unique credit sources have 
lower survival rates. The figure indicates the survival rates of firms based upon the number 
of unique credit sources they use. The baseline hazard rate is shown by the solid line where 
the number of unique credit sources is 0 (NUCS = 0), which exists for firms not using any 
credit sources. Each line in the graph represents the number of unique credit sources firms 
use. This graph indicates that firms with a higher number of unique credit sources in their 
last full year of operation have a lower survival rate over time. The line in the figure which 
indicates a firm using five unique credit sources (NUCS = 5) declines faster over time than 
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As with the number of total credit sources model, education, type of education, 
overall work experience, hours worked in venture, intellectual property, and competitive 
advantage are all negatively associated with closure and statistically significant. In addition, 
the amount of new equity in the last full year of operations continues to be positively related 
with closure. However, unlike the number of total credit sources model, outstanding debt is 
not associated with closure. 
The diversity index of credit sources is not statistically significant, as seen in the third 
model in Table 34. However, as with the number of total credit sources and number of 
unique credit sources models, education, type of education, overall work experience, hours 
worked in venture, intellectual property, and competitive advantage are negatively associated 
with closure and statistically significant. New equity is also statistically significant, and is 
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positively related with closure. This is the same as in the regression models with number of 
total credit sources and number of unique credit sources. Outstanding debt is not associated 
with closure. 
The previous survival models were performed using time invariant variables for the 
variables: multiple credit source, debt, equity, and hours worked in the venture. These 
variables can change over time. The changes in these variables could affect the survival of a 
new firm. Thus, I also run survival analysis models that allow these variables to vary over 
time. This is done by using the data for each of the six years for the time varying variables 
(multiple credit sources, amount of outstanding debt, amount of new equity, number of hours 
worked in venture, and credit crisis) as opposed to the level of these variables in the last full 
year of operations of the firm. The results are provided in Table 35. 
None of the multiple credit source variables are found to be statistically associated 
with survival. The number of total credit sources, number of unique credit sources, and the 
diversity index of credit sources have negative coefficients, which would suggest that as 
these variables increase over time that the chance of closure would decrease (i.e. the chance 
of survival would increase). i.e. this suggests that resourceful financing possibly helps a firm 
survive longer. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Thus, based upon 
these results, it cannot be said that resourceful financing in the form of credit improves the 
survival rate of new firms. 
Like with the time invariant survival analysis results, education, type of education, 
and overall work experience are negatively related to closure and statistically significant. 
Thus, more education, business education, and more overall work experience (when a firm 
starts) improve the chance of survival of a new firms. Outstanding debt is found to be 
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positively related to closure for the models with number of total credit sources and number of 
unique credit sources variables -like the invariant analysis results. As with the time 
invariant survival analysis, hours worked in the venture, intellectual property, and 
competitive advantage are negatively related to closure for all three time varying models. 
Table 35: Survival Analysis Results, Time Variant Analysis 
Coe11icicnt 
Number of Total Credit Sources -0041 
Number of Unique Credit Sourcc~ 
Divl'fsity Index of Credit Sources 
Number of Founders -O.OM 
Education of Founders -0069 
Type of Education afMain Founder -0676 
Work Experience of Founders (overall) -0019 
Work Experience of Founders (start-up) 0.024 
Amount of Out~tanding Debt 0.018 
Amount of Nc", EqUity 0.011 




Technology Level -0.053 
Product Service -0052 
Incorporation (m year I) 0.170 
Commitment to Venture 
Number of Hour:-. Worked in Venture -0010 
Founder Contributed Equity (in year I) 0.001 
Quality of Busincs~ Idea 
Intc!lt:uual Property (any year) -0.334 





Statistical :-.ignifkam.:e. p" 0.10. * P <: 0.05. ** p" (J.DI, *** P < 0.001 
N = 8.576 (519 obscrvalion~ dclelL-d because ofmisslngnes~) 
Numher of closures· 378 




















Pr('>,zl) Coefficient P'('17i) Coefficient 
0271 
-0.070 -0.075 0.458 
-0.526 
0301 -0.088 -1.088 0.277 -0.091 
0013 .. -0.069 -2.463 0.014 •• -0.070 
<0.001 ... -0.676 -3.999 <0.001 . .. -0.675 
0002 .. -0.019 -3.136 0.002 •• -0.019 
0824 0024 0.220 0.826 0.024 
0006 .. 0.078 10.449 0.010 • 0.030 
0073 0.011 UI7 0.069 0.011 
0.OK7 0.009 1.722 0.OR5 0.009 
0.609 0.071 5.347 0.593 0.077 
0.009 O.2lJl 1.R03 0.071 O.2IJX 
0.066 -0.504 -1.847 0.065 -0.506 
0.636 -0.053 -OAK2 0.630 -0.054 
0.634 -0.050 -0.466 0.642 -0.053 
0.141 0.169 1.462 0.144 0.166 
<0.001 ... -0.010 -3.899 <0.001 ... -0.010 
0.846 0.001 0.174 0.862 0.001 
0.005 .. -0.332 -2.818 0.005 .. -0.330 








-2.490 0.013 .. 
-3.992 <0.001 '" 











-3.942 <0.001 0 .. 
0.163 0.870 
-2.797 0.005 .. 
-2.666 0.008 .. 
Growth curve analysis is performed with the dependent variables being revenue and 
number of employees. The intraclass correlation coefficient is first calculated to determine if 
HLM is appropriate to use. Then unconditional models (without any predictors) are run to 
determine the best fitting curve. And finally, the conditional growth models are run and the 
results reported. 
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
Before adding the time component into the model, I first run null models on the entire 
sample to determine the amount of variance in multiple credit sources between each 
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observation. Null models are HLM models that build the 3-level model without covariates as 
follows45 : 
Levell Model (time) 
GROWTHtj,1 = TCOj,1 + etj,1 
Level 2 Model (firm) 
TCOj,l = ~O,O,I + rOj,1 
Level 3 Model (location) 
~ -y + u 1"0,0,1 - 0,0,0 0,0,1 
where, 
GROWTHtj,1 is, depending on which model is being run, the expected (predicted) 
revenue or number of employees at time t for firmJfor location I 
TCOj,l is the intercept of the dependent variable at time 0 for location 0 
~O,O.l is the parameter estimate for the intercept for location I 
YO,O,O is the parameter estimate for the intercept 
e, r, and u are time specific random error terms (variance at each level) 
The amount of variance in the revenue between each observation is measured by the 
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). The ICC at the firm level is 44.6 % for revenue and 
52.1 % for the number of employees. The ICC at the location level is close to 0% for 
revenue and is 1.2% for the number of employees. This indicates the variance between each 
observation is a non-trivial amount for both revenue and number of employees at the firm 
level and justifies building multilevel growth curve models to include firm at a separate level 
to extract away the variance at the firm level. However, the variance between observations is 
45 I use the notation of the HLM models as explained in (Raudenbush & 8ryk, 2002). 
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a trivial amount of variance between the observations at the location level, which indicates 
that a third level is not warranted. Thus, 2-level models are run for the growth curve 
analysis, and not 3-level models. 
Unconditional Model 
To determine what growth curve shapes to model for revenue and number of 
employees, a series of growth curve models are tested in the hierarchical linear model (HLM, 
also called multi-level modeling) framework. The basic growth curve is a linear model. 
Hypothesis 2 posits a positive growth slope. When examining the graphs of the growth 
curves for a sampling of firms in the data set, there are firms with positive linear growth 
cures in the sample. There are also cases where the slopes are not linear. Rather, some 
slopes of multiple credit source usage have a curvilinear shape. In addition, a curvilinear, 
concave growth trend for revenue and number of employees is modeled. Such growth curves 
are modeled with the quadratic variable of TIME (i.e. TIME2). 
The linear and non-linear (quadratic) growth models are tested without any predictors 
(unconditional model). The data fit is then compared between these models to determine 
which estimate best depicts growth trends found in the data. Once the best fitting 
unconditional model is found, I build and test the conditional models which include the 
necessary covariates. I provide the equations to further explain how the estimation of the 
data is performed mathematically in the HLM framework. 
The formulas for the unconditional model estimation in HLM for the growth model 
are as follows for level-l and level-2 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In the formulas shown 
below, level I is the within firm model, level 2 is the between firm model, and level 3 is the 
between location model. The following is the linear model: 
Level I Model (time) 
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where, 
GROWTHtj= JtOj+ Jtlj(TIMEtj,l) + etj 
Level 2 Model (firm) 
JtOj= ~o,o + rOj 
Jtlj= ~I,O + rlj 
GROWTHtj is, depending on which model is being run, the revenue or number of 
employees at time t for firm! 
JtOj is the intercept of the dependent variable at time 0 
Jtljis the slope of the dependent variable over the time periods in the model 
TIMEtjrepresents consecutive measurement time points (1 year) at time t for firm! 
(0, I, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
~O,O is the parameter estimate for the intercept 
~ 1,0 is the parameter estimate for the slope 
e and r are time specific random error terms (variance at each level) 
The following is the quadratic (non-linear) model: 
Levell Structural Model (time) 
GROWTHtj= JtOj+ Jtlj(TIMEtj) + Jt2j(TIME2tj) + etj 
Level 2 Model (firm) 
JtOj= ~o,o + rOj 
Jtlj= ~I,O + rlj 
Jt2j= ~2,0 + r2j 
where, in addition to the variables in the linear model, the following variables are included in 
the non-linear model, 
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Jt2j is the rate of acceleration (or decline) of the dependent variable over the time 
periods in the model 
TIME2tjrepresents quadratic portion of consecutive measurement time points (1 year) 
at time t for firm/CO, 2, 4, 9, 16,25) 
~2,O is the parameter estimates for the rate of slope change 
With two variables used for growth (revenue and number of employees), two 
different models are run with each of these dependent variables. First I discuss the results 
when revenue is the dependent variable. 
The linear model for revenue has a deviance of22,348, an AIC of22,360 and a BIC 
of 22,400. The non-linear (quadratic) model has a deviance of21 ,531, an AIC of21 ,551, and 
a BIC of21 ,519. The model fit figures are slightly lower for the non-linear model, 
suggesting the non-linear model fits the data better when the dependent variable is revenue. 
Because this is time series data, there is a possibility of autocorrelation. The need to 
test for autocorrelation in growth curve models (which use time series data) arises because 
the level-1 variables (repeated measures from a firm) are ordered based upon time. When 
autocorrelation is present, an assumption of regression is violated and the estimates will be 
biased downward and t-statistics biased upward. In addition, significant autocorrelation 
might yield non-trivial estimates of the future observations in a time series data set (Levich & 
Rizzo, 1998). The correlation between the revenue each year is statistically significant and 
relatively high (maximum absolute correlation = 0.785). I also test for autocorrelation in the 
unconditional models by examining the parameter estimate of the correlation structure (the 
Phi coefficient). The Phi coefficient is 0.124. With the absolute level of the Phi coefficient 
being less than 0.3, this suggests there is little association between the repeated measures for 
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each the variables. Then I examine the variance homogeneity of revenue over time and see 
the variance is not stable. This would suggest autocorrelation could possibly be present with 
revenue. And finally, I examine the model fit in HLM models to compare models with and 
without autocorrelation. The model fit statistics (deviance = 21,521, Ale = 21,543, and BIe 
= 21,618) are all lower for the revenue model with autocorrelation than without 
autocorrelation (note: the deviance, Ale, and BIe for the model with autocorrelation is 
presented in the previous paragraph). The model fit statistics suggest that the model 
corrected for autocorrelation fits the data better for revenue. Thus, autocorrelation is 
corrected for the growth curve analysis where the dependent variable is revenue. 
Mean levels of revenue of the intercept is 10.509 and is statistically significant (t-
value = 203.282, p-value < 0.001). The slope is 0.688 and is statistically significant (t-value 
= 22.260, p-value < 0.001). The quadratic factor on the slope is -0.101 and is statistically 
significant (t-value = -19.377, p-value < 0.001). These results for the unconditional model 
indicate that revenue increases at a declining rate, resulting in a concave growth curve. 
Results are shown in Table 36. 
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Table 36: Growth Curve Analysis Results, Unconditional Model, Dependent Variable: 
Revenue 
Fixed Effect Coefficient Std Error 
For Intercept 
Average ... (~()I) 10.509 0.052 
For TIME (slope) 
Average ... (~,,) 0.688 0.031 
For TIMe (slope) 
Average ... (~:) -O.lOl 0.005 
Number of Level-l units (observations) 6,711 
Number of Level-2 units (firms) 1,569 
df= 5,140 
Statistical significance: ' p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 





-19.377 <0.001 ••• 
The next analysis of growth uses number of employees as the dependent variable. As 
with the HLM models using revenue as the dependent variable, the linear and non-linear 
models are compared to find the best estimated model. The linear model for number of 
employees has a deviance of 49,472, an Ale of 49,484, and a BIe of 49,527. The non-linear 
(quadratic) model has a deviance of 49,125, an Ale of 49,146, and a Ble of 49,216. As with 
the revenue model, the model fit figures are lower for the non-linear model, suggesting the 
non-linear model fits the data better when the dependent variable is number of employees. 
As with the revenue model, there is a possibility of autocorrelation because this is 
time series data. The correlation between the number of employees each year is statistically 
significant and relatively high (maximum absolute correlation = 0.953). I also test for 
autocorrelation in the unconditional models by examining the parameter estimate of the 
correlation structure (the Phi coefficient). The Phi coefficient is 0.066. The absolute level 
of the Phi coefficient being less than 0.3 suggests there is little association between the 
164 
repeated measures for each the variables. Then I examine the variance homogeneity of 
revenue over time and see the variance is not stable. This would suggest autocorrelation 
could possibly be present with number of employees. And finally, I examine the model fit in 
HLM models to compare models with and without autocorrelation. The model fit statistics 
(deviance = 49,120, Ale = 49,142, and BIe = 49,220) are all lower for the number of 
employees model with autocorrelation than without autocorrelation (note: the deviance, Ale, 
and BIe for the model with autocorrelation is presented in the previous paragraph). The 
model fit statistics suggest that the model corrected for autocorrelation fits the data better for 
number of employees. Thus, autocorrelation is corrected for the growth curve analysis where 
the dependent variable is number of employees. 
Mean levels of employees of the intercept is -4.548 and is statistically significant (t-
value = -38.291, p-value < 0.001). The slope is 1.383 and is statistically significant (t-value 
= 16.075, p-value < 0.001). The quadratic factor on the slope is -0.249 and is statistically 
significant (t-value = -15.643, p-value < 0.001). These results for the unconditional model 
indicate that the number of employees increases at a declining rate, resulting in a concave 
growth curve. This is similar to the shape of the estimated revenue growth curve. Results 
are shown in Table 37. 
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Table 37: Growth Curve Analysis Results, Unconditional Model, Dependent Variable: 
Number of Employees 
Fixed Effect Coefficient Std Error 
For Intercept 
Average ... (~()) -4.548 0.119 
For TIME (slope) 
Average ... (~I!) 1.383 0.086 
For TIME2 (slope) 
Average ... (Bel) -0.249 0.016 
Number of Levc1-1 units (observations) 8,631 
Number of Level-2 units (firms) 1,633 
df= 6,996 
Statistical significance: ' p < 0.10; * P < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 










unconditional model (no additional variables at level 1 or 2), a conditional model is created. 
To create a conditional growth model in HLM, predictor variables are added at levels 1 and 2 
that represent independent and control variables. Independent variables are added, including 
the multiple credit sources (number of total credit sources, number of unique credit sources, 
and diversity index of credit sources). Control variables are added, including the number of 
founders, education of founders, type of education of main founder, overall work experience 
of founders, start-up work experience of founders, age of founders, gender, race, citizenship, 
technology level, product / service, incorporation, founder contributed equity at start-up, 
intellectual property, and competitive advantage over competitors. Age of founders, gender, 
race, citizenship, technology level, product / service, incorporation, founder contributed 
equity at start-up, intellectual property, and competitive advantage over competitors are time 
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varying variables and are thus included in level 2 of the model. The outstanding amount of 
debt and new equity obtained each year are time varying variables and thus are included in 
level 2 of the model. 
Separate models are built for revenue and number of employees. The quadratic (non-
linear) unconditional model (without the covariates except the TIME variables at level I) has 
the best model fit. Therefore, the quadratic model is run with all the covariates (full model) 
with the notation as follows: 
Level I Model (time) 
GROWTHtj= JtOj+ JtIj(TIMEtj) + Jt2j(TIME2tj) + Jt3j(MCStj) + Jt3j 
(DEBTtj) + Jt4j(EQUITYtj) + Jt5j(HOURSWtj) + Jt6j(ECONOMYtj) + etj 
Level 2 Model (firm) 
JtOj= ~o,o + ~O,I (SIZEFTf) + ~O,2 (EDUf) + ~O,3 (EDUTf) + ~O,4 (EXPWf) + ~O,5 
(EXPSf) + ~O,6 (AGEFf) + ~O,7 (GENDERf) + ~O,8 (RACEf) + ~O,9 (CITIZENf) + ~O,IO 
(TECHf) + ~O,JJ (PROD_SERVf) + ~O,I2 (lNCORPf) + ~O,f3 (EQUITYFf) + ~O,J4 (lPf) + 
~O,I5 (COMADVf) + rOj 
JtIj= ~I,O + ~J,J (SIZEFTf) + ~I,2 (EDUf) + ~I,3 (EDUTf) + ~I,4 (EXPWf) + ~I,5 
(EXPSf) + ~I,6 (AGEFf) + ~1,7 (GENDERf) + ~I,8 (RACEf) + ~I,9 (CITIZENf) + ~J,Jo 
(TECHf) + ~I,JJ (PROD _SERVf) + ~J,J2 (lNCORPf) + ~I,I3 (EQUITYFf) + ~J,J4 (lPf) + 
~I.I5 (COMADVf) + rIj 
Jt2j= ~2,O + ~2,I (SIZEFTf) + ~2,2 (EDUf) + ~2,3 (EDUTf) + ~2,4 (EXPWf) + ~2,5 
(EXPSf) + ~2,6 (AGEFf) + ~2,7 (GENDERf) + ~2,8 (RACEf) + ~2,9 (CITIZENf) + ~2,J2 
(TECHf) + ~2,JJ (PROD _SERVf) + ~2,I2 (INCORPf) + ~2,I3 (EQUITYFf) + ~2,I4 (IPf) + 
~2,I5 (COMADVf) + r2j 
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where, 
Jt3j= /)3,0 + /)3.1 (SIZEFTf) + /)3,2 (EDUf) + /)3,3 (EDUTf) + /)3,4 (EXPWf) + /)3,5 
(EXPSf) + /)3,6 (AGEFf ) + /)3,7 (GENDERf) + /)3,8 (RACEf) + /)3,9 (CITIZENf ) + /)3.13 
(TECHf) + /)3,11 (PROD _SERVf) + /)3.12 (INCORPf) + /)3.13 (EQUITYFf) + /)3.14 (IPf) + 
/)3.15 (COMADVf) + r3j 
Jt4j= /)4,0 + /)4,} (SIZEFTf) + /)4,2 (EDUf) + /)4,3 (EDUTf ) + /)4,4 (EXPWf) + /)4,5 
(EXPSf) + /)4,6 (AGEFf ) + /)4,7 (GENDERf) + /)4,8 (RACEf) + /)4,9 (CITIZENf) + /)4,}4 
(TECHf) + /)4,11 (PROD _SERVf) + /)4,12 (INCORPf) + /)4,}3 (EQUITYFf ) + /)4,}4 (IPf) + 
/)4.15 (COMADVf) 
Jt5j= /)5,0 + /)5.1 (SIZEFTf) + /)5,2 (EDUf ) + /)5,3 (EDUTf ) + /)5,4 (EXPWf) + /)5,5 
(EXPSf) + /)5,6 (AGEFf) + /)5,7 (GENDERf) + /)5,8 (RACEf ) + /)5,9 (CITIZENf ) + /)5.15 
(TECHf) + /)5,11 (PROD _SERVf) + /)5.12 (INCORPf) + /)5.13 (EQUITYFf) + /)5.14 (IPf ) + 
/)5,}5 (COMADVf) 
Jt6j= /)6,0 + /)6,} (SIZEFTf) + /)6,2 (EDUf) + /)6,3 (EDUTf ) + /)6,4 (EXPWf) + /)6,6 
(EXPSf) + /)6,6 (AGEFf) + /)6,7 (GENDERf) + /)6,8 (RACEf) + /)6,9 (CITIZEN.!) + /)6.10 
(TECHf) + /)6,11 (PROD_SERVf) + /)6.12 (INCORPf) + /)6.13 (EQUITYFf ) + /)6,14 (IPf) + 
/)6,}5 (COMADVf) 
GROWTH,j is, depending on which model is being run, the revenue or number of 
employees at time t for firm! 
MCS,j is, depending on which model is being run, the number of total credit sources, 
number of unique credit sources, or diversity index of credit sources used at time t for firm! 
Jtojis the intercept of the dependent variable at time 0 for firm! 
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:rtfjis the slope of the dependent variable over the time periods in the model for firm! 
TIMEtjrepresents consecutive measurement time points (1 year) at time t for firm! 
(0, 1,2,3,4,5) 
:rt2j is the rate of acceleration (or decline) of the dependent variable over the time 
periods in the model 
TIME2tjrepresents quadratic portion of consecutive measurement time points (1 year) 
at time t for firm! (0, 2, 4, 9, 16, 25) 
:rt3j is the slope of the dependent variable over the time periods in the model as a 
result of the change in outstanding debt for firm! 
DEBTtjis the amount of outstanding debt at time t for firm! 
:rt4j is the slope of the dependent variable over the time periods in the model as a 
result of the change in new equity funds obtained for firm! 
EQUITYNtjis the amount of new equity at time t for firm! 
:rt5j is the slope of the dependent variable over the time periods in the model as a 
result of the change in hours worked for firm! 
HOURSWtjis the average hours worked by the founder / founding team at time t for 
firm! 
:rt6jis the slope of the dependent variable over the time periods in the model as a 
result of the change in the status of the economy (economy is in a credit crisis or not) for firm 
! 
ECONOMYtjis the status of the economy (economy is in a credit crisis or not) at 
time t for firm! 
~o,o - ~O,l5 are the parameter estimates for the intercept 
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~l,O - ~6J5 are the parameter estimates for the slope 
SIZEFTfis the founding team size for firmj 
EOUfis the average education level (based upon highest degree achieved) of the 
founding team for firmj 
EOUTfis the education type (non-business degree - 0, business degree -1) of the 
founding team for firmj 
1) 
firmj 
EXPWfis the average work experience of the founding team for firmj 
EXPSf is a measure of if any of the members for firmjhave startup experience (0 or 
AGEFfis the average age of the founder / founding team squared for firmj 
GENOERfis the percentage of females on the founding team for firmj 
RACEfis the percentage of minority individuals on the founding team for firmj 
CITIZENfis the percentage of non-American individuals on the founding team for 
TECHfis the technology level (high or low) for firmj 
PROO_SERVfis if the firm offers a service (0) or a product (or both) (I) for firmj 
INCORPfis iffirmjhas incorporated in the first year of operations 
EQUITYFfis the amount of money the founder / founding team contributed to firmj 
at start-up 
IPfis iffirmjhas any intellectual property (patents, trademarks, or copyrights) 
COMPAOVfis iffirmjhas a competitive advantage over its competitors 
e and r are time specific random error terms (variance at each level) 
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The intercept is allowed to vary. In addition, the slopes are allowed to vary for 
TIME, TIME2, MCS, and DEBT. The slopes for EQUITY and HOURSW are not allowed to 
vary as the model did not converge when they were allowed to vary. The ECONOMY slope 
is not allowed to vary as the variable is not different between firms. Although the credit 
crisis changes over time for the new firms, all firms in the data set experience the credit crisis 
at the same level. 
The shape of the growth curves for revenue and number of employees in the 
conditional models are similar to the shape of the growth curves in the unconditional models. 
The intercept and TIME variables are statistically significant and positive, with TIME2 being 
statistically significant and negative. This indicates that revenue and number of employees 
initially increase, with the growth rates decreasing over time. 
Although the time components are statistically significant, the variables of interest in 
this analysis, multiple credit sources, are not statistically significant with revenue and number 
of employees. Number of total credit sources (0.010, t-value = 0.174 P = 0.862), number of 
unique credit sources (-0.081, t-value = -0.545, P = -0.586), and diversity index of credit 
sources (-1.686, t-value = -1.079, P = 0.281) are not statistically significant with revenue. In 
addition, total credit sources (0.395, t-value = 1.898, P = 0.058), number of unique credit 
sources (0.862, t-value = 1.675, P = 0.094), and diversity index of credit sources (0.758, t-
value = 0.140, P = 0.889) are not statistically significant with the number of employees. 
Outstanding debt, new equity, hours worked, and credit crisis are the other time 
varying variables. Outstanding debt, new equity, and credit crisis are not statistically 
significant with revenue in all three models. Hours worked is statistically significant and 
positively related with revenue in all three models. Thus, a firm with a greater number of 
171 
hours worked by the founders is associated greater revenue. Larger founder teams decrease 
the effect of hours worked on the revenue growth. Overall work experience decreases the 
effect of hours worked on the revenue growth, although the effect size is small. This 
possibly indicates that founders with greater work experience are more efficient in their 
ability to grow revenue as founders with greater work experience do not have to spend as 
many hours working in the firm to generate revenue growth. The effect of hours worked on 
revenue growth is also decreased for firms with a greater competitive advantage. General 
education positively affects the effect of hours worked on revenue growth. 
New equity is the only time varying variable that has an effect on employee growth. 
Firms that receive a greater amount of new equity experience higher employee growth rates. 
The effect of new equity on employee growth is decreases by firms with founders that have 
more education. Thus, new equity has less of an effect on employee growth for firms with 
founders that have more education. 
Details of the results are provided in Table 38 and Table 39. 
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Table 38: Growth Curve Analysis Results, Conditional Model, Dependent Variable: 
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1l-.ICITI7~N) 0.067 0.125 0.537 0591 0.067 0.124 0541 0.588 0065 0.125 0.523 0.601 
r~'IIJ (TECI-f) 0.031 1) 054 0506 0571 o.o::n 0054 0501 0.617 () 032 0.054 0.5X9 0.556 
f>." IPROD_SERVI 0.003 0.053 0.052 0958 0.00] 0.053 0055 0.956 ·0.010 0.054 -D.180 o R57 
II. " IINeORP) 0.022 0.057 0.395 0.693 0.011 0.056 o ISR o R51 0026 0057 0.454 0.650 
11." ,EQUlTYFi ·0.003 0.00.1 -0.8R(, 0.376 -0.002 0.003 -0.776 0.43H ·0.002 0.003 -0.76(' 0.444 
B I" (lP) 0.024 (J.n)) 0.432 0.666 0.024 0.054 0448 0654 0.029 0.055 0.533 0.594 
11·" \COMADV) -OOY5 1).096 -O.YX6 0324 -o.mn ().095 -0.916 0.360 ·O.ORS 0.0':16 ·U.RR2 o 37R 
Numbcr of Level-l umts (observahons) 6.619 6.619 6.619 
NumberofLe\'cl-1 umt~{finns) 1,562 1.562 1.562 
[}e\lance 2(J,312 20,287 20,320 
Ale 20,602 20.577 20,600 
RIC 215R7 21562 215'11 
StallstlCal ~ignifieance p < 0.10; * P < 0.05; "'* p" 0.01. ***p«HlOl 
Dependent variable: Number of employees 
Thl' thIrd level (location) variables are not mcluded in the r(,,~Hllts as none of the variables arc statistically significant, and by leaving them out of the result .. it saws space for the more important 
n:~ult:. 
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Table 39: Growth Curve Analysis Results, Conditional Model, Dependent Variable: 
Parameter 
Fixed Effcct~ 
Inttial status, ;t,,; 
Intercept ~ll'" 
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Rate of change' . IT., I (TIME') 
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11 __ (GENDER) 
II"(RACEI 
II" (CHIZEN) 
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1\",IEQUITYf) 
1\-" (lP) 
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2.980 0003 •• 
3.439 0.001 
0,110 0912 
0.0511 ·O.2~5 0798 
0.268 -0.073 0.942 
!).012 0.641 0521 
0.216 1937 () OS] 
0.011 -2.QIO 0.004 .. 
0.269 -2.094 0.036 
O.:BO 2381 0017 
0.48 J 0.536 0.592 
11.217 2.363 0018 
0.214 1.561 0.119 
0.229 -1.248 0212 
0.013 1.833 0067 
0222 -0.025 0980 
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1.109 -7,732 <0,001 
0.251 1537 0125 
0,096 0041 0967 
0.465 -0.007 0.'N5 
0020 -1.172 0,242 
D 36S 0 ORO D Q36 
O.Olx 0.274 07X4 
0.457 -1.254 0210 
0.%7 -0.765 0445 
0.S20 J 213 0226 
0.372 -1.156 024x 
0.370 -O.l2S 0.K20 
0.399 5.125 <0.001 
0.022 0971 0.332 
O.3S2 0.214 (U31 





0.05h -0326 0744 
0.268 -0.069 0945 
0,012 0,649 0,5)0 
0.216 1982 IU148 
O.oJ I -2.913 0.004 •• 
0.269 -2.143 0.032 
0.n9 21.c;1 0019 
0.480 0556 0578 
0,2)6 2408 0016 
0.214 1479 0.139 
0.228 -1.217 0.224 
0.013 1.805 0.071 
0.221 0021 0.984 
0.345 0.702 0483 
0,1211 -3,020 0,003 0-
0027 0631 0 527 
0,010 -0,242 0.809 
0.047 0037 0970 
G.DO'::: -0.053 0.958 
0.03:-; -1 979 0048 
0.002 2 094 0.036 
O.04~ 2350 0019 
O.O.c;q -1.fi60 O.O{)7 
O.OS5 -D.S93 0.372 
O.03X -.2.313 H.021 
0.038 ·1.522 0.128 
0.040 1.203 0.229 
0.002 -1.346 0.178 
0.039 0.513 O.60~ 
D.061 -0 H20 0.412 
Dil'enlt) Index of Unique Credit Sources 





















































































0050 -O.2K9 0.772 
0.268 -0.079 0.937 
0,012 0,739 0.460 
(j.21A 2021 0043 
D.Oll -3.00~ 0.003 .. 
0.269 -2.0H4 D.037 
0329 2.1:'1.80.017 
0479 0.646 0.518 
0.217 2.378 0.017 
0.214 1.529 0126 
0.229 -1.209 0227 
0.01.1 1.806 () 071 
0221 OOSO 0936 


































MCS, " ,(MCS) 
Intercept [\'1> 
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I-:qlllt~, JT ,(EQUITY) 
Intercept [{," 
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1\ .. (CITIZEN) 
II" '" (TECH) 
[{',II (PROD_SfRV) 
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0,,, 01') 
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0.208 i.H98 0.058 
0.035 ,1.743 0081 
1).016 -1.415 0157 
1),071 0.456 0648 
0.004 1.235 0 ~ 17 
0,06\ 0.945 0.345 
0004 -()2')1 0800 
0.091 -(U JO 0.757 
1),088 -0.557 0.577 
I) 107 0044 0965 
Il060 -0.092 0927 
0,057 ,0,421 0674 
0059 -() 355 0 n3 
0.004 -0.476 0,634 
0.062 1.385 0.166 
1).121 -1.075 0.283 
0,040 ,0.007 0,995 
'1.008 1.075 0283 
11.003 I.ORO 02RO 
lUllS -0.7]9 0460 
0.001 ,0,972 0.331 
0.012 -2.428 0015 
IlOOI· -0.344 0.731 
1).016 -0.281 0779 
!l018 -0.697 048ti 
0.027 1.003 0316 
0.012 O,S47 0397 
0.012 -UM,7 0.062 
[) 012 0.753 0.451 
1).001 1.175 0.240 
<1.012 ,1,17S 016S 
1).021 2.196 002l': 
0.036 2.162' (l.u31 
'),008 ,0 I JR 0.890 
1).003 ~3.079 {) 002 u 
0.014 -0.305 0761 
0.001 -0.523 I) bOI 
0.1111 (J.740 OA59 
'lOOI 0.209 0.834 
1).015 0.349 0727 
0.017 1156 0248 
(l.U25 -U.978 0.328 
0.011 205') 0040 
0.011 -0.57R 0563 
0.012 -0.374 0.709 
'lOOI ,1.640 0.101 
0.011 0.545 0.586 
































,2.851 0004 •• 
Numher uf llnique Credit Sounes 


































































0.514 (675 0094 
0.112 -0.559 0.576 
0042 -1.186 0236 
0.191 ,0,738 0.461 
0.009 I 223 0.221 
0,162 ,0.106 0915 
().()m~ -O.50h 0 fi 11 
0.2U7 -U.561 0575 
0.238 -0.242 0809 
o 329 0699 () 485 
0.158 -0.057 0.955 
0.160 0728 0.467 
O.lh.1 0170 OR65 
0.009 -1408 0159 
0.163 0699 0,485 
0.271 ,0,749 0,454 
0,044 ,0.199 OS43 
0.009 0.655 0.513 
0.004 1.031 0.303 
0.1116 ,11.047 0.902 
0.001 -1.056 0.291 
O.()J4 ,1.587 0.113 
0.001 -0.147 0883 
O,OIS ,0.078 0938 
0021 -O.flRI 049h 
0.030 0,594 0.553 
0.014 0.7\8 0,473 
0.014 -2.212 0.027 
0.014 0536 0592 
0.001 I 769 01)77 
0.014 ·1.143 0.253 
0.023 I 966 0049 
0.036 :!.230 0.026 
O.OOR ,0,180 0.857 
0.003 ,2.979 0.003 .' 
0.014 -0.313 0.754 
0.001 -0.561 0575 
f).OII 0737 0461 
0.00 I 0,094 0.925 
0.015 0.267 0.790 
0.017 1.1190.263 
0.025 -0.91 () 035!-: 
11.011 I 99S 0046 
0.011 -0.527 0591-\ 
0.012 -O.34:! 0733 
0,001 ,1.673 0094 
0.0 ( I 0 564 0.573 
0.019 -0.419 0,675 
O.OIR 1517 0127 
0.004 -0.393 0695 
0.001 2.411 0016 
0.007 1.296 0.195 
0.{)003 1.535 0.125 
0.006 0931 0.352 
0.0003 0.323 0.747 
O.OC17 0355 0722 
0.008 -0.075 0.941 
0.013 -0.363 0,717 
0,006 ,0.279 0780 
O.(l06 0423 O.6?:! 
0.006 -0.968 0333 
0.0003 ,0.022 0.982 
O.OOb -0,278 o,nl 
0,010 ,2.839 0005 .' 
Oh'ersity Index of Unique Credit Sources 

































































5.418 0.140 0889 
1.044 O.32~ 0,743 
0.455 0643 0 5:!O 
1.915 -0.324 0746 
0.093 -0.251 OJW2 
1.632 -1.22S 0.220 
0092 -() 644 0.520 
2.123 0.717 0.473 
:!.240 -O.loS 0867 
3.632 -O.5S~ 0577 
1.628 0.594 0553 
1.635 0,103 0918 
1618 -088~ 0176 
0091\ 0.167 0.867 
1671 0.089 0.929 
3,019 0.420 0.674 
0.160 0.071 0.943 
0.030 ,0.230 O.S I S 
0.013 -0.521 060:! 
0.057 0.158 0.874 
0,003 0,149 0.88 I 
0048 0.744 04'17 
0003 1).505 0,614 
0063 -0.799 0425 
0.Ofi9 -O.08~ 0930 
0.110 0.808 0.419 
0.048 ,OAIS 0.676 
0.048 -O.SH2 0.561 
0.048 1.042 0.298 
0.003 0.095 0.1)24 
0.049 ,0.28F 0.77) 
0,088 0,001 I 000 
0.036 2.097 01136 
0.008 ,0,103 0918 
0.003 -2.962 0.003 •• 
0014 ,0311 0.756 
0.001 -0.587 n.557 
0.011 0,6RI 0.496 
0,0111 0,229 0.819 
0.015 0295 0768 
0.017 1.146 0252 
0.025 -1.066 02H6 









































-2.843 0.005 .. 
~umber or Total Credit Sources Number of Unique Credit Sources Di\'t'rslt)' Index of lrnique Credit Sources 
Parameter Coefficient Std Error tMnlut' Sig. Coefficient Std Error tMvalue Sig. Coefficient Std Error t·nlu(' Sig. 
Crl'dit en .... 1<;. rT-,(FCONO\1Y) 
Intercept 11-, -I ISO 0.653 -\ 806 0071 -I ISo 0.654 -I XI4 0070 -1192 0650 -u)) 0.067 
Slope 11-., (SIZEFT) 0.\01 0.146 0.095 OAK7 0.112 ILl 46 o 76M (44) 0.116 0.145 0.7% 0.425 
II ,IEDUI -0.049 1).055 -0.905 0.366 -0.051 0.055 -0.928 0.354 -0.055 0.054 -1.01) 0.311 
B IEDUT) 0.139 1).251 0.556 0578 0.142 0.250 0.568 0.570 0153 0.249 0.61(' 0.538 
1\ _(EXf>W) 0.005 0.011 0401 0645 0.000 0.011 0.531\ 0.591 0.004 0.011 0.384 0701 
1\ ,IEXPS) -O.OM 0.206 -0.408 0683 -0.080 0.206 -O.J85 0700 -0.088 0.206 -0.426 0670 
11-, (AGEF) 0.015 ILOII U05 0172 0.014 0.011 1302 0193 0.016 0.011 1.471 0.141 
II (GEND.ER) 0.200 0.259 0.771 0441 0.211 0.259 0814 0416 0198 0.258 0.767 0.443 
hIRACE) -0.247 0.n2 -0.766 OA44 -0.234 0.322 -0.727 0467 -0.250 0.321 -0.777 0.437 
fI-.IC1Tl7EN) -0.415 0.457 -0.929 0353 -0.462 0.456 -1.013 0.311 -0497 0455 -1.092 0.275 
j)'I"JTECH) -0 )40 0.207 -1.640 0101 -0.357 0.207 -1723 DOSS -0.329 0.206 -1.597 0.110 
1'1-" IPROD SERV) 0.104 0.204 0.511 0.610 0.120 0.204 0.590 0.556 0.094 0.203 0460 0645 
11-" (INCORP) -0.035 0.217 -0.160 o X7) -0.050 0.217 -0.130 0.818 -0.047 0.217 -0.216 O.S29 
B-" \EQUITYFi -0.014 0.012 -1.20K () 227 -0.014 0.012 ~1.166 0244 -0.014 0012 -1.160 o ~46 
flo 4 tIP) -O.OoR 0.211 -0.324 0.746 -O.OSO 0.211 -0.379 0705 -0.079 0210 -0.377 0706 
fl-" \('O\IADV) 0.OX2 0.34() 0.241 \l.XIO 0.106 IU4\l 0.311 0756 O.OXI IU39 O.231J 0.81 I 
Number of Levcl-I unIts (obserV41tl0ns) 8.496 8.490 8A96 
Number of Level-I umt!-.(finn~) 1,626 1.626 1.626 
Ue\'lance 2lUI2 47.651 47.663 
Ale 20.602 47.941 47.953 
RIC 21,5S7 4R,903 41(975 
StatistICal slglllticance p.c' 010; * P ", 0.05, ** P <' 0 OJ: *** P < 0.001 
Dependent 'variable: Numbcr of employees 
The thIrd level (location) variables are not mcludcd 10 the resuits as none of the vanables arc stati"tieally significant. and by h~a\ ing them out of the resuits it saves space for the more illlport,tIll 
fl'!>uib 
Endogeneity 
Endogeneity is an issue that researchers need to examine when performing statistical 
analyses (Parker & Van Praag, 2006; e.g. Parker, 2009). If endogeneity is prevalent in the 
statistical model and not controlled for in the analysis, the coefficient estimates and their 
statistical significant levels could be biased. Endogeneity can arise due to several reasons. 
One of those reasons is due causal direction. With the decision to use multiple credit sources 
being a choice for founders, and the founders have a goal for their firms to survive and 
possibly grow, the possibility of endogeneity exists. In the statistical analyses, I test the 
relationship between multiple credit source usage and firm performance. Multiple credit 
source variables are the independent variables in the statistical models, and firm performance 
variables are the dependent variables. This setup implies that multiple credit source usage by 
new firms leads to a change in firm performance. However, the causal direction of the 
relationship between multiple credit source usage and firm performance could be in the 
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opposite causal direction. For example, a firm that is already growing could resort to the use 
of mUltiple credit sources as they need more funds to fuel the growth. Or a firm that is 
performing poorly and thus is having difficulty obtaining funds from a bank will resort to 
using multiple credit sources to try to survive longer. 
The endogeneity resulting from the bimodal causal direction can be addressed 
through theory and statistical methods. Theory explains "why" a relationship exists between 
the variables. In the theory development section, I built a theory that explains the causal 
direction being that multiple credit source usage leads to growth. In addition, statistical 
methods can be used to control for this source of endogeneity by including an instrumental 
variable. An instrumental variable is a variable that is correlated with the independent 
variables but not with the error of the equation. In the case of this study, an instrumental 
variable would need to be correlated with each of the multiple credit source variables, but not 
correlated with the error of the equation for each of the firm performance variables (survival, 
growth in revenue, and growth in number of employees). A viable instrumental variable was 
not found in the data set. Thus, an instrumental variable cannot be used to mitigate the 
possibility of endogeniety in the statistical analyses of the study. This issue is included in 
Chapter 5 when discussing the limitations of this study. 
Theory and instrumental variables do not take into account another endogeneity issue, 
omitted variable bias, also known as unobserved heterogeneity. Omitted variable bias results 
in a covariate variable not being included in the statistical analysis that could affect the 
dependent variable. I have included a large number of variables in the statistical analysis, 
which lessens the probability that an important variable is missing. 
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Even though I have included a large number of variables in the statistical analyses, 
there are several variables that are not present in the analyses that could affect the results. 
One possible variable that is missing that could have an impact on firm performance is the 
availability of credit and risk propensity of creditors. I control for that partially via the credit 
crisis. However, it is assumed that the credit crisis occurs for all firms, but over different 
time periods. Thus, the credit crisis variable is not firm or location specific. I then included 
a location variable that would try to control for the location being a factor (assuming that 
different locations have different amounts of credit supply). When running the HLM 
analysis with location as the 3rd level, the ICC was trivial, which indicated that location was 
not a factor. In addition, the estimates including location as a 3rd level and the estimates not 
including the 3rd level with location did not differ significantly. This suggests that location 
is not a factor, and possibly that the supply of credit is not a factor. Location might not be a 
factor because firms are able to obtain credit from creditors that are not located near them. In 
other words, credit is not obtained from a creditor in the same location - a new firm in 
Austin, Texas can obtain credit from a bank in Chicago, Illinois. In addition, many banks 
operate across states and across the country. Thus, their credit availability is measured by the 
entire country. Moreover, the data set that I used for this study is national (United States). 
This is also true for non-bank financial institutions, especially large one. With individuals 
able to easily move around the country (fluid labor movement in the United States), family 
and friends also might not be located in the same location as the firm. 
Another omitted variable that could be an issue, is personal wealth of the founders. If 
the founders have a higher amount of wealth, which includes tangible assets (for example, a 
large amount of equity in their home), they can possibly use that wealth as collateral when 
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obtaining credit. A larger amount of collateral could possibly increase the amount that the 
new firm can obtain from one credit source, thus affecting the reason to use additional credit 
sources to obtain the necessary funds the new firm needs to survive and possibly grow. 
However, the assumption is that most entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained. In other 
words, they don't have enough of the funds personally to adequately fund their business, nor 
do they have enough personal assets to fund their business. Other factors not included in the 
analysis that could influence firm performance could be personal wealth of the founder(s), 
risk propensity of creditors in the area of the firm, and supply of credit in the area. 
Even though some statistical analysis has been performed, and a large number of 
theoretically supported variables are included in the model, the possibility of omitted variable 
bias still might exist. Some might argue that not enough has been done to address the 
possibility of omitted variable bias in the analysis. From one perspective, omitted variable 
bias can be overcome by including a large number of variables in the model with the hope 
that there is less of a chance that an important variable is missing - which I have done in the 
previous analyses. However, by including a large number of variables in the model, there is 
more of a chance that one of those variables is correlated with an important variable that has 
been left out of the model. Thus, I perform additional analyses to address this concern. 
Panel data regression is a longitudinal statistical method embedded in the 
econometric framework that helps eliminate the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity 
when the omitted variables are constant over time. For example, personal wealth when 
starting a new firm is constant, and doesn't change since it is the personal wealth at the time 
the firm started and the analysis is performed over time (i.e. the other variables change over 
time). 
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A statistical method for growth analysis that handles unobserved heterogeneity is 
panel data regression. Panel data regression is an econometric approach to analyzing panel 
data, while hierarchical linear modeling is an approach derived from the discipline of 
statistics. Statistical researchers tend to focus on finding the best model that fits the data, 
while econometric researchers tend to focus on minimizing the endogenous aspects of a 
statistical model. 
Panel Data Regression 
Panel data regression is performed for two different dependent variables: revenue and 
number of employees. The three multiple credit source variables (number of total credit 
sources, number of unique credit sources, and diversity index of credit sources) are 
individually included as independent variables in each of the models. 19 control variables 
are included (number of founders, education of founders, type of education of main founder, 
work experience of founders (overall), work experience of founders (start-up), amount of 
outstanding debt, amount of new equity, age of founders, gender, race, citizenship, 
technology level, product / service, incorporation, number of hours worked in venture, 
founder contributed equity, intellectual property, competitive advantage over competitors). 
There are two types of models that can be used in panel data regression: 1) fixed 
effects models, and 2) random effects models. The fixed effects model controls for time 
invariant differences between the firms, so the estimated coefficients of the fixed effects 
model are not biased because of omitted time invariant characteristics of the firms. This 
means fixed effects models cannot examine time invariant characteristics of the firms. Fixed 
effects models are designed to study the causes of changes within a firm (or entity, or 
individual) (Kohler & Kreuter, 2008). In more detail, the fixed effects model restricts the 
slope coefficients and the variance to be the same across firms while letting the intercepts 
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differ, and treats all between firm covariances as o. The random effects model allows for 
time invariant variables to be included among the regressors. In the fixed effect model, these 
variables are included in the intercept. 
Fixed and random effects models are compared using the Hausman test to determine 
if to use a fixed effects model or a random effects model (Hausman, 1978). The null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the errors from the equation and the estimators are not 
correlated. All of the Hausman tests indicate a statistical difference between the models, as 
shown in Table 40. This suggests that the null hypothesis is rejected in all the Hausman tests 
and that the random effects model is inconsistent. Thus, the fixed effects model should be 
used. 
Table 40: Results of Hausman Tests between Fixed Effects Models and Random Effects 
Models 
"l p-value 
Dependent Variable: Revenue 
Independent Variable 
Number of Total Credit Sources 455.08 <0.001 
Number of Unique Credit Sources 518.97 <0.001 
Diversity Index of Credit Sources 668.64 <0.001 
Dependent Variable: Number of Employees 
Independent Variable 
Number of Total Credit Sources 66.40 <0.001 
Number of Unique Credit Sources 101.45 <0.001 
Diversity Index of Credit Sources 109.81 <0.001 
The notation for a fixed effects model in panel data regression is as follows: 
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GROWTHf,t = ~o + ~I (MCSf,t) + ... + ~20 (COMPADVf,t) + Ef,t 
where, 
GROWTHf,t is, depending on the model, the revenue or number of employees at time 
t for firm! 
MCSf,t is, depending on the model, the number of total credit sources, number of 
unique credit sources, or diversity index of credit sources at time t for firm! 
~o ... ~20 are the estimated coefficients in the model 
uf is the between firm error 
Ef,t is the error term at time t for firm! 
Table 41: Panel Data Regression Results - Dependent Variable: Revenue 
Estimate 
Number of Total Credit Sources 0035 
Number of Unique Credit Sources 
Di\'CTSI~ Index of Credit Sources 
Amount of Outstanding Debt (00) 
Amount of Ne\' Equi~ -0023 
Commitment to Venture 
Number of Hours Worl.cd In Venture (1.012 
Credit Cnsis 0.333 
R' (J.(195 




Statistical significancc· p < U.IO; • P < O.U5 .• * p < 0.01 .... p < 0 OO! 
Dependent variable Revenue 
Unbalanced panel 
n = 1562. T=I-6. N=6.619 
t-\alue Pc(>ltl) 
3.868 <(I.()O! ••• 
1776 U 076· 
-13.654 <(}.OOI ... 
10 7117 <o.t)Ol ••• 
12.289 <(),tJOI ... 
Estimate I-value P«>ltl) Estimate t-\a1ue 
0.094 3646 <0001 ••• 
0.038 0143 
0.002 0.720 0.471 0005 0689 
-0023 -13.749 «J.(IDj ••• -0.023 -13696 
(J012 10.702 <()OOI ... U 012 10.755 
0.336 12396 <0001 ... 0,335 12.348 











Table 41 shows the panel data regression results when the dependent variable is 
revenue. Two of the multiple credit source variables are statistically significant. The number 
of total credit sources is positively associated with revenue (0.035, t-value = 3.868, p < 
0.001). The number of unique credit sources is also positively associated with revenue 
(0.094, t-value = 3.646, p < 0.001). Thus, when number of total and unique credit sources 
increase over time, revenue of a firm also is found to increase. The diversity index of credit 
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sources is not statistically significant with revenue (0.038, t-value = 0.143, P = 0.886). This 
suggests that the diversity index of credit sources is not associated with changes in revenue. 
Table 42: Panel Data Regression Results - Dependent Variable: Number of Employees 
Estimate 
Number ofTolal Credit Sources () 079 
Number of Umque Credit Sources 
Dl\ersll) Index of Credit Sources 
Amount of Outstanding Debt () 030 
Amount ofNe,", Equil) -0015 
Commitment to Venture 
Number of Hours Worked lfl Venture 0.027 
CrcdltCrisis 0.288 
R' 0.021 




Statistical slgmficance p < (J.IO ... P < 0.05, ** P < U 01; *** p < U 001 
Dependent \ ariablc Number of employees 
Unbalanced panel 
n = 1626. T=J-6. N=!L496 
I-value Pr(>ltl) 
2.757 0.006 •• 
4.788 <0.001 ... 
-2769 0006 •• 
8262 <0001 .. * 
3302 <0.001 ... 
Estimate I-value Pr(>ltll Estimate (-\alue Pr(>ltl) 
Il 219 2.71l3 O.OU7 •• 
1.242 1.480 0139 
U 025 3.585 <0.001 ••• 0001 0027 U.978 
-0015 -2.864 0.004 •• -0015 -2863 () U()4 •• 
0027 8.220 <0.001 ... 0027 8347 <UOOI .. * 
0.296 3393 <0.001 ... 0293 3356 <0.001 ••• 
0021 O.02U 
0017 U 016 
29114 281l71l 
6,865 6.865 
<0 (lUI <0001 
Table 42 shows the panel data regression results when the dependent variable is 
number of employees. The results with the number of employees as the dependent variable 
are similar to the results seen when the dependent variable is revenue. Number of total credit 
sources and number of unique credit sources are statistically significant and positively 
associated with number of employees. The number of total credit sources is positively 
associated with number of employees (0.079, t-value = 2.757, P < 0.001). The number of 
unique credit sources is also positively associated with number of employees (0.219, t-value 
= 2.703, P < 0.001). Thus, when number of total and unique credit sources increase over 
time, the number of employees in a firm also is found to increase. The diversity index of 
credit sources is not statistically significant with revenue (1.242, t-value = 1.480, p = 0.139). 
This suggests that the diversity index of credit sources is not associated with changes in the 
number of employees. 
Summary of Results for Entire Sample 
The results presented for OLS regression, Probit regression, survival analysis, growth 
curve analysis, and panel data regression need an explanation when examining the results 
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together since the results are not completely consistent with each other. Examining the 
results together also helps form a better understanding of what they mean in the aggregate 
and thus helps answer the research question posed in this study. All the statistical analysis 
tools except growth curve analysis report some form of statistical significance between the 
multiple credit source variables and performance (survival and growth). Table 43 presents 
the summary of the results for all the statistical analyses provided up to this point, 
highlighting the statistical significance and relationship direction for the multiple credit 
source variables. 
Table 43: Summary of Results for Entire Sample 
Number of Total Number of Unique Di,ersity Index of 
Dependent Vanable Credit Sources Credit Sources Credit Sources 
HI' SUfyj, aI Hypothesis 
OLS Regression. Last Year Le\ els Age at 2009 " Neg " OLS Regression. End of First Year Le .... els Age a12009 Neg Neg " Probit Regression Last Year Le\ els Closure (0, I) " POSl " Probit Regression' End of First Year Le\ els Closure (0, I) POSl POSl " Co'\. Proportional HaLard Modeling: TIme Imanant Variables Closure E, ent .", POSl " Cox Proportional HaJ.ard Modelmg' Time Varying Variables Closure E,"ent .", " " 
H2 Gro\\1h H~ pothesis 
Re\enue 
OLS Regression. Last Year Le\els Re\ eoue - Last Full Year of OperatIOns Pos Pos Neg 
OLS Regression End of First Year Le\eis Re\ eoue - Last Full Year of OperatIOns " " Neg HlerarchlcaJ Lmear Modelmg Re\et1ue Each Year " " " Panel Data Regression Re\ enue Each Year Pos Pos " 
Number of Emplo~ ees 
OLS Regression Last Year Levels # of Employees - Last Full Year of Operauons " Pos Neg OLS Regression End of First Year Le\els # of Employees - Last Full Year of Operations " " Neg HlerarchicaJ Linear Modehng # of Employees Each Year " " " Panel Data RegressiOn # of Employees Each Year Pos Pos " 
Neg = negatn ely related With dependent \ariable: Pos = POSIU\ ely related with the dependent \ ariable: NS = not statlstistlcaJly siblJlificant 
StalislicaJ significance. '" p < 0 05: """ p < (l.Ot: """'" P < 0.001 
Control variables mclu<ie" number of founders, educatIOn of founders. type of education ofmam founder, \\orb. e\.perience of founders (overaJl). \\ork experience of founders (start-up), 
amount of outstanding debt amount of ne\\ eqUity. age of founders. gender. race. cItizensrup. technology level. incorporation (in year J), number or hours worb.ed in venture. founder 
contnbuted equity (m year I). mtellectuaJ property (any year). and competitne advantage 0\ er competitors (any year). Credit CriSIS IS included m SUfVI\aJ analysis. gro\\th cune analysIs. and 
panel data regresSiOn Location is not included m gro\\th cun e analysis as third-level \ ariable 
1 The SUf\"I\"aJ analysis "Pos" result IS smlilar to the "Neg" results m the OLS regression since the dependent \anable IS coded opPosite between OLS regression and sun·ivaJ anaJysis 
Hypothesis 1 posited a positive relationship between multiple credit sources and 
survival. The summary of the results suggests hypothesis 1 is not supported. Rather than a 
positive relationship, the results suggest there is a negative relationship between survival and 
at least one of the multiple credit source variables. Number of credit sources is negative and 
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statistically significant with survival only in the OLS regression analysis and only when 
using the first year variable levels. This suggests that using too many credit sources during 
the first year is not beneficial for survival. Number of unique credit sources is negative and 
statistically significant in all the statistical results except in Cox proportional hazard 
modeling when the variables are allowed to vary over time. This suggests that the number of 
unique credit sources, a form of diversity of credit sources based on a count method, is 
negatively associated with survival. In other words, when a firm uses a wider variety of 
unique credit sources, no matter how much it borrows from each unique credit source, the 
survival rate is lower. The diversity index of credit sources, a form of diversity of credit 
sources based on dollar value of each credit source that is used, is not statistically significant 
in any of the statistical methods that examine survival. 
Hypothesis 2 posited a positive relationship between multiple credit sources and 
growth. Growth is measured by revenue and number of employees. The summary of the 
results suggests partial support for hypothesis 2. The number of total credit sources is 
positive and statistically significant with revenue in OLS regression when using the levels in 
the last full years of operations and in panel data regression. In OLS regression when using 
the first year levels and growth curve modeling, number of total credit sources is not 
statistically significant with revenue. The same is the case for the number of unique credit 
sources. The number of unique credit sources is positive and statistically significant with 
revenue in OLS regression when using the levels in the last full year of operations and in 
panel data regression. 
These results suggest that multiple credit source usage is positively associated with 
revenue growth. However, when examining the relationship between multiple credit sources 
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and growth in the form of number of employees, there is a weaker relationship. The number 
of total credit sources is positive and statistically significant with number of employees only 
in the panel data regression. The number of unique credit sources is positive and statistically 
significant with number of employees in OLS regression using the last full year of operations 
and in panel data regression. Firms maybe borrowing more to generate revenue or invest in 
tangible assets rather than hire new employees. 
The diversity index of credit sources has a different relationship with growth. 
Diversity index of credit sources is negative and statistically significant with revenue in both 
OLS regression analyses for both revenue and number of revenue and number of employees. 
This suggests that a diversity of credit source usage in the form of dollar value is negatively 
associated with firm growth. 
Examining Surviving and Growth Firms Separately 
The previous analyses in this section used survival and growth as the dependent 
variables on the entire data set. However, there are different variations of growth rates 
among new firms as some firms grow quickly and others don't. This could be attributed to 
the goals of the founders (Cassar, 2004; Vos et aI., 2007). Some founders want to build firms 
that grow quickly while others want to start firms that stay small and are stable (i.e. lifestyle 
businesses). Firms that grow tend to survive longer (e.g. Phillips & Kirchhoff, 1989). The 
results in the previous analyses, in general, indicate multiple credit source usage has a 
positive relationship with growth, but a negative relationship with survival. With the two 
relationships being in opposite directions for the different performance measures, this 
suggests that nuances exist within the firms that grow faster and survive longer than other 
firms. Thus, I split up the data into four subsets based upon survival and growth. I perform 
additional analyses on each of the four quadrants in the 2x2 framework (see Figure 23). In 
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this case, survival and growth are used as the grouping variables as opposed to the dependent 
variables when using the 2x2 framework. 
Firms are allocated into the four quadrants of the 2x2 box framework, surviving / 
non-surviving and medium-to-high growth / low-to-medium growth firms46 • Medium-to-
high growth, surviving firms (quadrant 4) are defined as firms that are still operating 
independently after six years and are above the mean of the growth parameter (revenue, 
employees) for at least two years or in year six. Low-to-medium growth, surviving firms 
(quadrant 3) are determined to be below the mean of the growth parameter (revenue, 
employees). Low-to-med growth, non-surviving firms (quadrant 2) are defined as firms in 
the data set that close before or in year six and are not above the mean for the growth 
parameters (revenue, employees) for less than two years. Medium-to-high growth, non-
surviving firms (quadrant 1) are defined as firms that close before or in year six in the data 
set and are above the mean for the growth parameters (revenue, employees) for less than two 
years. Figure 21 and Figure 22 provide graphical illustrations of the grouping criteria using 
the growth rates in revenue and employees for five example firms. The trends of each firm 
can be compared to the mean growth trend to show why each firm is placed into each of the 
four quadrants. Figure 23 presents the number of firms in each quadrant based upon the 
selected growth parameter (revenue, employees). 
46 The categorization of growth is based upon the mean of the revenue and number of employee variables for 
the firms in the dataset. Using the mean to split high and low growth firms is similar to how a competitive 
advantage is defined by Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, and Schaefer (2009). They define a firm having a 
competitive advantage if the firm earns a higher rate of economic profit than the average rate of economic profit 
of other firms competing in the same market. 
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Figure 23: 2x2 Framework - # of Firms in each Quadrant 
Firm Survival 
2 
Low to Med 
Med to High 
I'll 
Closed Survive 
Rev: 340 finns, Rev: 943 FInns 
1,4040bs 5,6580bs 
Emp:274 fimls Emp: 804 finns 
1, 1550bs 4,8240bs 
Rev: 43 FInns Rev: 308 firms 
1850bs 1,8480bs 
Emp: 109 finns Emp: 447 fimls 
4340bs 2,6820bs 
Total sample: 1,634 finns , 9,095 obs 
Data sets: 8 (2 for each quadrant) 
Grouping criteria: 
Survival: survive or close during 6 year period 
3 
4 
Growth : growth above or below the mean for at least any two years or above mean the last year of operations 
Growth is measured in 2 ways: I) by revenue (Rev) 2) by number of employees (Emp) 
Analysis is perfonned on each of these data sets for both revenue and number of 
employees, along with analysis on only surviving / non-surviving firms and medium-to-high 
growth / low-to-med growth firms . Table 44 presents the summary of these results. 
Table 44: Summary of Results by Survival, Growth, and Quadrants 
OLS Regression Sun·j"al Analysis Growth Cun 'cAnalysls Panel Data Regression 
Independent Variables: Independent Variables: wI Time wI Time 
Last Year Lc\'cls End of First Year Lo\'e1s In\'arlanl Vars YIU)'ing Vars 
MuhiE:ic Credit Source Variable DV: Ase DV; Rc\' DV: Em!:!! DV: As:c DV: Rc\ ) V: ElitE: Event. Closure Event. Closure DV: Rc\ DV: Em!?:s DV: Rc\' DV: Eml?:s 
Only SUI"" j"ing Firms (N - 1.2SI ) 
Num ber a rTatal Cred it Sources N .~ Pos ... "IS "A " ", , .\ \,jA ", Neg Po. .. Po, 
Num ber of Unique Credit SOUft:CS '" Pos •• N, " .. \S \S " ., N A \, NS Po, Po, Di\'crsit~ Jndex af Cred it Sources " .\ \' '" , A " 'S N \ " .. " "<' Neg Neg 
Only Non-Surviving Firms (N -= 383) 
Nu mber orTOlal Credit Sources Neg • ~~ ,~ " " Pos • POS1 ,~ " ~S Po, " Number of Unique Credil Sources Neg ••• " " Neg ' " Pos •• POS1 'S " ~~ ~S ~~ Di versity Index of Credit Sources Neg •• N~ ,~ ,~ " ,~ " \S Neg NS Neg Neg .. 
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OLS Regression Survh al Anah'sls Growth Curve Anal"sis Panel Data Re8!cssion 
Covariates: Covarimes: Time Invariant TimcVorying 
Independem Variab les Last Year Le\cls End of First Year Le\'els Variables Variables 
Multiple Crcdit Source Variable DV: Age DV: Rc\ DV; Em~ DV: Age DV. Re" )V: Em~ E\cn!. Closure E\cnt Closure DV: Re\' DV: Emps DV: Rc\' DV. Emps 
Only Mcd·to-High Growth Finns; Re\'en ue (N ,.. 351 ; Closed - 43) 
Number ofTotnl Credit Sources \5 Po, ... ,,~ Neg • N, N, " N5 "S Neg 'IS Po, Numberof Unique Crodi t Sourccs ,,~ Pos . !\S \, !\~ !\~ S \, ", !\S 1\" '" Di\'ersi~ Index of Credit Sources ,., "S '5 ,., 'S ,., ,., !\, "., "., Neg ,s 
Only Lo\\ -to· Mod Growth Finns: Re\'cnue (N '"' 1,283: Closed =240) 
Number of Total Credit Sources Neg •• Po, ... ,., Neg .. Ncg .. 'is !\" 'IS ,,~ Neg Po, N, 
Number of Unique Crodit Sourccs Neg ... '5 "5 Neg ••• Neg . N" POS I '" I\S '1~ Po, \~ Divcrs l t~ Index of Credit Sources Neg ••• Neg . Po, Neg· Neg ... " N<; ,~ 'IS "- "IS 
Only Med-to-High Growth Firms: Number of Employees (N - 556; Closed - 109) 
NumberorTotal Credit Sources \., Po, ... \S Neg • !\" "" 
,., ", Neg "\\ Po, 
Number or Uniquc Credil Sources Neg •• Po, 1\., Neg . !\" \5 ~\ " " "., ,S 
,., 
Di\'crsit~ Indcx orCrodit Sources Neg •• \., "., , N, \" \, "-~ ,., N~ Neg Neg .. 
Only Low·to·Mcd Growth Firms: Number or Em ployees (N "'" 1,089; Closed '"' 174) 
Number orTotal Credit Sources Neg • Po, ... Pos • Neg .. \., 'IS !\S NS N5 Neg Po, Po, .. 
Numbcror Unique Credit Sourccs Neg ... 'S Po, Neg ... ,S NS POS I 'IS N5 "'~ Po, .. Po, 
Di\'crsi t~ Index or Credil Sources Neg ••• Neg .. \5 Neg • \S Neg •• SS "., "., "5 Neg Po, 
OLS Regression Survival Analysis Growth Cun'eAnal\'sis Pancl Dma Regression 
Co\annlcs: Covariates: Timc Im'ariant Timc Varying 
Independent Variables Last Year Levels End or Firsl Ycar Lc\ cis Variablcs Variables 
Mu ltlF:le Credit Source Variable DV: Ase DV; Rc\ DV; Em~~ DV; A~p DV: Rev)V: Em F: Evcnt: Closurc Evcnt Closure DV: Rc\ DV: EmF:s DV: Rev DV. EmF:s 
Quad 411: Surviving, Med·to-High Growth Finns· Re\'cnue (N = 308) 
NumberorTotaJ Credit Sources ~A Po, ~., ~ .\ ~~ '5 , -\ , -\ ,~ Neg .. ~S Pos 
NumberorUniquc Credit Sources ~ -\ Po, ,,~ , .\ ~S "S " .\ , -\ ,~ ~ ~S ,,~ 
Di \'crsit~ Index or Credit Sources '" \S 'IS " -\ ,~ .. " !\ .. \ " -\ ~S \S Neg '" 
Quad 3a' Sun 'lvlns. Low·to--Med Growth Finns· Re,Tenue (N "" 943) 
NumberorTotal Credit Sources " -\ Pos " " -\ Neg " 'S , .. \ ,~ NS Po, ", Nurubcror Unique Credit Sources " .\ '5 '" " -\ Neg • " ".\ , .\ 'S NS Po, '" Diversity Indcx or Credit Sources " -\ " Po, " .\ Neg ... '> .\ ".\ ,~ NS "S NS 
Quad 211 : Non-Surviving, Low-to-Mod Growth Finl1s • Revcnue eN - 340) 
Number orTolal Credit Sources Neg •• Po, Po, ... "S " ,S POS I " '5 Po, .. 'S NS Number or Uniquc Credit Sources Neg ... N' " Neg • Pos . Po, POS I '" " NS NS NS Di\'crsity Index orCredit Sources Neg _. Neg . Pos . " " N, " " Neg " Po, 'IS 
Quad I a: Non·Sun 'iving, Mcd-to-High Growth Finns· Revenue (N = 43) 
Number orTolal Credit Sources " " N~ " " " '" 'IS ,S NS " !\, Number or Unique Credit Sou~cs 1\.S 1\:\ NS N\ ,;s " POS I ", Neg NS , NS Di\'crsit~ Index or Credit Sources Po, 1',;~ '" ,~ " " N~ " Neg "5 Neg Neg .. 
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OLS Resression Survil'al Analysis Growth Curve Anall'sis Panel Data RCSfCSsion 
Covariates: Covariates: Time I",'srinnt Ti me Varying 
Independent Vanab les Last Year Levels End of First Ycar Lc"cls Variables Variables 
Mullie1e Credit Source Variable DV: A~e DV; Re\ DV; Erne! DV. Age DV: Re\' )V: Emp Event: Closure Event: Closure DV; Rc\ DV: Emps DV: Rc\ DV Emps 
Quad 4b: Surviving, Med· to·High Growth Firms - Number of Employees (N - 447) 
NumbcrofTotal Credit Sources ~, Pas ... \is "A ", "" N , 'A "5 Neg 'S Pos Numbcrof Uniquc Credit Sources " , Pas NS '" ,,"S ~5 N\ " .\ "S " ,,"S NS Di\'crsit) Index of Credit Sources " , " ~S , " 'S 'S "" '\ 'A ""S 'S Neg Neg 
Quad 3b: Survil'lOg. Lo,, -u,.Mcd Growth Firms - Number of Em ployees (N "" 804) 
Number of Total Credit Sources , '\ Pas ... '" " .\ "5 '<S N, 'A N, 'S Pas Pos .. Number of Uniquc Credit Sourees " .\ ~S Pas " , 'S '" "'" ,,\ '5 NS Pas Pas Diversity Index of Credit Sources " Neg .. Nc" ".\ '" Neg •• NA N \ " Neg Neg Pos .. 
Quad 2b: Non-Surviving, Low-lO·Med Growth Finns· Number of Employees (N ., 274) 
Number of Total Credit Sources Neg .. NS \S 'is NS Pos! NS Pas Pas N' 
Numbcrof Unique Credit Soun::cs Neg ... NS " Pas .. " '5 POS I "5 ", '5 'S Pas Di\'ersi t~ Index of Credit Sources Neg • N5 'S \is " " 'S \is Neg " \S NS 
Quad lb. Non-Sur\,ivlng, Med-tcrHigh Growth Firm s - NumbcrofEmployecs (N'" 109) 
Number of Total Credit Sources '" NS NS 'S 'S \5 ,S '5 " "S '5 'S Number of Unique Credit Soun::cs Neg .. NS " "S '" Pos . Pos! ,,"S Neg "- NS " DivCTSl t) Indcx of Cred it Sources NS NS 'S \is " 'S 'IS " 'IS " Neg .. Neg 
DV :. dcpendcnt variables. Neg "" negati\'cl~ rclated with dcpendent , ·ariablc. Pos E positi\cl) related wi th the dependent \'oriablc; NS = not sta l ististjcD II~ significant. N/A "" 110t applicablc 
Statistical significancc: . p < 0.10: · p < 0.005 • •• p < 0.01.· .. p < O.UOI 
Control \'anables include: number of foundcn. cducat ion offoundcrs. type of cducation of mal11 foundcr. wori.. cxpericnce of founders (o\erall). \\ork experiencc of founders (start-up), amount of 
outstwlding debt, amount of ncw CqU lty, agc of founders. gcnder, race, citizenship, technology level, incorponuion (in year I), number of hours worked in venture, founder contributcd equity (in year I). 
Intellectual propert) (an) year), and compctlti\'c ach'antage ovcrcompctitors (an) ycar) Credit crisis is included in survival analysis. growth cUr\'e analysis. and pancl data regression. Locat ion is not 
includcd in growth cun'c analysis as third·lc\·cl variablc 
1 Thc survival analysis "Pos" result is simi lar to the "NegH resu lts in the OLS rcgression since the dependent \ ariablc is codcd oppositc between OLS regression and survival analysis 
I highlight some ofthe important results as they relate to the analyses that use the full 
dataset of firms. In quadrant 3b, for panel data regression, all six of the analyses are 
statistically significant. Number of total credit sources and number of unique credit sources 
are both positively associated with revenue and number of employees. This supports the 
hypothesis that usage of multiple credit sources positively affects growth, when measured as 
the growth in the number of employees for growing firms that survive. However, the 
diversity index of credit sources result is strange because the result for revenue is opposite of 
the result for number of employees. The diversity index of credit sources is negatively 
associated with revenue, which suggests that more diversity of credit sources is associated 
with lower revenue. Therefore, diversity of credit sources is not good for a firm. Or firms 
with less revenue are unable to diversify their usage of credit over multiple credit sources or 
are able to obtain all they need from one credit source (i .e. they do not experience credit 
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rationing). Since the panel data regression handles the longitudinal data, we can say that 
diversity of credit sources is associated with lower revenue, especially when lagging the 
multiple credit source variables47 • This analysis is not reported in the table, but when I 
performed the analysis with lagging the diversity index of credit source variable, the result is 
still negative and statistically significant. Thus, of the firms that don't grow very much, 
diverse usage of credit sources is not a prudent financing strategy. It could be that these 
firms are the living dead, and are just hanging on, when they should be closing. And to 
explain the positive association between diversity of credit sources and number of 
employees, the results might be suggesting that firms at the top end of the spectrum of slow 
growth firms (i.e. the fastest growth firms within the group of low-to-medium growth firms) 
implement a diverse use of credit sources to not be reliant upon anyone credit source to fund 
labor costs when they are not growing quickly (i.e. when they are growing slowly). 
In quadrant 1 a, the quadrant for non-surviving, medium-to-high growth firms 
(amount of revenue), in the OLS regression, there is only one relation that is statistically 
significant. The last year diversity index of credit sources is positively related to age at 2009 
(the proxy for survival in the OLS regression). This relationship is statistically significant at 
the p < 0.05 level. This indicates that the more diverse the usage of credit sources the last 
year, the longer the firm that will ultimately close within 6 years will live. In other words, 
firms that will ultimately close within six years try to stay alive by tapping into other types of 
credit sources. However, the diverse use of credit sources does not stop the firm from 
eventually closing. 
47 By lagging the multiple credit source variables, there is a stronger case for causation rather than only 
association with the dependent variables (survival and growth). However, I still say "associate" because I am 
not able to control for all other plausible explanations since I am not running an experiment. 
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Quadrant la only has this one statistically significant relationship in the OLS 
regression results. The lack of statistical significance in quadrant 1 a could be due to the low 
number of observations ( 43 firms). 
Statistical Testing for Reasoning of the Hypotheses 
The reasoning for my original two hypotheses is that being resourceful in financing 
by using multiple credit sources leads to an increase in survival and growth rates because 
using multiple credit sources provides additional funds for the new firm. Hypothesis 1, 
which dealt with survival rates, is not supported. However, hypothesis 2, which dealt with 
growth rates, is supported. To determine if the reasoning is correct for hypothesis 2, it is 
necessary to perform additional analysis. The logic presented to predict that multiple credit 
source usage leads to growth is that using mUltiple credit sources leads to the firm being able 
to access additional funds, and these additional funds improves firm performance. However, 
another reason why multiple credit usage leads to growth could be so that new firms are not 
reliant upon the survival or market power of one financing source when using multiple credit 
sources (Detragiache et aI., 2000) and new firms could possibly have more pricing power 
when using multiple credit sources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) (resource dependence 
argument). 
The resource dependency argument could possibly be the reason why new firms use 
multiple credit sources. Even though banks are the most used credit source by new and 
young firms, entrepreneurs may be hesitant to solely use one bank as they mistrust banks 
(Howorth, 2001). Even though most entrepreneurs don't switch banks (Howorth, Peel, & 
Wilson, 2003), they are not trusting of banks because the entrepreneur fears the possible loss 
of control in his/her business (Binks, 1991; J. E. Bolton, 1971; Cosh & Hughes, 1994). 
Entrepreneurs start firms because they want to be autonomous (N. M. Carter, Gartner, 
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Shaver, & Gatewood, 2003), so they are hesitant to take any form of external funding if 
possible. However, entrepreneurs are financially constrained and thus they need to take 
external funding if they are to operate their firm (e.g. Evans & Jovanovic, 1989; Evans & 
Leighton, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et aI., I 994b; Lindh & Ohlsson, 1996). The lack of trust in 
banks is especially evident when banks use heavy monitoring tactics, as entrepreneurs 
perceive heavy monitoring as an indication of a lack of trust (Howorth & Moro, 2006). A 
lack of trust in the banks by entrepreneurs leads to new firms possibly taking less in funds 
from a bank than they need to be properly capitalized, and instead working with mUltiple 
credit sources. 
Detragiache et al. (2000) suggest that firms may have an incentive to diversify across 
many relationships. This is especially the case when the risk of losing a given creditor 
relationship is high. In investigating Italian firms, Detragiache et al. (2000) find that to 
guarantee its survival, a firm will insure itself against the loss of a credit source by 
maintaining multiple credit relationships. Thus, multiple banking relationships protect the 
borrower against a sudden deterioration of the liquidity position of the bank (Detragiache et 
aI., 2000). 
Guiso & Minetti (2004, 20 10) find that a firm is able to allocate information rights 
across multiple banks to prevent the banks from controlling the relationship. Firms with 
more valuable and more homogenous assets are able to differentiate borrowing across 
creditors. Borrowing differentiation is inversely related to restructuring costs and positively 
related to the informational transparency of the firm. Their main conclusion is that the 
structure of credit relationships is used to keep creditors and borrowers in check so to not 
abuse the relationship. This is also the reason that Houston & James (1996) suggest when 
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they find a negative relationship between the number of banking relationships and growth 
with large publicly traded firms, but a positive relationship between the number of non-bank 
financial relationships and growth. 
Young firms pay higher average interest rates than old firms (M. A. Petersen & 
Raj an, 1995). However, competition from additional credit sources eliminates these 
excessive rents (Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990). This is also seen by Bonfim, Dai, & Franco 
(2008) in a data set of small, medium, and large firms in Portugal that spanned from 1996 to 
2004. Their analysis shows that when a firm borrows from more than one bank, the interest 
rate on bank loans becomes 12 to 33 basis points lower on average. In addition, as long as 
firms limit their search to just a few creditors, firms seeking financing from multiple banks 
reduce the chance of being denied credit (Thakor, 1996). 
To determine if multiple credit sources are being used to obtain additional funds, I 
run OLS regression, growth curve analysis, and panel data regression analyses using 
outstanding debt as the dependent variable and multiple credit sources as the independent 
variables. When running OLS regression, and using the last year of full operation variables, 
all three mUltiple credit source variables are positive and statistically significant with 
outstanding debt. Growth curve analysis also indicates a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between multiple credit sources and outstanding debt. When running panel data 
regression with debt as the dependent variable, the same result is obtained. All three multiple 
credit variables are positive and statistically significant with outstanding debt. These results 
support the reason why multiple credit sources are used - to obtain additional funds. Table 
45, Table 46, and Table 47 show the results for the OLS regression, growth curve analysis, 
and panel data regression. 
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Table 45: OLS Regression Results - Dependent Variable: Outstanding Debt 
Standardized Standardized Standardu.cd 
Coefficient t-\alue S.g Coefficient '-,alue Sig. Coefficient (-,alue Sig 
Number or Total Credit Sources CUSS 11.66K <(l.OO! .... 
Number of Umque Credll Sources 0407 17498 <0 unl ... 
01\ crsi~ oflndex of Credit Sources 0.657 34.915 <(1.00) ••• 
Number of Founders 0049 1.859 0.063 (l.OM 2.622 0009 •• 0.057 2846 0.004 •• 
EducatIOn of Founders -0.087 -3250 O.UOI •• -0092 -3.622 <u.on) ... -0078 -3.835 <0.001 ... 
T~ pc of Education of Mam Founder 0.037 1.464 0144 0.044 I.K31 0067 0.0}4 0.708 0.479 
Work E'Xpericncc of Founders (o\"crall) 0041 1.451 0147 0021 U 772 0.440 0032 1495 0135 
Wor}.. Expenence of Founders (start-up) 0.043 1.678 0.094 0.047 1.924 0055 0.032 1.631 0.103 
Amount of Ncy, Equity 0.042 1.695 0.090 0.040 1702 0.089 0001 0.072 0943 
Age of Founders -0038 -1.377 0169 -U,(J24 -().902 0.367 -0.006 -0.230 0.818 
Gender 0.011 0,454 0650 o (JOS 0322 0.747 O.U(); 0242 U.8U9 
Race ·0.041 -1.6U2 0109 -0 U25 -1039 0.299 ..0.034 -1.728 0.084 
Citizenship OU03 0123 0.902 0008 0.322 U.747 -U.OO9 -0.468 0640 
Tcchnolog~ Level -0029 -1153 U.249 -U.037 -1.542 0.123 -0.006 -0.310 0.757 
Producti Sen Ice 0.155 6.103 <0001 .o. U.143 5.923 <0.00) ••• U.l34 6.893 <0001 ... 
Incorporation (in ~ear 1) 0.U35 1401 0.161 0.047 1986 U 047 • 0022 I 158 () 247 
Commitment to Venture 
Number of Hours Worked in Venture U 097 3.011 <().OOI .. 0 U.091 3792 <0.001 ••• 0056 2.896 0004 •• 
Founder Contributed Equit:'o (in ~ear I) 0.062 2.358 0.019 • 0.049 1973 0.049 • 0.067 3.374 0.001 •• 
QUall~ of Business Idea 
Intellectual Property (any year) o.O()() 0018 0.985 -(l.OOS -0.33U 0.742 -0006 -0.314 0753 
Competitive Adyantage 0\ er Competitors (any year) -0007 -0294 0.769 0011 U457 0.648 O.O(J4 0.210 0.834 
Rc\enue o U50 1496 0.135 u 033 1.072 U.284 0.064 2546 O.otl • 
Number of Empl~ees (J.()46 1422 0.155 (J.OS; 1.768 0.077 . -0.006 -0230 U.818 
R' 0]90 0.271 0.526 
Adjusted R' u 178 0261 () 519 
Statistical sigmficance 'p < (l.IO,· p < 0.05.·· p < U 01: *u p < 0 001 
N° 1.643 
Dependent' ariablc Amount of outstanding deblln last r ull ~ car 
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Table 46: Growth Curve Analysis Results - Dependent Variable: Outstanding Debt 
Parameter 
FIxed Effects 
InitiaJ status. 110J 
Intercept Boo 









B,. ,,, (TECH) 
f"" (PROD _ SERV) 
B,." (lNCORP) 
B"" (EQUITY F) 
B ... " (IP) 
B,." (COMADV) 
Rate of change. 1t 1,1 (TIME) 
Intercept B I" 









B, '" (TECH) 
f,,, (PROD_SERV) 
B,,, (IN CORP) 
B, " (EQUITYF) 
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Rate of change;. Jt._.r(TIME:) 
Intercept B:1l 
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-0 177 0.859 
0.705 0.481 
0.048 0.962 













Number of Unique Credit Sources 


















































3.829 -2.228 0.026 
0.987 -1420 0.156 
0335 -0421 0.674 
1488 -0.125 0.900 
0066 -I 554 0 120 
1262 -0110 0.913 
0.062 0.539 0.590 
I 569 1.697 0090 
2015 0.480 0631 
2.874 -1.1 86 0236 
1259 0.595 0.552 
1271 -1759 0.079 
1424 -1206 0.228 
0.075 -0064 0.949 
1249 0.314 0.754 
1.939 1.142 0.254 
1.293 1.123 0262 
0290 -1.131 0258 
0110 -0036 0972 
0508 0.185 0.853 
0022 1.504 0.133 
0,409 0809 0419 
0.021 -1083 0279 
0.516 (l.053 0957 
0.685 -0.941 0347 
0.976 0.124 0746 
o 4Il 0.884 0.377 
0404 -1628 0.104 
0433 1443 0.149 
0.024 -0070 0944 
0,415 0.582 0.561 
0.708 -0.785 0.432 
0229 -0917 0359 
0050 0871 0.384 
0.019 0.229 0.819 
o 088 0284 0 776 
0004 -IA33 0.152 
0072 -0731 0465 
0.004 0974 0)30 
0091 -0.107 0915 
o 120 0797 0,425 
0.170 -0015 0988 
0.072 -1066 0.287 
0071 I 239 0215 
0.076 ~l.891 0)73 
0.004 0.180 0857 
0.073 -0.612 0541 
0124 0899 0)69 
Diversity Index of Unique Credit Sources 

















































0721 -12840 0.000 
o 189 -0,468 0.640 
0.062 0958 0338 
0281 -0.251 0.802 
0.012 -1349 0.178 
0.235 0738 0,460 
0.012 -0.355 0.722 
0.293 0912 0.362 
0.187 -0.842 0.400 
0503 0.234 0.815 
0.235 -0.533 0.594 
0.239 -1.083 0.279 
0.265 -1016 0310 
0014 1.092 0.275 
0.236 0.439 0.661 


































































MCS. '" (MCS) 
Intercept ~'I) 
Slope ~., (SIZEIT) 
~,,(EDU) 
~ .. (EDUT) 
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B, " (PROD _ SERV) 
~'" (lNC'ORP) 
~, " (EQUllYF) 
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Hours Worked. ll.u(HRS) 
Intercept B, (> 











B, " (INCORP) 
~". (EQUllYF) 
~'" (lP) 
~, " (COMADV) 
Rcvenue.1l6J (REVENUE) 
Intercept j1(,{1 
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-D 946 0.344 
I 828 0068 
-0.808 0419 
-0.492 0623 





I 052 0.293 
-0.213 0.831 
-D 803 0.422 
1927 0.054 



























Number of Unique Credit Sources 


































































I 108 10151 0.000 
0.240 -1.397 0162 
0.092 -4 159 0.000 
0.423 -0230 0.818 
0019 -1.700 0.089 
0347 2.123 0034 
0.019 -0006 0995 
0445 1011 0.312 
0.539 1.820 0069 
0767 -1.406 0160 
0.346 -1423 0.155 
0341 0.535 0593 
0.355 -0.293 0.769 
0020 0.124 0.901 
0.350 -D 199 0.842 
0.578 -0686 0.493 
0.064 0478 0.633 
0.014 0.284 0.776 
0.005 1.594 0.111 
0023 2868 0.004 
0001 2.129 0.033 
0.019 0.640 0.522 
0.001 -I 867 0062 
0.025 1.145 0.252 
0.032 -1043 0297 
0.044 1.370 0.171 
0.019 -0.545 0.586 
0.019 -0.192 0.848 
0.020 I 718 0.086 
0.001 0.276 0783 
0020 1.804 0.071 
0035 -1461 0.144 
0031 0649 0.516 
0.006 0840 0401 
o 003 1.093 0.274 
0.012 -1427 0.154 
0000 2.330 0020 
0009 -I 180 0238 
0001 -1.288 0.198 
0.012 0.301 0.763 
o 015 1.203 0.229 
0.022 -1881 0060 
0010 -1361 0174 
0.009 -0.272 0786 
0.010 0.644 0.519 
0.001 0,424 0.672 
0.010 -0.333 0.739 
0.017 -0.136 0.892 
0.355 -D 600 0548 
0.086 I 839 0066 
0.031 0.209 0.834 
o 112 0.989 0.323 
0.0058 0.190 0.850 
0113 0111 0912 
0.0058 0266 0791 
o 145 -1.760 0079 
0.177 -0 829 0.407 
0.253 1.685 0.092 
o 112 -0.432 0.666 
0115 2467 0014 
0.127 0.826 0.409 
0.0066 -0003 0.998 
o 112 -0.374 0.708 
0.179 -0906 0365 
Diversity Index of Unique Credit Sources 

































































0.980 33.339 0.000 
0.207 3 164 0.002 
o 083 2 055 0.040 
0375 -0.81l 0.416 
0017 1,443 0.149 
0304 0350 0.727 
0016 -D.023 0.981 
0.389 -I 688 0092 
0464 -2240 0.025 
0699 -0.676 0499 
0.305 -0.998 0.318 










































































































Number of Employees. It./(EMPS) 
Intercept f\-.I) 















Credit Crisis. lt~AECONOMY) 
Intercept flX,li 









B .. ", (TECH) 
B,,, (PROD_SERV) 
B,,, (INCORP) 
B, p (EQUITY F) 
B,,, (lP) 
B", (COMADV) 
NumbcrofLcve1-1 untts (observations) 




Number of Total Credit Sources 






































































































StatistlcaJ sigmficance. p < 0.10, * p < 0 05. ** P < 001. *** P < (J.(lOI 
Dependent vanable Number of employees 
Number of Unique Credit Sources 






































0.122 -0469 0.639 
0.027 0755 0450 
0010 0.215 0.830 
0047 0.733 OA64 
o 002 -0.904 0366 
0.038 0286 0.775 
0.002 0.527 0598 
0.047 -0103 0.918 
0064 -J51O 0131 
0.089 -0.158 0.875 
0038 0.059 0.953 
0037 -I III 0.267 
0.041 0.991 0322 
0.002 I 689 009 I 
0038 -1211 0.226 
0067 1301 0193 
1.289 -0.722 0.471 
0.279 2.425 0015 
0108 -0196 0844 
OA81 -0382 0.703 
0022 0.264 0792 
0.399 -0332 0740 
0.02 I -0.033 0.974 
0515 0.214 0.831 
0.660 1495 0135 
0.906 -0.606 0.544 
0401 -0794 0427 
0394 J.520 0 129 
0418 -2.124 0.034 
o 023 -0.668 0.504 
0404 -0423 0672 
0.698 0308 0.758 
Diversity Index of Unique Credit Sources 






































































































The thud level (location) variables are not mcluded In the results as none of the variables are statlstJeally significant. and b~ leaVing them out of the results it saves space for the more tmportant 
results 
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Table 47: Panel Data Regression - Dependent Variable: Outstanding Debt 
Estimate t-\a!ue Pr(>ltl) Estimate t-\a!ue P«>ltl) Estimate t-,atuc Pr(>ltl) 
NumbcrorTotal Crc(h! Sources 1859 
Number of Unique Credit Sources 
DI\'ersity Index of Credit Sources 
Amount of Nc\\ Eqult~ () 018 
Commitment to Venture 
Number of Hours Worked in Venture 0.023 
Credll (nsis 0.116 
Rc\cnuc 0.125 
Numbcr of Employees 0.109 
R' 0.168 




Statistical significance' p < 0.10, '" p < 0 OS. ** P < U 01;""* p < 0 001 
Dependent \ ariable' Outstandmg debt 
Unbalanced panel 
n = 1560T=I-6. N=6,.'i69 
Individual Credit Sources Analysis 
30703 <0001 ... 
1433 0.152 
2727 0.006 .. 
0.579 (1563 
1 191 0234 
3.764 <(J.OO) ••• 
6.940 52.660 <0.001 ... 
32.989 300.518 
0004 0.323 0.747 -0.001 -0.388 
0.0)6 2.201 0.028 • 0006 3086 
0.263 1.494 0.135 0.076 L523 
0.028 0.310 0.757 0.019 0.709 













multiple credit sources. However, it could be that one individual credit source is driving the 
results. Thus, I performed the same analyses (OLS regression, Probit regression, survival 
analysis, growth curve modeling, and panel data regression) by unpacking the credit sources 
and including each credit source individually in each analysis. 
Credit obtained from family members, when measured by the number of total credit 
sources (i.e. total number of family members which provided credit to the firm), is 
statistically significant and negatively associated with survival. This suggests that new firms 
that obtain credit from a large number of family members have a lower rate of survival. 
When measuring credit sources by unique credit source used by a new firm (i.e. a 
dichotomous measurement of credit source - 0 or 1), credit card institutions, owners, and 
family members are statistically significant and negatively associated with survival. Thus, if 
new firms use credit cards, have owners that provide credit to the firm, or use credit provided 
by a family member, the firms experience lower survival rates. Credit obtained from non-
bank financial institutions is statistically significant and negatively associated with survival 
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only when the credit is obtained in the first year. This different to the findings in Astebro 
and Bernhardt (2003), where they find a loan obtained from a bank in the first year is 
negatively related to survival. 
For growth, when the dependent variable is revenue and number of employees, credit 
obtained from banks is statistically significant and positively related for both measurements -
number of total credit sources and number of unique credit sources. This suggests that 
financing from banks can be helpful in growing new firms (e.g. Huyghebaert et aI., 2007). In 
addition, bank credit obtained in the first year is associated with growth. This result provides 
an interesting scenario based upon credit from banks in the first year also being negatively 
associated with survival (as mentioned in the previous paragraph). 
Credit from non-bank financial institutions is statistically significant positively 
associated with revenue growth when measured by the number of total credit sources (in the 
growth curve analysis). Credit from employees is statistically significant and positively 
associated with revenue growth for both number of total credit sources and number of unique 
credit sources (in the growth curve analysis). Credit card usage in the first year, as measured 
by the number of unique credit sources, is statistically significant and negatively related with 
revenue growth (in OLS regression). 
Table 48 provides a summary of the results for the analysis using individual credit 
sources. 
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Table 48: Summary of Results for Individual Credit Sources 
OLSRe!!:res~")11 Problt Rel:lressloll SUJ"\i\al Anal\~I~ Grn\\1hCurveAnalvsls Pane! Datil Rel:lre~~l(m 
lndependentVanables Independent Vanllblc~ IndcpendentVurs IndcpcndcntVars . Time . Time 
La~1 YellT l.<:\eI .. f'od offusl Year Lc\cls LaslYear End of Finil Year In\lmantVar~ VaT'vlngVars 
DV Age IJV Rc\ [)V Emf" DV A~e nv Re\)V ErnE DV Closure [)V Closure hent Closure E\en! Cl0.~ure DVRe\ lJV Emps DV Re\ IJV Emps 



















Pns ... Po, 
Pl>~ 
Neg ••• 




Po, .. Pus 
Neg •• 
Pos' I'os' I'os' 
... Po, .. Po, 
Neg ••• Neg •• Pn~l Pas' Pas' 
Neg' I'o~' Pos' Pm' 
])V dependent \anahle. Neg negatl\eh related "lth dependent \anable. Po~ ro~1tlveh related "lth the dependent \anable. NS not stati~tl~tH;all~ MgIllfio.;.ant 
Statl~tlcal ~lgtllflcano,;e • p 005.·· P 00 I . ... P 0.00 I 
Po, ... Pm. . .. Pm 
Po, Pn~ .. 
Po, Po, 
Pos . .. 




Control \anable~ mdude number offounder~. educat]{nl offoundeN. 1"f'C nfeducatlOn oj mam founder. "or].. expcnellcc of founde", (u\era1!). "or].. expcnence of founder, (start-up). amoont of outstarJdmg debt. amount ofnev. eqU1~. age oj 
founder, gender. race. citi,en~hlp. technolog\ le\e!. mcotpJratwn (10 ,ear I). number of hOOT_ "or]"ed 10 \enture. founder contnbuted equI~ (m ~'ear 1). mte1!ectual propert\ (an~ ~ear). and c{lmpetltl~e ad\anlage o\er competltor,(an~ ~ear) 
Credit cns" I~ mduded m sUT\l\alanal~sl'. grol>.lh cun'c anahsl~. and panel data regressioo Location I~ not mc1uded m gnll>.th eUT\'e analyst, a~ third-level \'anable 
I The "Pm" re"ull In Problt relUes~lon and wr\l\al anal\,t, t~ ~lmllar to the ''Neg'' result, 111 the OLS regre~sloll Since the dependent \anahle IS coded 0ppo~lte between OLS regre;sion and Problt regresslOfl survi\al anal~'sl' 
These results suggest a couple of individual credit sources are associated with 
survival and performance. However, individual credit source usage is not a measure of 
resourceful financing. Rather, being resourceful in a financing strategy is in the form of 
using a combination of sources. Thus, the analysis using individual credit sources only 
provides additional information about which individual credit sources might be more 
important than others (i.e. to better understand which individual credit source might be 
driving the multiple credit source results). 
Formal vs. Informal Credit Sources Analysis 
The individual credit sources might not be associated with survival and growth. 
Moreover, after seeing the multiple credit sources associated with survival and growth, it 
might be interesting to see what bundles of multiple credit sources are most important. Past 
research has examined credit sources based upon formal and informal structures (e.g. 
Ayyagari et aI., 2010; Beck et aI., 2008; Cassar, 2004). Formal credit sources are banks, 




whereas informal credit sources are owners, employees, family members, friends, and other 
individuals. I perform the same analyses (OLS regression, survival analysis, growth curve 
modeling, and panel data regression) replacing the multiple credit source variables into just 
two categories: formal and informal credit sources. 
In OLS regression, with the variables for the last full year of operations, both formal 
and informal credit sources are negative and statistically significant with age at 2009 (the 
survival proxy). This is similar to the results from the analyses using the initial multiple 
credit sources variables. When the dependent variable is revenue, only the formal multiple 
credit source variable is statistically significant. The association between the formal multiple 
credit source variable and revenue is positive. This suggests the combination of formal credit 
sources is driving the association with revenue growth in the last full year of operations. 
This is the same story that the main analysis is indicating. When the dependent variable is 
number of employees, the formal multiple credit source variable is positive and statistically 
significant. In the main analysis, this relationship was not statistically significant. These 
results with formal mUltiple credit sources indicate the relationship is stronger with the 
formal multiple credit source variable than the initial mUltiple credit source variable. 
When using the first year levels of the variables, both the formal and informal 
multiple credit sources are negative and statistically significant with age at 2009. This is 
similar to the last full year of operations variables and the main analyses. The formal and 
informal mUltiple credit source variables are not statistically significant with revenue and 
number of employees. This is consistent with the results when using the initial multiple 
credit source variables as independent variables. 
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Table 49: Summary of Results for Formal vs. Informal Credit Sources 
OLSRe/:fn'~s!(lI1 Proll!! Regre~~lOn SUr\'!\aIAnal\sls Gro"'thCurveAnal\sls Panel DalaRegress,oo 
Independent Vanah1es Independent Vanables indcl"v'11dentVars IndependentVars '" TIme \\ TIme 
Last Year Le\el~ ~nd nfFlTs\ Year J.A!\cls Lasl Year End ofFIT1;\ Year [nvaoan! VaTS Van 109 Var~ 
[)V Age DV Rev DV Erne' lJV Age DV Rc\ )V Emp DV Closure DV Closure F\'ent C[!Xure F\enl' Closure DV Rc\ DV Emps DV Rc\ DV [mps 
Number of Total Credl! Source~ 




Neg •• Pos' •• Pn~ ••• p(l~" Po~ 0" Pus ••• 
Number oj Umque Credll Source, 
Formal Credit ~)urce, 
lnfonnalCredit Sources 
1'0' ••• Po, ••• Neg •• 





DV dependent \'anable. Neg negali\el~ related I'.llh dependent ,'anable. Po~ posltl~e!~ related \\Ith Ihcdependenl \anab!e NS - not stati~tlstica1!~ slgIlllicant 
Slali~h~al ~Ig",ficance • p 005, ** P O.OI.·u P O(Kll 
Pn~ •.• Pns ••• Pns ••• 
Control \anables lIlclude number \lffoolldcr~_ edllcahon ofloullders. I~pe nf edu~auon ofmalll foonder. "'or1. expenence of foundeN (merall). \\ort.. expenence of founders (start-up). amounl of outstandmg. debt. amount ofne\\ eqtnl). age of 
founder.. gender. race. citll:enshlp. technolog, leveL mcorporatlon (m ~eaT I). number ofhoor~ \\ort..ed m venture. founder contributed I;)qult>. (111 \ear I). II1tellectual prope~ (an~' ~ear). and competitive ad\antage over competitors (an~ ~'ear) 
Credit cn~l\ I~ II1cluded 111 sUT\I\al anal~'sl~. grll\\lh curve anah SIS. and panel dota Tegre~SI\)f] location IS not II1cluded 111 gro\\lh cune anal~sis as thlrd-leH:l \ariable 
I I he "Pm" re .. ul1m Pfoblt regressIon and sUf\Jval anal~~J~ I~ ~Imllar to the "Neg" result .. in the OLS regrcsslon Mncc Ihe dependent \anable I~ coded 0pPl'~Jle Ol;)t\\"",'11 ()L~ regressIOn and Prohlt regressIOn sunl\ol anal~sls 
Robustness Checks with the Credit Crisis Variable 
The exact time period during which the great recession of 2008-2009 affected finns' 
ability to raise capital might not coincide with the exact time of the recession. The NBER 
indicated the recession was 18 months from December 2007 through June 2009. The 
recession could be more of a factor than the credit crisis. Therefore, I ran a robustness check 
removing the credit crisis variable and replacing it with the recession variable, which is 
similar to the credit crisis variable in the analyses that included the variable (i.e. survival 
analysis, growth curve modeling, and panel data regression). The variable is a dichotomous 
variable, but has 1 for years 2008 and 2009 rather than 2007 and 2008. Years 2004-2007 are 
O. The results are similar to the analyses which used the credit crisis variable. This would 
indicate that it doesn't make a difference is the credit crisis or the recession variable is used 
in terms of the findings related to multiple credit source usage. 
Conclusion of the Results 
In this section, I presented the results of several analyses using OLS regression, 
Probit regression, survival analysis, growth curve analysis, and panel data regression. These 
additional analyses were perfonned to check the robustness of the results of the main 
analysis. Hypothesis I and 2 are not fully supported when using the entire sample. 
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However, when performing additional analyses based upon grouping the firms by survival 
and growth, hypothesis 2 is supported for firms that survive and have medium-to-high 
growth. Hypothesis 1 is still not supported in the additional analyses. Rather than finding a 
positive relationship between multiple credit sources and survival, the results indicate a 
negative relationship. 
In conclusion, when examining the results ofOLS regression, Probit regression, 
survival analysis, growth curve analysis, and panel data regression, the results indicate that 
firms that use multiple credit sources are associated with a lower chance of survival. Overall, 
however, for those firms that survive, higher multiple credit source usage is associated with 
higher growth rates. These results suggest that being resourceful in financing in the form of 
multiple credit source usage is beneficial to new firms that are already growing faster than 
average, but not new firms that are growing slower than average. This could indicate the 
multiple credit source financing strategy should be used because the firm wants to use 
multiple credit sources, not because it has to use multiple credit sources. The use of multiple 
credit sources cannot be used by creditors as a signal to determine the survival and growth of 
firms during the early years of operations. It is only after the third or fourth year that the use 
of multiple credit sources provides a positive or negative signal to external entities such as 
creditors. 
Robustness checks were performed for various purposes. First, statistical analyses 
were performed to determine if the logic behind the theory is correct. The results suggest the 
logic that multiple credit sources are used to obtain additional funds as opposed to lowering 
the dependence on one resource. In addition, additional statistical analyses indicate that 
several banks are still a large influence on firm performance. However, the combination of 
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the individual credit source analysis and the main analysis performed in this study on 
mUltiple credit sources indicate that non-traditional credit sources used in combination have 
an affect on firm performance. This is further supported in the additional analyses performed 
between formal and information credit sources. The number of total formal credit sources 
has a positive influence on growth, while the number of total formal credit sources has no 
effect on survival unless used in the first year. In that case, formal credit sources have a 
negative influence on survival. The number of unique informal credit sources has a negative 
effect on survival. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this study, I pose the question ifbeing resourceful in financing by using multiple 
credit source usage affects the performance of new firms. The results do not provide a 
simple answer to the question. Rather, the results suggest that survival and growth factors 
playa role in answering the question. Although there are strengths in the study that help 
answer the research question, there are limitations that could call into question the 
conclusions and that require further research to fully answer the research question, including 
the possibility of endogeneity being present in the model. In this chapter, I discuss the 
results, the strengths and limitations of the study, and provide suggestions for further 
research. 
Theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 2 lead to two hypotheses that predict a 
positive relationship between multiple credit source usage and performance. However, the 
results suggest this theory is contingent on whether a new firm is growing or not. Thus, if the 
new firm is growing above average, then the theory holds for growth but not for the 
relationship between multiple credit sources and survival. The results of the analysis suggest 
that using multiple credit sources is beneficial for growth firms, as using multiple credit 
sources leads to additional funds that are used to help them grow faster. This is shown in the 
results as multiple credit sources are associated with higher growth for this set of firms. The 
need for additional credit (external funds) for growth firms, along with the presence of credit 
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rationing, fuels the need to use multiple credit sources. By using multiple credit sources, 
these firms are able to obtain additional funds. However, using mUltiple credit sources is 
detrimental for new firms that are not growing, as the use of multiple credit sources is 
associated with lower survival rates. Firms that are not growing and use multiple credit 
sources are shown to have lower survival rates. Thus, a boundary condition needs to be 
added to the theory that stipulates that the theory only applies to firms that are growing above 
average. In addition, the theory should be modified to only exist for the relationship between 
multiple credit sources and growth and not survival. 
The results suggest that the reason that new firms use multiple credit sources is 
important in determining if such a financing strategy is beneficial for new firms. It could be 
that using multiple credit sources when growing is planned, whereas the use of multiple 
credit sources when not growing quickly is a reactionary financing decision. Such reasoning 
is supported in a study by Howorth (2001). She finds through several case studies that a 
major difference between growing firms and stagnant firms is not the preference for a certain 
type of financing, but the planning of cash flow and the forward thinking of where the next 
source of funding is going to come from. Firms in her sample that grow are firms that 
perform cash flow planning and have an idea of where their next source of funding will come 
from. Thus, firms that are reactionary in their financing strategy are less successful than 
firms that understand their cash flow and plan for their next round of financing. 
Such reasoning is also supported by Cassar (2004). He uses an ex-ante measure of 
growth, the intention of the major decision maker to grow. He finds that firms that intend to 
grow use more bank financing but do not have higher leverage (debt/assets), long-term 
leverage, or total outside financing. This is because they use the debt efficiently and use 
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more equity. Cassar suggests new firms use banks in the first place because new firms have 
the increased incentive to establish relationships with creditors as early as possible. In 
addition, banks require better value for their money: ensuring growth-oriented borrowers 
wisely use the asset that is bought with the borrowed money. This supports banks being 
strong disciplinary forces for growth-oriented firms. Thus, growth-oriented borrowers are 
able to use the debt better by planning and managing future cash flows, whereas non-growth 
or low-growth-oriented firms do not. 
I hypothesized that the use of multiple credit sources would be positively associated 
with survival. However, the use of multiple credit sources was found to be negatively 
associated with survival for a portion of the firms. There could be several explanations for 
this which support why the use of multiple credit sources could actually hinder new firms. 
First, when new firms use non-bank credit sources that provide credit at higher costs, new 
firms may be increasing their financing costs. These higher financing costs could decrease 
the survival probability (cost argument). Second, using multiple credit sources forces 
founders to maintain more relationships with creditors, which leaves less time for them to 
focus on the primary operations of the firm (relationship management argument). Third, the 
use of multiple credit sources could result in firms being less disciplined with their cash 
(discipline argument). If a firm is less disciplined with its cash, it will not use the funds to 
effectively improve performance. Fourth, potential funders might be deterred from providing 
funds in the future because multiple credit sources create a poor signal to the market about 
the firm's future cash flow potential (signaling argument). Higher financial costs, the 
increased time needed to maintain additional relationships with creditors, emitting a negative 
signal, and being less disciplined with the additional funds could lead to a decrease in 
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survival probability of new firms. Or, banks might be correct in their assessment of new 
firms that are not able to sustain their operations. 
Obtaining credit from too many sources when using multiple credit sources could 
result in an increase in costs for new firms. Higher capital costs could result since the lenders 
are not able to capitalize on economies of scale. Economies of scale are important for 
lenders to small and new firms since it costs more to gather information from these firms. 
Possibly the firm has to tap a second creditor at a higher interest rate, after the first creditor 
says "no more". Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that additional relationships with banks 
result in higher interest rates, while providing access to additional funds. They also find the 
firms that borrow more tend to have more late payments. This suggests that firms with 
multiple bank lending relationships are in financial distress more often and thus are 
performing worse. This might suggest that lower quality firms are the firms using multiple 
credit sources (several banks). However, in performing sensitivity analyses, they find that 
the number of banking relationships does not always predict the quality of a firm. 
Using multiple credit sources requires establishing and maintaining more 
relationships than if only one credit source is used. Multiple relationships could be 
detrimental to a new firm. Relationships take time to keep in good standing. New firms 
have limited resources. An increase in the number of credit sources over time for new firms 
requires additional resources to maintain the relationships. Even though multiple credit 
sources can result in the benefit of obtaining additional funds, multiple create sources could 
also over extend the limited resources of new firms. This could lead to a less than optimal 
usage of the resources and could lead to firm failure. An optimal number of credit sources 
might exist for new firms, with the optimal level changing over time as the firm evolves. 
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Using multiple credit sources could result in less discipline by both creditors and 
borrowers. There is a common thought in the finance literature that debt improves 
managerial decision making. Jensen (1986) argues that by issuing debt, managers are 
effectively promising to payout future cash flows, which is to say that debt controls 
managerial discretion. This argument is also formalized by Harris and Raviv (1990) and 
Stulz (1990) based upon legally mandated, unalterable payments to creditors. The threat of 
default in paying the creditors and losing everything in the firm is a strong motivator for 
firms to be disciplined in its operating and financial decisions. Using multiple credit sources 
could result in firms being less disciplined in their behavior. Foglia, Laviola and Marullo 
Reedtz (1998) find that there is less discipline exercised by lenders when a borrower uses 
multiple banking relationships. Creditors are less strict and possibly piggy back off of the 
lead creditor. Along these lines, Foglia et al (1998) examine Italian firms and find that 
multiple banking relationships are significantly associated with greater fragility of the 
borrower. In addition, Ongena and Smith (2000) survey 1,079 firms across Europe and find 
firms tend to use more creditors in countries that have poor enforcement of creditor rights. It 
has been observed that when there is no controlling shareholder, there is not one single 
shareholder that has a sufficient incentive to monitor and control management (Stiglitz, 
1985). The research tends to treat the banks' function as being similar to shareholders 
(Ciocca, 1997). It is costly for creditors to monitor borrowers as they must acquire and 
assess data on the borrower's behavior. When there are multiple creditors, this information 
acts more like a public good where no one creditor has an incentive for monitoring. This is 
because the cost of monitoring is borne by just one creditor and the benefits will be enjoyed 
by all the creditors, including the inactive creditors (Diamond, 1984; Foglia et aI., 1998). 
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These findings and arguments suggest that borrowers could "get away with" being less 
disciplined with how they use their funds and overall operations when using multiple credit 
sources. With less discipline by the creditors, which results in less discipline by the new 
firms, new firms should see a higher rate of failure. 
Using numerous credit sources could send a bad signal to the market. Banks are often 
considered to be the best financial intermediary to determine if firms will be viable entities -
they do a good job in screening and assessing (Diamond, 1984, 1991 a; Fama, 1985; 
Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984). They are the primary source of debt capital for new firms 
(e.g. T. Bates, 1990; Berger & Udell, 1998) and they are often cheaper than other alternatives 
(e.g. Astebro & I. Bernhardt, 2003; Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht, 2007). Therefore, when 
banks decide not to provide credit to a firm, it could be a sign that the firm really is not a 
viable entity and should face the reality that it is unlikely to exist in its present form 
(signaling argument). Such signaling could reduce information asymmetry, as was 
demonstrated in Spence's (1973) seminal work on labor markets where a job applicant might 
be able to distinguish him- or her-self from other job applicants by engaging in behaviors 
(e.g. obtaining more education) that reduce information asymmetry between the prospective 
employer and the job applicant. Spence's signaling theory has been used to explain how firm 
debt (Ross, 1977) and issuance of dividends (Bhattacharya, 1979) signal the quality of firms. 
However, the results in this study suggest that multiple credit source usage is a negative 
signal to future financiers. The market might think the firm has to use numerous credit 
sources since they cannot obtain funds from the main credit source. Thus, the market would 
think the firm is a high risk. Firms try to build a reputation that can provide certification to 
raise funds in the future (Diamond, 1991 b). Hence, the financing decisions made today 
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affect the ability to access financing in the future. For established firms, the existence or 
renewal of a banking relationship is a positive signal to the stock market (James, 1987; 
Lummer & McConnell, 1989; Shockley & Thakor, 1997). Being resourceful might be a 
positive signal in the eyes of equity investors. However, for creditors, who are usually more 
risk averse than equity investors, being resourceful in the use of credit sources before 
establishing a history of above average growth could be a bad signal. Thus, potential 
creditors might be unwilling to contribute additional funds in the future. If the firm 
approaches numerous credit sources to obtain additional funds, then the probability of 
obtaining funds from one of them possibly decreases if it sends a negative signal to the 
market. Return on equity and return on assets have been found to be negatively associated 
with the number of banking relationships (Castelli et aI., 2010). In addition, Cole (2011) 
finds that firms with multiple banking relationships are more likely to be denied credit and he 
argues that this is the case because multiple banking relationships provide a negative signal 
to the market. However, the results in this study don't suggest that the usage of multiple 
credit sources initially provides a negative signal to the market. Multiple credit source usage 
doesn't signal if a new firm will survive or grow until the third or fourth year of operations. 
Finally, it could be that banks are in fact rational in limiting credit to new firms 
properly as those new firms they limit credit to are those more likely to eventually fail. By 
using additional credit sources, the firms just fail at a later stage than if they had not received 
additional debt from additional credit sources. This would suggest that new firms should 
cease operations when banks limit credit to them since they are not pursing a positive net 
present value project. The bank is doing these new firms a favor by not providing debt 
financing to these negative net present value entities. The bank is rationally assessing the 
215 
viability of the firm, but the founders are overly optimistic and persistent. Thus we see the 
irrational pursuit of a negative present value project by founders. 
Banks tend to be better at monitoring and handling information asymmetry issues as 
compared to non-bank institutions (Diamond, 1984). Other credit sources have not 
developed the tools in as much detail as banks and thus have less sophisticated means of 
obtaining information from, and monitoring of, new firms concerning their ability to service 
their debt. This would mean that banks are rational in their reasons for not lending additional 
money to new firms when the new firms are asking for additional funds. From my results, 
this is the case for new firms that are not growing. Therefore, with new firms that acquire 
additional funds from multiple credit sources to overcome credit limits imposed by banks, the 
survival and growth rates should be lower if banks are more rational and have better 
information than other credit sources to determine the quality of firms. It would also suggest 
that new firms that are not growing should use only one credit source for debt financing. 
In times of distress, multiple creditor relationships could be especially a disadvantage. 
New firms are often in financial distress. And as shown in the results of this study, multiple 
credit sources are not beneficial for survival of new firms when the firm is not growing above 
average and possibly doesn't represent a positive net positive value project in the eyes of the 
creditors. This is supported by other studies which have found that with established firms, 
multiple relationships are a disadvantage when borrowers are in distress because it is difficult 
to coordinate their actions (e.g. Gertner & Scharfstein, 1991 ).48 This might not be an issue 
with new firms as their assets are small compared to established firms. Hence creditors 
would be fighting over a bigger pie with established firms than with new firms. Established 
48 Brunner & Krahnen (2008) did not find any support for multiple banking relationships having difficulty in 
restructuring debt when examining firms and banks in Germany. 
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firms might try to continue if pushed into bankruptcy, whereas new firms usually cease 
operations when faced with bankruptcy. 
The argument I make in the theory development section is that credit rationing takes 
place and that one credit source (i.e. a bank) will not give a new firm all of the funds its 
needs (Type I credit rationing). Thus, the new firm looks at alternate credit sources to obtain 
additional funds that the bank would not provide. However, there could be an alternative 
explanation. It could be that the bank is willing to provide more funds to the firm and that 
the new firm does not want to rely solely on one bank or credit source. They want to 
distribute the power of the external financiers and do not want to have one funding source be 
too powerful. If the one credit source becomes too powerful then that could possibly result in 
the one source increasing the interest rate or calling in the debt. This could increase the new 
firm's costs and/or force the firm to shut down. However, if that is the case we would have 
seen an increase also in the number of banks used per firm over time. When looking at the 
raw data most firms did not increase the number of banks from which they borrowed money. 
In addition, the additional analysis performed with the dependent variable as debt indicated 
that multiple credit sources are positively associated with the amount of debt a firm has 
outstanding. If the resource dependency argument was to be supported, the use of mUltiple 
credit sources would not have been positively associated with the amount of debt 
outstanding. Rather, the amount of outstanding debt would have remained stable (or possibly 
decreased) when there was an increase in multiple credit source usage (i.e. a substitution 
effect). 
One of the major assumptions of the theory is that credit rationing exists with new 
firms. However, there are arguments in the literature which suggest that credit rationing does 
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not exists and thus a funding gap does not exist. As such, credit rationing has been contested 
by Coelho, de Meza, & Reyniers (2004), de Meza & D. C. Webb (1987, 2000), de Meza 
(2002), Cressy (1996b), and more recently by Vos et al. (2007). These studies argue that 
there is an oversupply of entrepreneurs starting firms due to unrealistic optimism by 
entrepreneurs. This unrealistic optimism by entrepreneurs may be responsible for credit 
rationing (Coelho et aI., 2004). Government subsidies and tax lending could be exacerbating 
the problem rather than lowering credit rationing issues by providing undue incentives for 
entrepreneurs to start firms (De Meza & D. C. Webb, 2000). In addition, the funding gap 
might not exist because few small and new firms are interested in growth and do not request 
external financing (Vos et aI., 2007). If credit rationing is not prevalent for new firms, my 
arguments are weakened and other arguments (other than the capital constraint argument) 
might explain why new firms use multiple credit sources and why the usage of multiple 
credit sources affect new firm performance. However, Vos et aI's (2007) work supports my 
findings that multiple credit sources doesn't help the performance of slow growing firms 
since many firms do not grow quickly and thus don't need much in the way of external 
credit. 
Strengths 
The strengths of the study include being a cohort longitudinal study, using multiple 
and sophisticated statistical methods in the form of survival analysis, growth curve analysis, 
and panel data regression, and perform various robustness checks, and additional analysis. 
First, this study is a cohort longitudinal study of new firms. There are few longitudinal 
studies on new firms in which the researchers are able to examine the change of multiple 
financial variables. This study helps address that void. Because I studied a cohort for six 
years from the time the firms started in 2004, the study does not suffer from survival bias that 
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so many existing entrepreneurship studies suffer from. The survival bias is solved by having 
firms monitored from the first year they are formed until they close or the data collection is 
finished, whichever comes first. Second, the use of multiple statistical methods to analyze 
the longitudinal data is appropriate. OLS regression and Probit regression are simple 
statistical method that past studies have used. They use difference scores for the varying 
variables. Data is lost when using difference scores. Therefore, using statistical methods 
that use the longitudinal data provides a more meaningful result. The use of these multiple 
statistical methods help paint a better picture of the relationship between multiple credit 
sources and new firm performance. Each statistical method served a purpose in explaining 
the association between multiple credit sources and new firm performance. This would not 
have been captured if static or cross-sectional analysis was used. Using growth curve 
analysis, I was able to examine the long-term changes from an overall trend point of view. 
Three, I perform multiple robustness checks to insure what is being seen in the results does· 
not account for other reasoning than what I theorized. I also performed additional analysis to 
better understand which credit sources are the most important in the multiple credit source 
equation. 
Limitations 
As with any study, this study has limitations. One limitation relates to causality. 
Although my data is longitudinal, the multiple credit source - debt model cannot 
convincingly interpret causality. One prerequisite for interpreting causality is the time order 
effect. I interpret the results of the mUltiple credit source - debt model as the number of 
credit sources affecting the debt level change. However, debt level could affect the change 
of multiple credit sources. 
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Another limitation of the study is the possibility of endogeneity. There are two main 
sources of endogeneity: 1) endogeneity due to reverse causality, and 2) endogeneity due to 
omitted variables. I theorize that a change in multiple credit sources leads to a change in new 
firm performance. But, as mentioned earlier, it is possible for a change in new firm 
performance to lead to a change in multiple credit sources. Statistical and research methods 
can be used to minimize the endogeneity issue. However, I was not able to empirically test 
the causal direction via the traditional statistical method of using an instrumental variable 
since a viable instrumental variable was not available. A controlled random experiment 
would be the best research method to use so to be able to control for causal direction as well 
as other factors that could influence the relationship of the variables. Performing a controlled 
random experiment would be cost prohibitive, especially when performing a longitudinal 
study. Endogeneity due to omitted variables is addressed by using a large number of control 
variables and by using panel data regression .. 
The closure rate in the data set is lower than past studies. With the differences, the 
generalizability of the findings might be limited. The lower closure rate seen in the data set 
could be due to firms not reporting that they have failed but rather deciding to not respond 
(i.e. a factor of attrition). The Kauffman Foundation, and the firm that administered the 
survey, Mathematica, try to determine if firms really close or were still operating and didn't 
respond. However, the survey administers might not have been able to accurately determine 
if a firm closed or was still operating and didn't respond. In this study, I removed firms from 
the data set based upon missing data and non-response. When running a t-test on the survival 
variable between the sample of firms that were removed and the firms that were kept in the 
sample for analysis, there was a statistical significance difference (see Appendix C for the 
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result of the t-test on AgeAt2009 to see the difference in means for survival between the 
firms that were removed and the firms that were kept in the sample for analysis). In addition, 
there is a large number of "living dead" firms - firms that are not showing signs of life as 
they have little to no revenue, little to no costs, and the founders spending a low number of 
hours working in the venture, however, the firms do not officially stop operations. With the 
lower closure rate compared to the full sample, the results of the study might be different 
than if the entire sample was analyzed. In addition, the closure rate in the entire data set is 
much lower than past studies (e.g. Bruderl et aI., 1992; Cressy, 2006b; Evans, 1987a, 1987b; 
Mata & Portugal, 1994; Phillips & Kirchhoff, 1989). The past studies could have included 
positive closures. The Small Business Administration (SBA), which some of the past studies 
used data from the SBA, includes any change in a business to be a closure. For example, if 
the company mergers with another entity, bought by another entity, or even when a firm 
changes the type of incorporation. When a company changes from being a limited liability 
corporation (LLC) to being an S corporation (firms would do this to be able to offer shares to 
investors), the original LLC firm is considered closed. The closure rate increases to 31 % in 
this study if positive closures are included. However, as explained in Chapter 3, including 
positive closures would contradict the negative aspect of closure that I am examining in this 
study. Finally, the closure rate might be lower because firms that failed in the first year are 
not included in the data set. The survey administrators survey firms after the first year to get 
the first year data. Firms that were initially to be included in the data set, but close before the 
end of the first year, are not included. The annual closure rate is highest in the first year of a 
firm's operations (Cressy, 2006a). 
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Certain firms were removed from the data set based upon various criteria. There 
were logical and theoretical reasons for removing observations, as explained in Chapter 3. 
However, removing observations could affect the results. I compare the means between the 
sample that was kept for the analysis and the sample of the firms that were removed to if 
there are material differences between the two samples. I find that many of the variables are 
different (see Appendix C for the results of the t-tests). This would support that the sample 
analyzed is different than the entire data set that has firms that are randomly selected from 
the general population of firms started in 2004 in the United States. Thus, the findings 
possibly are limited to the sample being analyzed and the generalizability could be limited. 
One of the strengths of the study is that it controlled for age since all of the firms 
were from the same cohort (i.e. started in 2004). However, I only looked at one period that is 
2004-2009. This period could be different than other periods because of unique economic 
issues during 2004-2009. For example, the average interest rate varied from 3.87% to 
5.03%49, which is low historically for the United States within the past 40 years. Since debt 
is tied to the interest rate, a change in interest rates could affect the financing decision made 
by founders when starting new firms. Therefore, the sample could be biased to debt since the 
interest rates were historically low. 
This is also the case with any other period-specific factors that affected the multiple 
credit source usage in the entire sample, but would not have affected a sample of firms that 
began in another year. It is difficult to then generalize that certain propositions or theories 
are valid or invalid in general. A set of economic macro factors affected the financing 
decisions of all the firms in the sample, and the actions of different lenders. In tum this 
49 Source: treasurydirect.gov. The average interest rate is based upon the total of marketable and non-marketable 
interest-bearing debt. 
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affects the multiple credit source usage at the same time that the forces I hypothesize affect 
multiple credit source usage were also at work. 
The period that the data set covers includes the recent credit crisis. It is likely that 
during the crisis period many new firms may have been forced to borrow more than usual to 
improve their survival. This is what Heshmati (2002) finds in a study of Swedish small and 
medium-sized firms in the early 1990s. I try to control for the credit crisis with a simple 
control variable. However, by including only a control variable might not completely' take 
into consideration the effect of the credit crisis. In summary of these last several limitations, 
with the data used in this study, I cannot distinguish between cohort and age effects. 
Further Research 
One of the biggest limitations of the study is the causality issue. Multiple credit 
sources could lead to a change in performance or firm performance could lead to a change I 
the mUltiple credit source usage. This issue can be addresses in further research. Obtaining 
an instrumental variable which can alleviate the econometrics issue of endogeneity will 
ensure unbiased results and better answer the research question. In addition, performing 
interviews with entrepreneurs to find out why and when they used multiple credit sources 
could be helpful in better answering the research question. 
Further research needs to examine credit sources used in personal debt to finance new 
firms. In this study, I only examine the business debt of new firms. However, new firms do 
not have a financial or operational track record, nor do we see owners and managers separate 
from one another. The personal collateral of the owner-managers is used by new firms to 
access debt. It could be that new firms use personal debt to get initial debt or to access 
additional debt since banks have limited the firm from borrowing additional amounts. 
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Multiple credit sources from personal debt should be examined to determine the role it plays 
in a new firm's capital structure and alleviating credit limits imposed by banks. 
Sequencing of financing might be important to a new firm's survival and growth. For 
example, Astebro & I. Bernhardt (2003) find that obtaining a bank loan first leads to a lower 
survival rate of new firms. In addition, Mason & Harrison (1996), Florin & Schulze (2000), 
and Van Osnabrugge & R. J. Robinson (2000) find that sequencing in funding sources is 
critical in determining subsequent investment by equity investors. Mason & Harrison (1996) 
find that angel investment increases the probability that a firm will receive venture capital 
investment, while Florin & Schulze (2000) find that venture capital improves the odds of 
obtaining funds from an initial public offering. In addition, angel investors can provide loan 
guarantees for the firms they invest in (Van Osnabrugge & R. J. Robinson, 2000), leading to 
additional access to credit. But does the use of one particular credit source lead to obtaining 
funds from another credit source in the future? Further research needs to be performed to 
answer this question. 
By focusing on only the credit side in this study, I was able to get into more detail of 
the arguments and understand the vast credit literature. However, by doing that, I left out the 
equity financing option and the total credit and equity effects. Apart from credit, equity is 
the other main external funding source. Combing both credit and equity sources (i.e. looking 
at all external financing sources new firms use) could be important. For example, Westhead 
& Cowling (1995) include in their study the number of finance sources that a firm uses 
during the start-up period when they examine growth of high technology firms in Great 
Britain. Performing correlation analyses, they find that new firms that have access to and use 
multiple sources of finance tend to grow faster. They do not discuss the results as it was not 
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the main focus of their study, and they only examine high tech firms and only focus on 
growth as a dependent variable. A study on all types of firms' use of multiple financing 
sources for both survival and growth is warranted. 
This study uses data only from the United States, which is a developed country. Thus 
the results might not be able to be generalized to undeveloped and developing countries. 
Debt and equity are the two most important forms of external financing for new firms in 
developed countries. For example, in the United States, debt and equity are equally used. 
However, this is not the case in undeveloped or developing countries as equity is less 
available in undeveloped and developing countries (e.g. Ayyagari et aI., 2010; T. Bates, 
1997; B. S. Black & Gilson, 1998). Debt is used more often as a means of financing in these 
types of countries. Thus, the use of multiple credit sources might affect performance of new 
firms differently in undeveloped and developing countries. As such, further research on the 
use of multiple credit sources in developing and undeveloped countries is needed. In 
addition, with the economic factors affecting all the firms in the sample, a second cohort of 
new firms would provide data that could assist in further answering the research question 
presented herein. 
Finally, to follow-up on being resourceful in a constraining environment, a recent 
book by Collins et al (20 10) has highlighted how even poor individuals - individuals that 
supposedly do not have a large amount of financial resources - are resourceful in their 
financing activities. The authors study individuals in South Africa and India who earn less 
than $100 per month as a household. Many of these individuals own their own business. 
The findings indicate that the individuals use a portfolio of financing vehicles to ensure they 
have enough money to live on each month. The individuals use alternative funding sources 
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even when such sources of funding are more expensive than other funding sources that are 
available to them. Contrary to rich households, Collins et al (2010) find that poor households 
instead manage their finances to ensure that funds can be obtained in the desired amounts at 
the desired point in time. The authors make the comparison to firms in their research of 
individual households by saying that wealthy households manage their finances like 
established corporations and poor households manage their finances like new firms. Poor 
households find it difficult to locate appropriate financing instruments and sources, and thus 
turn to small-scale borrowing from relatives, friends, neighbors, and employees to obtain the 
necessary funds. This is often hard work and can involve high costs that often involve not 
only economic costs, but also social and psychological costs. Therefore, resourceful 
financing has bigger implications than just with businesses, and can be further researched at 
the individual level to better understand the consequences of being resourceful in one's 
financing activities. 
Conclusion 
This study posed the research question, does resourceful financing in the form of 
multiple credit source usage affect the performance (survival and growth) of new firms. The 
results suggest that the use of multiple credit sources is positively related to growth rates for 
firms that are growing above average, thus supporting the theoretical framework proposed in 
the study. However, for firms that are growing below average, multiple credit source usage 
is found to be negatively associated with the survival rates. This suggests that founders 
should be resourceful in their financing options only when they are growing quickly and they 
should not use multiple credit sources when they are not growing or as a means to get out of 
a dire financial situation. The use of multiple credit sources cannot be used by creditors as a 
signal to determine the survival and growth of firms during their early years of operations. It 
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is only after the third or fourth year that the use of multiple credit sources provides a positive 
or negative signal to external entities such as creditors. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Correlations between Variables 
This appendix presents the correlations between the variables used in all the analyses 
in this study. There are 64 variables. Many of the correlations are statistically significant at 
the p < 0.05 level or lower. The highest correlation in absolute tenns is 0.953 (between 
number of employees in 2008 and in 2009). As can be expected, many of the highest 
correlations are between the different years of the same variable (e.g. between revenue in 
2004,2005,2006,2007,2008, and 2009). However, the correlations are not very high on 
average. The average correlation is 0.116 (using the absolute correlations). 
An interesting side note pertaining to the examination of the correlations is to 
determine if hiring employees precedes an increase in revenue (i.e. does growth in number of 
employees precede growth in revenue or vice versa). This is interesting as I use both 
employees and revenue to measure growth when examining the relationship between 
multiple credit sources and growth. The results are different for each of the two measures of 
growth. This would indicate that they are measuring different types of growth, and thus 
support the notion that growth is multi-dimensional (Parker, 2009). When examining the 
correlations between revenue and credit, there is statistical significance for all but one of the 
36 relationships in the correlations. The correlations between these 36 relationships range 
between 0.083 and 0.801. When examining the correlations between revenue and credit in 
the previous year, there is a low correlation between most of the variables (ranging 0.121 to 
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0.392), except between debt in 2008 and revenue in 2007 (0.705). This suggests that firms 
do not use an increase in revenue to retire debt, but rather need to use more debt to fund 
growth. This is important to understand since one of the dependent variables in the analyses 
in this study is revenue. Revenue is a means for firms to gain funds through operations as 
opposed to external financing. With the funds generated through revenue, a firm might not 
need as much external funding (including credit). Therefore, if the firm first grows 
operations (e.g. buys machinery, hires more employees) rather than growing revenue, then 
the examination of credit is of interest as we want to see if credit is used to support revenue 
growth or if additional revenue results in retiring debt. If revenue precedes operations 
growth, then credit is less likely to be used as the firm will be look to use retained earnings 
before tapping into debt or equity (Myers & Majluf, 1984; e.g. Myers, 1984). That is, unless 
the founders want to leverage their operations rather than use the cash generated from 
revenue to fund their future operations. 
If firms use retained earnings more, then it could weaken my theoretical argument 
presented in the theory development section. It was argued in the theory development 
section that new firms do not have a large amount of retained earnings they can draw upon, 
and thus debt becomes the first sizeable option to use based upon the pecking order theory. 
Along with a high amount of information asymmetry prevalent in new firms, this would lead 
to credit rationing. With credit rationing being prevalent, new firms are not able to obtain all 
the necessary credit from one creditor. Based upon the pecking order theory, new firms then 
exhaust all their debt options, which leads to the usage of multiple credit sources. The 
pecking order theory also says that if given the option to use retained earnings or credit, firms 
would use retained earnings. Ifnew firms select to use retained earnings as opposed to 
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credit, this would diminish the usage of multiple credit source usage. If retained earnings are 
used as a substitute to multiple credit source usage, then the decrease in multiple credit 
source usage over time would coincide with firm being able to sustain itself through internal 
funds as opposed to external funds. This would go against the argument that over time new 
firms have less info asymmetry, and thus are rationed credit less, and are able to obtain all 
the necessary credit from one credit source (e.g. one bank) as opposed to having to use 
mUltiple credit sources. 
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022 - 030 
075 •• 053 
097 ••• 035 
035 -012 
039 - 025 
042 013 
020 - 021 
-030 - 023 
-045 -018 
070' OU2 
039 - 011 
058' -.067" 
022 004 
.072 •• 059' 
.022 062 • 
030 -003 
.069 • -.056 • 
101 ... -.057· 
076" -.078 •• 
093·· -068·· 
.015 051 • 
.032 - 029 
047 -051' 
Vanable 
21 Number of Unique Credit Sources 2005 
22. Number of Unique Credit Sources 2006 
23 Number ofUmque Credit Sources 2007 
24. Number of Unique Credit Sources 2008 
25 Number ofUmque Credit Sources 2009 
26 Diversit) Index of Credit Sources 2004 
27. Dl\·ersl~ Index of Credit Sources 2005 
28 Dhersit) Index of Credit Sources 2006 
29 Dhersit) Index of Crcdlt Sources 2007 
30 DI\·ersit) Index of Credit Sources 2008 
31 Diversit) Indcx of Credit Sources 2009 
32 Amount of Outstandmg Debt 2004 
33 AmoWlt ofOutstandmg Debt 2005 
34 Amount of Outstanding Debt 2006 
35 Amount of Outstanding Debt 2007 
36 AmoWlt of Outstanding Debt 2008 
37 AmoWlt ofOutstandmg Dcbt2009 
38 Amount ofNe", Equity 2004 
39 AmoWlt ofNe", EqUlt) 2005 
40 AmoWlt ofNe", Equit) 2006 
41 AmountofNe", EqUlt) 2007 
42 AmoWlt ofNe'" EquJt) 2008 
43 Amount ofNe", EqUlt) 2009 
44. Number of Founders 
45 Education of FOWlders 
46 T ypc of Education of Main Founder 
47. Work Experience of Founders (o\·erall) 
48. Work Experience of Founders (start-up) 




53. Technolog) Le\el 
54 Product / Service 
55 Incorporation (in year I) 
56 Number of Hours Worked In Venture 2004 
57. Number of Hours Worked m Venture 2005 
58 Number of Hours Worked 10 Venture 2006 
59 Number of Hours Worked 10 Venture 2007 
60 Number of Hours Worked m Venture 2008 
61. Number of Hours Worked m Venture 2009 
62 Founder Contributed Equit) (in year I) 
63 Intellectual Propert) (an) year) 
64 Competitivc Advantage O\·cr Compelltors (any )ear) 
Statistical significance * p < 0 05, ** P < 0 0 L ... p < (l.00 I 
Variable 
31 DI\ersit) Index of Credit Sources 2009 
32. Amount of Outstanding Debt 2004 
33. Amount ofOutstandmg Debt 2005 
34 AmoWlt or Outstandmg Debt 2006 
35. Amount of Outstanding Debt 2007 
36 AmoWlt of Outstanding Debt 2008 
37 Amount of Outstanding Debt 2009 
38. Amount ofNe", EqUl~' 2004 
39. Amount ofNe\\ EqUlt)' 2005 
40 Amount of Ne", Equit), 2006 
41. Amount ofNe", Equi~· 2007 
42. Amount ofNe\\ Equit) 2008 
43 Amount ofNe", Equi~· 2009 
44. Number of Founders 
45 Education of Founders 
46. Type of Education of MalO FOWldcr 
47. Work Experience of Founders (overall) 
48. Work Expenence of Founders (start-up) 
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55 IncorporatIOn (in year I) 
56 Number of Hours Worked in Venture 2004 
57. Number of Hours Worked in Venture 2005 
58. Number of Hours Worked in Venture 2006 
59. Number of Hours Worked In Venture 2007 
60. Number of Hours Worked m Venture 2008 
61 Number of Hours Worked 10 Venture 2009 
62. Founder Contributed EqUlt) (in year I) 
63 Intellectual Property (any year) 
64 Competitive Advantagc ovcr Competitors (any year) 
Statistical significance· p < 0 05 ... P < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
239 ", 
162 .. , 274 , .. 
119'" 227'" 329'" 
082"· 152·" 276"· 310 ... 
142··· 049· .065·· 020 025 
679·" 203··· 164··· 142 ,.. .073 " 
212··· 687·" .239 .... 187 '" 078" 
166"· 242··· .685··· 239 ,.. 171 , .. 
116'" 221'" 329'" 672 .. , .272 , .. 
10&'" 174'" 276'" 315 ,.. 624 , .. 
0&1 .. 048 088 '" 069" 082 , .. 
144'" 105'" 1l8'" 089·" .103 u. 
101'" 123'" .127'" 112 ,.. 117 , .. 
090'" 103'" 134'" 092 '" 079" 
038 100 ,.. 080 .. 064' 088 " 
002 019 .055 010 017 
073 " 052 ' 078 " 014 057 ' 
048 044 080" 015 022 
019 025 066" 007 014 
031 038 056' -.007 007 
00& 018 071 " 047 019 
044 059' 068 ' 015 037 
041 049' 030 039 020 
-.034 - 017 -.021 047 058 ' 
036 076 .. 072 " 104 '" 058' 
027 059' 052 ' 069·· 092 .. oO 
04& 020 038 062' 002 
-.036 - 030 -047 -023 -.021 
-.057· - 071·· -.086·" -029 -056' 
010 060' 018 -015 - 008 
001 062' -007 040 001 
-006 -010 057' 070" 059 ' 
05&' 039 043 005 050' 
056 • 083 ••• 080 .. 084 .. , 015 
113'" 068" 097'" 075 " 039 
18S··· 159 .. •• 144·" .103'" 082 '" 
144'" 250'" 229'" 203'" 154'" 
121 ", 206'" 293 '" 247 ,.. 22& , .. 
104'" 170'" 257'" 289'" 241'" 
087'" 170'" 251'" 294 '" 309 '" 
%3· 045 011 049' 027 
010 064" 054 ' .066" 068·· 
050 • .059· 050 • 067" 049' 
(31) (32) (33) (34) (35) 
018 
094 .. , 399 , .. 
069" .742'" .582 .. , 
104'" .368'" 519'" 506'" 
097 .. , .299 .. , .468 .. , 494 .. , 449 .. , 
038 .162'" 179'" 219'" 219'" 
020 113'" 222'" 118'" 125'" 
018 016 .206'" 058' 098 , .. 
-.002 .007 154 .. , 030 088'" 
.022 015 120'" 049 074" 
006 005 141 .. , 013 062 ' 
016 031 .136 ,.. 081" 054 
.037 127'" 122 .. , 123 .. , 102 .. , 
027 001 - 024 -.005 - 005 
086 .. , 044 .052 ' 070 .. 073 .. 
.048 050' 054' 061 ' 035 
052 ' 059 ' 078 .. 053 ' 066 ' 
-.019 010 006 022 014 
-041 -050' -069" -054' -058' 
014 - 003 -.012 007 - 010 
025 - 009 -.027 -012 - 010 
009 -036 -003 015 -001 
051· 064'" 079·· 101 ... • 075" 
061· 023 047 055· 039 
085'" 012 023 013 019 
131 ... • 031 029 059· 011 
215 ,.. 077" 034 107'" 028 
266 .. , 024 068 .. 057 ' 060 • 
287··· 006 021 055· 018 
325 .. , 018 047 065' 026 
023 051 ' 029 035 .049 
068" 029 -001 012 017 




125 , .. 
131'" 
104 '" 
089 , .. 
172'" 
114 , .. 

































236 .. , 
194 , .. 
159 '" 
.093 , .. 
154··· 
119 , .. 





















142 .. , 
199 , .. 
176 .. , 
.141 .. , 
117 .. , 










065 • .069· 
079" 030 
077" 081" 






-003 - 008 











































252 .. , 
173 '" 






827 .. , 
.831 .. , 
.771 .. , 
373 .. , 
602 .. , 










083 .. , 













.088 .. , 
124 .. , 
.120 .. , 





















102 .. , 
.148 , .. 
240 .. , 
. 267 , .. 
231 , .. 
221 .. , 
000 
035 
. 064 .. 
(39) 
830 .. , 
805 .. , 
407 .. , 
618 .. , 



















092 .. , 
.0]] 
(30) 
439 .. , 
054· 
.087 , .. 
090 .. , 





















.109 , .. 
128 .. , 
207 .. , 
251 ' .. 
287 .. , 





811 .. , 
664 .. , 
681 .. , 



















091 .. , 
026 
Vanable (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) 
41 Amount ofNc", Equit) 2007 
42 Amount ofNc", Equity 200& 474 ... 
43 Amount ofNe", Equity 2009 . 804 ••• 564 ••• 
44. Number of Founders 118 ... 109 ... 107 ... 
45. Education of Foundcrs 065· . 043 .079 •• -.059· 
46 Type of Education of Main Founder - 009 - 006 008 028 253··· 
47 Work Experience of Founders (overall) 024 002 021 -.089 ... 058 • - 003 
48. Work Experience of Foundcrs (start-up) 042 .024 . 010 213 ••• 057 • 105 ••• 033 
49 Agc of Founders 008 - 047 - 009 - 073 •• 165··· 047 .388 ••• 142 ••• 
50 Gender - 044 - 041 - 032 . 034 031 -.025 -.166 ••• - 028 031 
51. Racc 013 . 007 027 006 .094 ••• 062 • - 086 ••• 022 - 149 ••• 034 
52 Citizenship - 013 -.016 -.016 .015 128 ••• 023 -.083 ••• 068 •• 024 -.019 
53. Technolo~ Le\el 048 070 • .052 014 182 ••• 057· .208 ••• 025 063 • -.086 '" 
54 Product I Scn Ice 067 • . 036 069 • 078 •• -.092 ••• -.025 - 083'" 098 ... - 013 007 
55 Incorporation (in year I) 064 • 063 • 073 •• 181 ••• 037 030 .020 107 ••• - 048 - 005 
56 Number of Hours Worked In Venture 2004 012 -.002 -.002 -.100 ••• - 069" 052· .074 .. 049 • - 074" - 070" 
57. Number of Hours Workcd in Venture 2005 -.025 -.009 -.013 -028 -.070 •• 086 ••• 083 ••• 028 - 085 ••• -.121 '" 
58. Number of Hours Worked In Venture 2006 028 029 033 008 - 059· 097 ••• 080 •• 036 - 057' -.089 ••• 
59 Number of Hours Worked In Venture 2007 044 036 045 030 - 025 128 ••• 096 ••• 029 -.081 •• -.0&8··· 
60. Number of Hours Worl..cd in Vcnture 200& -.005 012 .016 022 -.O() I III'" 105 ••• .001 -.056 • -.082 '" 
61 Number of Hours Worked In Venture 2009 056 • 038 033 028 005 089 ••• 109 ... 040 - 057' -082 •• 
62 Founder Contributed Equity (in ) ear I) -.002 033 010 063 • 076 •• 062 • 036 045 .070 •• -()46 
63 Intellcctual Propc~ (any year) 097 •• , 101 ••• 104 ••• 121 ••• 143 ••• 037 -.005 .072 •• -.018 -.013 
64 Competitive Ad\"antage O\er Compelltors (an) )ear) 023 028 028 013 -.006 032 025 029 -.046 019 
Statistical slg11lficance. " p < 0 05 .... P < 0.01: *** p < 0.001 
Variable (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56} (57) (58) (59) (60) 
51 Race 
52 CILlZ(mship 256 ... 
53. Technolo~ Lc\'cl 027 ()47 
54 Product I Scn ice -.027 - 012 - 020 
55 Incorporation (m year 1) 036 053 • 059 • 019 
56 Number of Hours Worked in Venture 2004 074 •• - 003 - 004 063 • 071 " 
57. Number of Hours Worked in Venture 2005 032 -015 008 066 •• 080 •• 604 ••• 
58 Number of Hours Worked in Venture 2006 031 - 017 012 025 .092 ••• 484 ••• .632··· 
59. Number of Hours Worked in Venture 2007 - 004 - 027 042 .041 069 •• 422 ••• .555 ••• 709 ••• 
60 Number of Hours Worked In Venture 2008 -.007 - 002 059· .000 034 362 ••• .498 ••• 647 ••• .770 ••• 
61. Number of Hours Worked m Vcnture 2009 012 002 045 .()47 038 348 ••• 435 ••• 578 ••• 693 ••• 804 ••• 
62. Founder Contributed Equity (in ) car I) -.024 024 020 040 063· 088 ••• 093 ••• .036 024 039 
63. Intellectual Propc~ (any)car) ()44 014 102 ••• 193 ••• 084 ••• 063 • .090 ••• .079 •• 090 ••• 078 •• 
64 Compctiti\ e Advantage over Compelltors (an) ycar) 024 004 090 ••• 131 ••• 030 168 ••• .161 ••• 181 ••• 188 ••• 158 ••• 
Statistical significance: * p < 0.05 .... P < 0 01."''' P < 0.001 
Vanablc (61) (62) (63) (64) 
61 Number of Hours Worked In Venture 2009 
62. Founder Contributcd Equi~ (in year I) .018 
63. Intcllectual Property (any ycar) 112 ... 020 
64. Compcliti\C Ad\antagc ovcr Competitors (any year) 156 ••• 014 163 ••• 
Statistical significance: '" p < O.c)5~'" p < 0 OL *** P < 0 001 
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Appendix B: t-Tests ofthe Multiple Credit Source Variables between Quadrants 
An additional analysis I perfonn is in the fonn of t-tests to compare the means of the 
multiple credit source variables for each of the four quadrants. Comparing the means 
between the four quadrants (as part of the 2x2 framework that is explained in the main 
portion of the document) for each year will show if there are different levels of multiple 
credit source usage between finns based upon survival and growth rates. Figure 24, Figure 
25, and Figure 26 show the means for each of the quadrants for each of the three multiple 
credit source variables for six years, with the growth grouping parameter based on revenue. 
Presenting these figures in graphical fonnat provides a better understanding about how 
multiple credit source usage changes for new finns over time based upon their survival and 
growth classification. The results of the t-tests are reported in Table 51. 
As a reminder, the four quadrants are based upon survival and growth 2x2 box 
framework, surviving / non-surviving and medium-to-high growth / low-to-medium growth 
finns50• Medium-to-high growth, surviving finns (quadrant 4) are defined as finns that are 
still operating independently after six years and are above the mean of the growth parameter 
(revenue, employees) for at least two years or in year six. Low-to-medium growth, surviving 
finns (quadrant 3) are detennined to be below the mean of the growth parameter (revenue, 
employees). Low-to-med growth, non-surviving finns (quadrant 2) are defined as finns in 
the data set that close before or in year six and are not above the mean for the growth 
parameters (revenue, employees) for less than two years. Medium-to-high growth, non-
surviving finns (quadrant 1) are defined as finns that close before or in year six in the data 
so The categorization of growth is based upon the mean of the revenue and number of employee variables for 
the firms in the dataset. Using the mean to split high and low growth firms is similar to how a competitive 
advantage is defined by Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, and Schaefer (2009). They define a firm having a 
competitive advantage if the firm earns a higher rate of economic profit than the average rate of economic profit 
of other firms competing in the same market. 
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set and are above the mean for the growth parameters (revenue, employees) for less than two 
years. The quadrants divided by growth of revenue are marked with an "a" (e.g. 4a, 3a, 2a, 
and la). The quadrants divided by employee growth are marked with a "b" (e.g. 4b, 3b, 2b, 
and I b). Figure 23 from Chapter 3 illustrates the number of firms in each quadrant. 
For the number of total credit sources, initially, the trends of the medium-to-high 
growth firms (comparing quadrants 4a and la) are similar, although the first year levels are 
statistically different between the two groups of firms. Then after year three (after 2006), 
both groups of firms decrease their number of total credit sources, although the medium-to-
high growth firms that close (don't survive) decrease their number of total credit sources 
quicker (even though their means are not statistically different). 
The changes in the multiple credit sources over time for firms in quadrant 4a and I a 
firms are similar in terms of the number of unique credit source usage, but with less 
pronunciation in the changes over time. This is confirmed in the statistical significance level 
of the t-tests between quadrants 4a and la, as the means between these two groups of firms 
are not statistically different for most of the years of multiple credit source variables. The 
multiple credit source usage in the first year is not different between quadrants 4a and 2a 
firms. Thus, the multiple credit source variables do not distinguish themselves between firms 
that grow or firms that survive in each year of operation. The difference in the means for 
quadrants 4a and 3a is statistically significant for all three mUltiple credit source variables for 
every year. Surviving firms that grow exhibit higher means for number of total credit 
sources, and number of unique credit sources, and the diversity index of credit sources for all 
six years. 
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When comparing non-surviving firms based upon growth (comparing quadrants 2a 
and la), many of the means of the mUltiple credit source variables are statistically different 
and negative, as shown in Table 51. The medium-to-high growth firms that don ' t survive 
have a higher usage of total credit sources, unique credit sources, and diversity of credit 
sources. 
When comparing low-to-medium growth firms based upon survival (quadrant 3a and 
2a), there is not a statistical difference between the means of the mUltiple credit source 
variables except for the first year (2004). In the first year, low-to-medium growth firms that 
don ' t survive exhibit a higher level of multiple credit source usage. 
Quadrant 2a firms , low-to-medium growth firms that do not survive, exhibit a 
declining trend in multiple credit sources usage as all three multiple credit source variables 
show a negative trend in their means over time. 
Quadrant 3a firms , low-to-medium growtn firms that survive, exhibit a constant level 
of multiple credit source usage over time. In other words, there is not much change over 
time in the multiple credit source usage for firms that don ' t grow, but survive. 
Figure 24: Comparison of the Means for the Number of Total Credit Sources between 
Quadrants, Grouping based upon Revenue 
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--Quad4a 
•••••• Quad 3a 
--- Quad 2a 
- - Quad 1a 
Figure 25: Comparison of the Means for the Number of Unique Credit Sources between 
Quadrants, Grouping based upon Revenue 
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Figure 26: Comparison of the Means for the Diversity Index of Credit Sources between 
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--Quad4a 
•••••• Quad 3a 
--- Quad 2a 
- - Quad 1a 
Table 51: t-Test Results between the Quadrants, Grouping based on Revenue 
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112 -053 958 
189 3.434 001 
217 4.675 <0001 
224 4.111 <0001 
430 2.945 003 
N/A 
059 -I 194 233 
066 3 264 001 
067 5167 <0.001 
081 4912 <0001 
112 4.471 <0001 
N/A 
021 -.245 806 
023 3. 100 002 
.025 3.328 001 
.028 4119 <0001 
038 3.605 <0001 
N/A 
Mean Std Error Sig 
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Mean Std. Error Slg 
















078 -4.180 <0001 
094 -1469 142 
103 - 747 455 
170 1.225 221 
195 1.214 225 
N/A 
044 -4.544 <0001 
046 -1460 144 
049 - 773 .440 
063 I 043 .297 
085 1.359 174 
.016 -3371 
.0]7 -1815 










Mean Std Error Sig. 
















188 -4.959 <0001 
224 -4.919 <0001 
287 -5 186 <0001 
417 -1009 313 
511 -1.572 116 
N/A 
107 -3.925 <0.001 
110 -3.828 <0.001 
131 -2.423 016 
151 -.829 407 
221 -1391 .165 
N/A 
038 -2 059 040 
040 -3.445 001 
049 -4.118 <0001 
055 -1.575 116 
086 -1.373 170 
N/A 
Mean Std. Error SIS 
(Hailed) Difference Difference 
-.607 246 -2.465 014 
-.%6 323 -2994 .003 
-IAIO 388 -3.637 <0001 
-.628 326 -1926 056 
-1039 369 -2.819 .006 
N/A 
-.221 215 -1029 077 
-.356 120 -2 958 003 
- 279 135 -2072 039 
-191 160 -1195 234 
-A23 191 -2216 030 
N/A 
- 026 043 - 594 553 
- 108 046 -2361 019 
- 171 053 -3 205 002 
- 123 057 -2171 031 
- 148 084 -1771 081 
N/A 
The previous results used revenue as the grouping variable for the growth dimension. 
The number of employees is the other grouping variable used for the growth dimension. 
Figure 27, Figure 28, and Figure 29 show the means for each of the quadrants for each of the 
three multiple credit source variables when using number of employees as the grouping 
variable for the growth dimension. The results of the t-tests are reported in Table 52. 
The trends and differences in means statistically are similar to the t-tests where the 
grouping variable for the growth dimension was revenue. The noticeable difference is in the 
change between 2007 and 2008 for quadrants 2b and 2a, which are firms that don ' t survive 
and have a low-to-medium growth rate. When using revenue as the grouping variable, the 
multiple credit source variables increased from 2007 to 2008; whereas, when using number 
of employees as the grouping variable, the multiple credit source variables continue to 
decrease from 2007 to 2008 as they did from 2006 to 2007. 
Figure 27: Comparison of Means between Quadrants, Number of Total Credit Sources, 
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--Quad4b 
•••••• Quad 3b 
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Figure 28: Comparison of Means between Quadrants, Number of Unique Credit 
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Figure 29: Comparison of Means between Quadrants, Number of Unique Credit 
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--Quad4b 
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--- Quad 2b 
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Table 52: t-Test Results between the Quadrants, Grouping based on Number of 
Employees 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Mean Std Error Sig 



















072 3.483 001 
105 5.640 <0001 
114 6.181 <0001 
.123 5.405 <0.001 
127 5.558 <0.001 
103 4.180 <0.001 
041 3.165 002 
044 5417 <0.001 
043 6.658 <0001 
043 6843 <0001 
042 5.772 <0.001 
040 4968 <0.001 
015 4704 <0.001 
.015 6600 <0001 
016 6916 <0.001 
015 6159 <0001 
016 6421 <0001 
015 6352 <0001 
Mean Std. Error Sig 
















102 003 997 
174 2.920 004 
018 42.713 <0001 
246 3 340 001 
391 2.208 028 
N/A 
057 -.706 481 
162 .080 013 
067 4.013 <0001 
083 4141 <0001 
118 2875 004 
N/A 
020 1414 158 
022 3328 001 
024 3434 001 
028 4228 <0.001 
041 2766 006 
N/A 
Mean Std. Error Sig 
























135 1 607 
646 385 
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Mean Std. Error Sig 
(2-tailed) Difference Difference 
-.792 129 -6.128 <0.001 
-750 160 -4.690 <0 001 
-1.096 235 -4.654 <0.001 
-.222 277 -.804 422 
-.035 388 -.089 .929 
N/A 
-A13 070 -5.916 <0.001 
-.253 072 -3.507 <0.001 
- 254 089 -2.855 004 
- 080 108 -.745 457 
004 151 026 979 
N/A 
-.141 025 -5684 <0.001 
-.127 .027 -4740 <0001 
-.172 033 -5 191 <0.001 
- 055 040 -1378 168 
-032 058 - 549 .583 
N/A 
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070 -5.916 <0.001 
072 -3.507 <0.001 
089 -2 855 004 
108 -745 A57 
151 026 979 
N/A 
025 -5.684 <0.001 
027 -4740 <0001 
033 -5191 <0001 
040 -I 378 168 
058 - 549 583 
N/A 
Appendix C: Comparing Firms in Sample with Firms removed from Sample 
Firms were removed from the longitudinal population (3,297 firms in the longitudinal 
population) when building the sample for which the main analysis was run. The reason why 
firms were removed from the starting longitudinal population was because: 1) the firm was 
not started as a new independent business, 2) the firm had zero capital in year one, 3) the firm 
had no founding team members, 4) the credit source variables were missing data, 5) the firm 
didn't use credit within six years, 6) the firm was sold or merged, or 7) the firm was an 
outlier or had incorrect data. The removal of firms for these reasons resulted in a 1,631 firms 
being removed, which represents about half of the longitudinal population. Removing half of 
the initial sample brings into question the results on the main analysis as the firms that were 
removed could be different from the firms that were left in the sample. If the firms that were 
removed are different from the 1,634 firms that were kept in the sample, then further analysis 
needs to be performed to determine if the differences affect the main results and thus the 
findings of this study. 
To determine the difference between the two sets of firms, t-tests are performed on 
each of the variables in the analysis. The results of the t-tests are presented in Table 53. 
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Table 53: t-Tests between Firms in Sample and Firms Removed from Sample 
Age at 2009 2 
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.841 .071 II 846 <OOO( 
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604 070 8652 <0001 
.428 022 19465 <OOO( 
47( 022 21 110 <0001 
479 021 23.159 <0001 
456 .021 22151 <0001 
.356 .019 18.497 <OOO( 
338 018 (8443 <0001 
106 008 (3736 <0001 
126 .008 16.370 <0001 
.136 008 18101 <OOO( 
122 007 (6.893 <0001 
«6 007 16.311 <0001 
(05 007 15.348 <0001 
075 024 3 1(2 002 
222 072 3 094 002 
065 013 5.129 <0.001 
I 185 362 3275 001 
025 017 1412 (58 
463373 (0111.344 .046 963 
158(2787 9581.345 1.650 
-12696088 31999.660 -397 
099 
692 
35765.936 21453.805 1667 096 
3867.837 15407.508 .251 802 
14424.468 11383.970 1267 205 
-62478.450 62668.974 -.997 319 
594175914111.751 421 .674 
7807.242 19218.109 406 685 
24443.288 15945 883 (533 .125 
(2645030 12185.378 1.038 300 
37061.449 19182.650 1932 053 
296 .410 723 470 
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I The "Finns removed from Sample" does not Include observatIOns that are outliers and have incorrect data entry Issues Thus. the total number affirms in the t-test (3,265 
= 1.634 + 1.631) is less than the tota1 numbcroffinns aVailable III the longltudmal popUlation (3297) 
2 "Age at 2009" IS a prox~ for SUl"\tval that IS used III the additIOnal analysIs (OLS regressIon). The vanable represents ho\\ old the finn is in 2009 If the firm IS stlillrving 
when the data collection stops In 2009. the age is 7 If the firm closed in 2009 or beforc. the agc of the firm at \\hieh It closed is the age of the firm In 2009 
267 
The age of the firm at 2009 (a proxy for survival) is statistically significant between 
the two groups. The firms that were removed had a lower age on average, which means that 
more of firms which were removed from the sample closed than the firms that were kept in 
the sample. With less closures in the sample, this probably means there is less statistical 
significance in the survival analysis, thus representing a conservative result in the main 
analysis (i.e. possibly a bias towards a Type II error, as opposed to a bias towards a Type I 
error). For the growth variables, the difference in revenue and number of employees are not 
statistically significant for most of the years. Only revenue is statistically different in the first 
year between the two sets of firms, and only years 2007-2009 are statistically different for 
number of employees. The three years of statistical differences with the number of 
employees might affect the number of employee analyses, as the firms that were removed 
had a lower number of employees on average and a lower standard deviation on average. 
Again, this would suggest the results are conservative regarding the analyses when using the 
number of employees. 
For the multiple credit source variables, all three of the variables show a large 
statistical difference in the means between the two groups. This is disturbing because these 
are the main variables that are used in this study. This is unusual, since the outstanding debt 
and new equity are not statistically different between the two sets of firms and one would 
expect there to be a correlation between these two figures and the multiple credit source 
variables. This could be the case because a majority of the firms that were removed from the 
sample didn't use credit in any of the six years (756 firms). In examining the subset of firms 
that were removed not because they didn't use credit during the six years and not because 
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they didn't answer the multiple credit source questions (139 firms), there is less of a 
difference in these variables. 
For the control variables, there are several variables that are statistically different 
between the two sets of firms. Gender, race, incorporation, hours worked in the venture, 
intellectual property, and competitive advantage are statistically different between the 
groups. Firms that were removed had a higher percentage of female and non-white founders 
on their team. This would suggest that the results are conservative with regards to these two 
factors being statistically significant in the analyses. In other words, the analyses might not 
pick up the nuances associated with female and non-white founders. Firms that were 
removed had a lower rate of incorporation, the founders worked less hours in the venture, 
had less intellectual property, and the founders felt they had less of a competitive advantage. 
The higher incorporation rate in the sample used in the main analyses means more formal 
firms are in the analysis. The variance of the firms in the sample is still high for the 
incorporation rate, which provides for a richer analysis. Firms that incorporate more are 
going to be able to use more formal credit sources than firms that are not incorporated, but 
this should not bias the results. To ensure this is the case, I ran a simple regression where I 
regress the multiple credit source variables on the incorporation variable and compare the 
results between the two sets of firms. The results are similar with incorporation being 
statistically significant for both and have similar coefficients. 
For hours worked in the venture, the lower number of hours indicates the founders 
were running the firm as a second job possibly and not fully committed to making the new 
firm a success. I want to analyze firms that are creditable and not firms which are second 
jobs for individuals. Thus, it is good that these firms were removed from the analyses. 
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The intellectual property and competitive advantage variables are proxies for the 
quality of the business idea. With these two variables being lower for the firms that were 
removed from the sample, it would suggest that firms with poorer quality business ideas are 
not being included in the analyses. Firms with poorer business ideas would tend to not be 
able to obtain credit, at least from formal creditors. That would make sense since a majority 
of the firms that were removed from the sample didn't use credit in any of the six years. 
Age of owners, citizenship, technology level, product / service, and owner 
contributed equity at startup are not statistically different between the groups. Even with the 
statistical differences in some of the control variables, the results should not be discounted. 
These variables are control variables in the analyses and thus are not the main focus of the 
study. However, with the statistical differences between the two groups of firms, the 
differences need to be taken into account when understanding the findings of the study. 
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